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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 31 Okt, 2011 19:26 
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Liitunud: 23 Jaan, 2006 15:10
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...sealt edasi mõtles Weimari Vabariik juba oma järgmisi käike - paljud laevatehased viidi Saksamaalt üle Venemaale ja mujale Euroopasse...


Annad ehk mõne tehase kohta natuke täiendavat infot või viiteid allikatele? Eriti nende kohta, mis Venemaale ehitati?

terv
o

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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 31 Okt, 2011 20:17 
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Liitunud: 26 Nov, 2010 21:03
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oleeg kirjutas:
Veeväljasurve: 983 tonni (862 sukeldudes)

Et kas sukeldunult väiksem?


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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 01 Nov, 2011 17:55 
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Lemet kirjutas:
Tegelikult ei vasta torpeedoaparaat või torpeedotoru mitte salvele, vaid (püstoli analoogiaga) hoopis sellele kohale, kuhu padrun salvest edasi liigub. Nii et "torpeedosalv" on tegelikuses hoopistükkis torpeedosektsioon. Kuhu enne lahinguretke torpeedod ladustatakse. Ja kuute torpeedosektsiooni ühel Teise Maailmasõja aegsel diisel-allveelaeval ju kindlasti pole. Flaki nimetuses juba sõna "kahur" sees, (Flugabwehrkanone), milleks seda ingliskeelset "gun" lisandit veel sinna vaja? Aga see niisama pisike nokkimine, lase aga edasi.


Tegelikkus on väga ähmane asi, mina kah seda ei tea, torpeedo on ise kah toru, "torpeedosektsiooni" võiks nimetada hoopis torpeedo väljalaske aparaadiks ja salv on koht kust asja saab koheselt kasutada. Mitte sinna ei ladustata asju. "Ümberladustamine" kasutus juhuks kui peaks automaatrelvas moon lõppema.


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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 01 Nov, 2011 18:09 
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Tegelikkus on väga ähmane asi, mina kah seda ei tea


Selline mulje on lugupeetava viimase aja postitustest jäänud jah... :lol:, aga torpeedosektsiooni nüüd väljalaskeaparaadiks kohe kindlasti nimetada ei saa, sektsioon ja aparaat on vähe erinevad asjad.

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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 29 Dets, 2011 20:13 
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Mõned artiklid internetist kokku korjatuna, lisaks tavapärastele http://uboat.net, http://www.uboatarchive.net/ ja http://ubootwaffe.net/

konvoid:
McLean, Douglas M.: The Battle of Convoy BX-141
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... _19-35.pdf

Syrett, David: The Last Murmansk Convoys, 11 March-30 May 1945
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... _55-63.pdf

Syrett, David: Failure at Sea: Wolf Pack Operations in the North Atlantic, 10 February-22 March 1944
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... _33-43.pdf

Syrett, David: The Battle for Convoy UC-1, 23-27 February 1943
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... _21-27.pdf

Syrett, David: The Battle for Convoy ONS-154, 26-31 December 1942
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... _41-50.pdf

Syrett, David: The Battle for Convoy HG-75, 22-29 October 1941
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... 41to51.pdf

Syrett, David: On the Threshold of Victory: Communications Intelligence and the Battle for Convoy HX-228, 7-12 March 1943
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... _49-55.pdf

Syrett, David: The Battle for Convoy HX 133, 23-29 June 1941
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... _43-50.pdf

Goette, Richard: Britain and the Delay in Closing the Mid-Atlantic "Air Gap" During the Battle of the Atlantic
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... _19-41.pdf

History of Convoy and Routing FX-37
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/l ... -1945.html

tehnoloogia:
Fisher, Robert C: The Impact of German Technology on the Royal Canadian Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic, 1942-1943
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern%5Fmar ... 4_1-13.pdf

McLean, Douglas M.: Confronting Technological and Tactical Change: Allied Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Last Year of the Battle of the Atlantic
http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/cmh/back%20iss ... lantic.pdf
http://www.usnwc.edu/NavalWarCollegeRev ... Winter.pdf (märkustes rohkem infot)

