Iisraeli-Hezbollahi sõjast

[kaur3]

Short '06 Lebanon War Stokes Pentagon Debate.

Leaders Divided on Whether to Focus On Conventional or Irregular Combat

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... id=topnews

Natuke statistikat palestiinlaste raketinduse kohta.

http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=902175

[kaur3]

Juutide geograafilisest haardest.

How Israel Foiled an Arms Convoy Bound for Hamas.
Monday, Mar. 30, 2009

Israeli fighter-bombers, backed by unmanned drones, were responsible for a mid-January attack on a 23-truck convoy in the Sudanese desert carrying arms to Hamas militants, two highly placed Israeli security sources revealed to TIME. The attack was a warning to Iran and other adversaries, showing Israel's intelligence capability and its willingness to mount operations far beyond its borders in order to defend itself from gathering threats.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ ... 52,00.html

[kaur3]

A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD

Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Farquhar
General Editor

May, 2009

Chapter 2. Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics .............. 45
Introduction ...................................................................... 45
Application of the PMESII+PT Variables ............................ 46
Hamas and Hezbollah ....................................................... 46
Politi cal .............................................................................. 48
Military .............................................................................. 50
Economic ........................................................................... 53
Social ................................................................................. 55
Infrastructure .................................................................... 56
Information ....................................................................... 57
Physical Environment ........................................................ 58
Time .................................................................................. 60
The 2006 Second Lebanon War ........................................ 60
Hezbollah TTPs .................................................................. 61
2008-2009 Hamas/Israeli Conflict ..................................... 67
Hamas TTPs ....................................................................... 68

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/d ... rquhar.pdf

[kaur3]

Israeli Lessons on Hybrid War

By Greg Grant Friday, June 5th, 2009

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/06/05/israe ... ybrid-war/

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1 lugu.

http://kingsofwar.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/op26.pdf

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Paistab, et araablaste raketinduse tehnilised lahendused ei olnud mitte midagi uut päikese all.

Sakslaste tehnika 1930. aastate keskpaigast.



Rumeenia tehnika.



Jugoslaavlaste tehnika. Vt keskmist pilti.

img154.jpg (1.3 MB)

Sakslaste tehnikat veel.

http://talks.guns.ru/forummessage/42/000073.html

II MS ajal aretati ka NSV Liidus välja raketikompleks РСЗО М-8-8, mille kontseptsiooni kaitsmisel kirjutas insener, et tänu oma väikesele kaalule on see hästi kasutatav mägistes tingimustes, kus tavalise suurtükiväe tegevus on raskendatud.



Vt lk. 2.

http://rapidshare.com/files/304370584/MRLM88.pdf.html

[kaur3]

Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_pap ... _OP285.pdf

[kaur3]

Ühe India kindrali ülevaade.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2007/04

[kaur3]

Hizbullah's alleged Scuds raise storm clouds over Lebanon

http://www.iiss.org/publications/strate ... r-lebanon/

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If War Comes: Israel vs. Hizballah and Its Allies
Jeffrey White
September 2010

The next war on Israel's northern border will bear little resemblance to the 2006 confrontation between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hizballah in Lebanon. This conflict is likely to be broader and much more intense, certainly Israel's most serious since 1973, with the potential to transform the wider region both militarily and politically.

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubP ... cus106.pdf

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Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah
Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG835.html

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The Hezbollah Myth and Asymmetric Warfare

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journa ... -elkus.pdf

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Jutt käib siis pikamaa Spike NLOS'ist ehk Tamuzist.

The Tamuz was used extensively during the Second Lebanon War in 2006 when Meitar fired 600 missiles at Hezbollah targets. Nevertheless, the results were not satisfactory and a new operational doctrine was written for how to operate the missile in an urban terrain and against which targets. The missile was again used against Hamas targets during Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in January 2009 with greater success.

http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2011/0 ... tamuz.html

Mis oleks saanud 2008. aasta augustisõjas, kui grusiinid oleks juba eskalatsioonifaasis miinipildujate duelli asemel tulistanud osseetide positsioone juutide selle raketiga ning mitte sattunud olukorda, kus lõpuks tulistasid Gradid linna mõlemalt poolt? See oleks ikka tore snaiping olnud, kus juutide UAV'd oleks taevas olnud ning rakettidele teed näidanud. ... võib-olla neile lihtsalt ei müüdud neid

Juudid ise ei ole tagasihoidlikud.

The Israeli Army Artillery Corps has said it introduced major improvements to the advanced Tammuz missile, describing the new version as “a strategic surprise and deterrence force against the enemy in any coming war.”

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/1184 ... ny-new-war

[kaur3]

An interesting debate was held recently at the Latrun International Land Warfare conference, as the commander of the IDF Northern Command, Major general Gershon Hacohen detailed the evolution of Arab armies and irregular forces into semi-irregular formations, challenging the Israeli domination of the battlefield with hybrid warfare concepts.

http://defense-update.com/20110913_evol ... ation.html

How can a conventional, technologically superior army like the IDF can degrade the fighting capability of such ‘hybrid’ forces and how do one assess the wear, remaining combat capability and operational potential of such irregular forces? In the linear war, where ‘battalions’ ‘brigades’ and ‘divisions’ form the main fighting power, clearly defined numerical data is available, sensing groups of fighting vehicles, and translating the information into clearly defined targets which are ‘dead’ or ‘live’. Under such conditions, having destroyed military formations could be regarded as final, or at least temporary, until enemy reinforcements could arrive to replace the losses, which would take time and further opportunities for targeting. However such clear definition cannot be attributed to a small commando unit, irregular guerrilla element or remotely controlled rocket site being activated at will.

http://defense-update.com/20110914_figh ... field.html

[kaur3]

Hard Fighting
Israel in Lebanon and Gaza
by David E. Johnson

When Israel fought Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, it discovered that it was ill prepared for the challenges posed by its "hybrid" adversary. Hybrid adversaries employ effective standoff weapons (e.g., antitank guided missiles, man-portable air-defense systems, mortars, rockets, unmanned aerial systems). Thus, defeating such opponents requires different tactical and operational concepts than those used to fight the irregular adversaries — who do not have standoff weapons — that the Israelis had become accustomed to confronting. In the war's aftermath, the Israeli military undertook significant reforms whose effectiveness was demonstrated in 2008–2009 during Operation Cast Lead, when Israel fought Hamas in Gaza.

Like Israel in 2006, the United States today is likely ill prepared for hybrid warfare after years of focusing on irregular adversaries. To identify lessons that the U.S. military might learn from the Israeli experience in Lebanon, the author examines the following: the state of the Israeli military before the Second Lebanon War, the challenges that Hezbollah's hybrid warfare posed, the lessons the Israelis learned from the 2006 war, the reforms the Israeli military undertook to address its deficiencies, and how Israel fared during Operation Cast Lead three years later.

The author finds that, in facing hybrid opponents, joint combined-arms fire and maneuver are necessary; precision, stand-off fires are critical (but not sufficient); and responsive and adequate air, artillery, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support are vital. Finally, heavy forces — based on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles — are key to fighting sophisticated hybrid opponents because they reduce operational risk and minimize friendly casualties.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1085.html