www.militaar.net
http://www.militaar.net/phpBB2/

M Palokangas "Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä – sissisodankäynnin ..."
http://www.militaar.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?f=47&t=28793
2. leht 2-st

Autor:  kaur3 [ 30 Okt, 2017 21:57 ]
Teema pealkiri:  Re: M Palokangas "Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä – sissisodankäynnin .

Paywalli taga on peidus Norra sõjaajaloolase väga huvitav artikkel Norra valmistumisest NSVL võimaliku okupatsiooni vastu vahetult peale II MS-i. Juttu on Norra sõjaväeluure plaanidest NATO liikmena Soomes ja Rootsis. Olavi Riste tõdeb, et ei ole teada, kas allpool olevad mõtted ka ellu viidi.

M. Palokangas ei ole millegi pärast maininud Ristet kordagi. Huvitav oleks teada põhjust. Kui keegi Palokangast tunneb, siis võiks küsida.

Tsiteeri:
Olav Riste (2007)

With an eye to history: The origins and development
of ‘Stay-Behind’ in Norway


Journal of Strategic Studies, 30:6


Tsiteeri:
Military logic and basic principles of tactics, however, suggested that ‘retardation’ operations directed against a Soviet offensive with Norway as the target should be launched at the earliest possible stage, involving operations also on Swedish territory. This first planning document33 hence envisioned five groups established within the triangle southern Sweden–Stockholm–Oslo. Five other groups would take care of ‘retardation’ within the triangle Oslo–Rogaland– Sørlandet. Equally important as a deployment area for operations against Norway was northern Finland. In an extensive dossier from November 1953 in the archives of the Intelligence Staff, an assessment is made concerning whether and how potential ‘retardation’ opera- tions, as well as intelligence and SB activities, could be carried out on northern Finnish territory, preferably through a Finnish–Norwegian cooperative effort.34
The premise seems to have been that larger-scale operations in Finland, as for example the destruction of border road bridges at Ivalo and Inari, would have to be carried out by Finnish soldiers organized into two groups with a total of 56 men, and with cover detachments of about 100 men for each group. Norway could make a contribution here with plans and support in the preparation phase, performed by Finnmark Army Command. However, as far as stay-behind was concerned, the Norwegian intelligence service could play a more active role. The proposal aimed at establishing three observation posts for intelligence-collection purposes after the model of the ‘Lindus’ ‘Group 27’ in the areas of Salla–Rovaniemi (north Finland) and Ivalo– Rajajoseppi (north Finland). The agents would be recruited locally, and the posts established immediately before or after the outbreak of war. SB groups on the ROC model, for sabotage operations, would be needed only ‘when the country is firmly in enemy hands, and after the enemy is well on his way in repairing the damage done by the Army and the Retardation units’. The idea here was to insert Norwegian or Finnish units from the outside in the manner of ‘hit and run raids’. But a certain amount of explosives, weapons and food had to be deployed in depots already in peacetime.
As early as 1953, plans were thus being laid for a special organization for ‘retardation’ operations in Finland, based on a Norwegian–Finnish cooperative effort in which the Norwegian SB organization was to provide support in the planning and preparation, while the ‘foot soldiers’ were to consist of Finnish troops. The available material, however, provides no precise indications of the degree to which these plans were realized.
Several years later, in 1961, the CPC committee in NATO presented a similar project, this time again as an element in SACEUR’s Emergency Defence Plan. The aim was to identify targets for secret intelligence and sabotage operations in the eventuality of Soviet forces invading Finland, or Finland becoming a base area for war operations against NATO in Europe. The intelligence measures were to be carried out as soon as the defence plan had been put into effect, while the action plans were to be put on hold until special orders were received. In the event of a communications failure, the actions could still be carried out immediately after Soviet forces had invaded Finland. As far as possible, all preparations were to be made in peacetime. The principal objective for all the operations would be to localize and destroy Soviet nuclear weapon and air defence installations. Moreover, Finnish resistance groups were to be organized for actions against enemy forces and their supply lines.35
These plans were based on a scenario in which the war would break out without or with only a brief warning, and in which nuclear weapons would be used already in the initial stage. The objective of the Soviet Union was assumed to be to establish a forward set-up for early warning, fan out its air force and rocket units, construct mobile short- range missile launch pads directed at targets in northern Europe, and secure transit areas for ground forces for the invasion of northern Norway. The planners anticipated that Finland, with its small military resources, would be unable to maintain organized resistance over a protracted period. Finland would therefore declare neutrality, and attempt to avoid war by acceding to some Soviet demands. But the Finns possessed a strong will to resist, and would be able to carry out an extended guerrilla war against the interloper, with Western support.
The planning document was careful to give an assurance that the choice of objectives and means for such a scheme would be the prerogative of the national secret services. In the Intelligence Staff, a short outline was drawn up to show how Norway could contribute to such a scheme, especially with a view to the organization and build-up of a reporting and sabotage network on Finnish territory. The first thing that had to be done was to get hold of contact persons within the Finnish armed forces and political institutions, and thereafter to find five to ten Finnish or Norwegian radio operators, and provide the necessary equipment. A separate staff would have to be set up for the project, with a permanent nucleus consisting of two men, and otherwise with the participation of SB instructors.36 Available sources give no indication as to whether this project got any further beyond the drawing-board stage than the previously mentioned plan.