India ookean:
Dr Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones: “Just like a Training Exercise”. The Destruction of U-198 in the Indian Ocean 12 August 1944
http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume6_numbe ... -Jones.pdf

operatsioonid seoses dessandiga Normandias:
Gough, Barry M.; Wood, James A.: "One More for Luck": the Destruction of U971 by HMCS Haida and HMS Eskimo, 24 June 1944
http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/cmh/back%20iss ... 201944.pdf

allveelaevastiku areng enne sõda:
Dienstschrift nr.15 Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles 1919-1935
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ ... -XXXIV.pdf lk.530-607

liitlaste õhujõud:
Jones, Jarvis P.: Army Air Forces in the Battle of the Atlantic.
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 168/rec/52

liitlaste luurearuanded:
november 1942
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 67/rec/142

detsember 1942
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 747/rec/56

jaanuar 1943
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 599/rec/27

veebruar 1943
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 775/rec/26

märts 1943
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 598/rec/37

aprill 1943
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 590/rec/19

mai 1943
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 3068/rec/9

juuni 1943
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 2804/rec/6

juuli 1943
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 87/rec/103

august 1943
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 2611/rec/7

muu:
O'Malley, Charles S., Jr.: Battle of the Atlantic.
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 292/rec/76

History of the Anti-submarine Measures Division of the Tenth Fleet.
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ ... 01/rec/151

Russell, Jerry C.: Ultra And the Campaign Against the U-boats in World War II.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA089275

Breemer, Jan S.: Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare.
http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval ... -Warf.aspx

Charles M. Sternhell and Alan M. Thorndike: OEG REPORT No. 51 ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... index.html
pdf versioon transkribeerimata: http://www.cna.org/research/1974/antisu ... rld-war-ii

Carl E. Behrens: EFFECT ON U-BOAT PERFORMANCE OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM DECRYPTION OF ALLIED COMMUNICATIONS.
http://www.cna.org/research/1954/effect ... e-obtained

ACB 0233/44(3) South-West Pacific Anti-Submarine Warfare Reports (WWII)
http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publi ... ports-wwii

LLewellyn-Jones, Malcolm: The Royal Navy on the threshold of modern anti-submarine warfare, 1944-1949
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did= ... hos.408475

Neate, James: The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force in anti-submarine warfare policy, 1918-1945.
http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/4163/

Kurzsignalen on German U-boats
http://users.telenet.be/d.rijmenants/en/kurzsignale.htm

C.B. 4501 History of U-Boat policy
http://www.uboatarchive.net/U-boatPolicy.htm

Battle of the Atlantic Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence SRH-024
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/l ... gence.html

Battle of the Atlantic Volume IV Technical Intelligence From Allied Communications Intelligence SRH-025
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/l ... gence.html

Blockade-Running Between Europe and the Far East by Submarines, 1942-44 SRH-019
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/l ... 42-44.html

täiendan postitust, kui midagi asjalikku leian.


Viimati muutis andrus, 11 Jaan, 2017 0:23, muudetud 6 korda kokku.

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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 17 Dets, 2012 0:18 
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Sõja lõpu poole hakkasid saksa allveelaevad suuremal arvul tegutsema Briti saarte ümbruses rannikuvetes. Sellest sündis brittidele palju uut peamurdmist. Üks uuem uurimus, Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones: The Royal Navy And Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917-49 väidab, et just sealt saadud kogemused olid olulised brittide pealesõjaaegse allveelaevatõrje arengus (kahjuks books.google.com enam ei lase antud raamatusse sisse vaadata, tuleb mind niisama uskuda :) ). Toon ära pisut infot mis laseb asjast lähemalt aimu saada.
Seda teavet on hea kasutada ka sakslaste allveelaevatõrje ees seisnud probleemide hindamiseks, sest erinevalt lääneliitlastest tegelesid nemad kogu sõja jooksul tõrjega põhiliselt rannikuvetes.