http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... 0701676527

Autor:  Juhani Putkinen [ 30 Okt, 2017 22:31 ]
Teema pealkiri:  Re: M Palokangas "Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä – sissisodankäynnin .

See "Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä" on Soome "sissikindrali" poolt kirjutatud raamat, mis tembeldati salajaseks ja keelati avalikustamast.

Palokangas lihtsalt leidis selle arhiivist ja avalikustas midagi lisamata või välja jätmata.

Autor:  kaur3 [ 30 Okt, 2017 22:58 ]
Teema pealkiri:  Re: M Palokangas "Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä – sissisodankäynnin .

Hea Juhani, pidasin silmas Palokangase doktoritööd, mille pool pealkirja on laenatud kindral Koppineni raamatust.

kaur3 kirjutas:
Täna hommikul kl 10 võetakse Helsingis alljärgnev doktoritöö ette. Jõudu autorile :)

Tsiteeri:
Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä : sissitoiminta suomalaisessa sotataidossa
Palokangas, Marko (2014-05-23)

Tohtoriopiskelijan väitöskirja
Julkaisusarja 1 : No. 17
Sotahistorian laitos
2014-05-23

275 lk


http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10 ... sequence=2

Autor:  Juhani Putkinen [ 30 Okt, 2017 23:05 ]
Teema pealkiri:  Re: M Palokangas "Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä – sissisodankäynnin .

Vabandan, et eksisin. Olen lugenud nii sissikindrali teose kui ka Palokangase doktoritöö.

Autor:  kaur3 [ 24 Mai, 2018 18:13 ]
Teema pealkiri:  Re: M Palokangas "Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä – sissisodankäynnin .

Uus raamat kolonelleitnant Markko Palokangalt Soome relvajõudude luuretaktika arengust iseseisvuse ajal.

Tsiteeri:
Hankitun tiedon varassa : yhtymätason tiedustelutoiminnan kehitys Suomessa itsenäisyytemme aikana
Palokangas, Marko (2018)

Suomalaista yhtymätasoista tiedustelutaktiikkaa ei ole aiemmin tutkittu. Tiedustelutoiminnalla hankitaan yksityiskohtaiset ja tarvittavat tiedot vihollisesta, maastosta, säästä ja suojelutilanteesta yhtymän ja joukon taistelua sekä johtajien päätöksentekoa varten. Yhtymä on siten aina tiedustelutoiminnalla hankitun tiedon varassa.

Kirjoittaja, everstiluutnantti, dosentti Marko Palokangas (s. 1973) on yleisesikuntaupseeri ja sotatieteiden tohtori, joka on palvellut Karjalan prikaatissa, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulussa, Maasotakoulussa, Puolustusvoimien tutkimuslaitoksessa ja Kainuun prikaatissa. Palokangas on kirjoittanut useita sotahistoriaan ja sotilasperinteisiin liittyviä kirjoja sekä tutkimuksia Suomalaisen sotataidon kehityksestä.


http://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/156930

2. leht 2-st Kõik kellaajad on UTC + 2 tundi [ DST ]
Powered by phpBB © 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007 phpBB Group
http://www.phpbb.com/