Meeting of Anti-U-Boat Warfare Committee, 31.October 1944 [TNA CAB 86/6]
[…]
(ii) Sir Max Horton said he anticipated that the principal danger would be from U-Boat operations in the focal areas, particularly in the north-west and south-west approaches. The enemy had never previously operated close inshore except on a limited scale for very short periods. He felt that our hunting forces would be handicapped in the anticipated new campaign by three factors: firstly, the enemy's use of the 'Schnorkel', which would greatly reduce the effectiveness of our coastal air forces and surface forces; secondly, the enemy's new Radar which would enable him to evade air and sea hunting forces using Radar; and thirdly, the reduced efficiency of our Asdics due to temperature layers frequently experienced in the shallow waters where operations were expected and to the presence of wrecks in these waters. He gave an outline of probable enemy tactics, saying that he anticipated that U-boats would lie on the bottom near focal points, particularly in areas where wrecks were common, and would remain in this position listening for approaching convoys. On the approach of a convoy the U-boat would probably come to about 80 feet, carry on an attack and then return to the bottom. He pointed out, however, that such tactics would place great strain on U-boat crews, particularly on the Captains, and that in view of the present state of the enemy's morale, it was likely that only a minority would prove really determined in such tactics.
He mentioned that we had modified one of our submarines to achieve 12 knots submerged and had been using this craft for exercises with escort groups. A particularly experienced group had had no success during the first week of such exercises, but had improved rapidly thereafter. As this was the only submarine so modified, the training programme was difficult one.
(iii) Sir Andrew Cunningham mentioned that our anti-submarine forces were being increased to 21 escort groups of which 18 were already operational. He agreed that the threat, if the new U-boats operated inshore, would be serious. While agreeing that the cost must be carefully counted before diverting bombers from the present oil campaign, it must be remembered that the enemy's U-boat was his only remaining worthwhile weapon.
(iv) Captain Howard-Johnston said that he had analysed a large number of attacks on wrecks carried out in the Channel during the invasion period. Provided the attacking forces when in contact with a non-sub[marine] echo adopted the policy of three accurate attacks, the presence of wrecks should not serve to give a submarine immunity. The enemy's use of the 'Schnorkel' during the above operations had been a considerable handicap to our coastal air forces, but nevertheless he had achieved little during this period.
(v) Sir Max Horton said that one of the great handicaps under which attacking forces were operating at present was the use of 'Foxer' and 'Cat' devices to defeat the 'Gnat' torpedo. These devices seriously affected 'Asdic' efficiency, but it might be possible to dispense with them by means of a new scheme to reduce the propeller noise of attacking craft. Another possibility was the use of an expendable 'noise maker' which was showing considerable promise and which should deflect the 'Gnat' torpedo without adverse effect to 'Asdic' efficiency.
(vi) The First Lord mentioned the concrete piercing bomb for attack on U-boat pens at Bergen and Trondheim. Sir Charles Portal said that so far only Fortress aircraft could carry this weapon and that their range was insufficient to reach Trondheim.
(vii) In answer to the Prime Minister it was stated that considerable anti-U-boat mining had been carried out both in the north-west and south-west approaches and in the Channel and off the coast of Norway.
(viii) Admiral Stark suggested the possible use of blimps fitted with MAD equipment for locating U-boats resting on the seabed in coastal waters. He said that Admiral King had enquired regarding our estimate of the probable enemy tactics when the new U-boats were in service and had offered assistance if required.
(ix) Dr Goodeve mentioned a form of underwater IFF which was under design and which might be of value for marking the position of well-known wrecks. The endurance of this device at present was about one week, but this might be increased to several months by modification.
(x) Sir Robert Renwick (MAP) suggested that a Radar coast watch might be instituted in narrow waters where it was thought probable that new U-boats would operate. Although the range of ASV on 'Schnorkel' was only six miles from aircraft, it might be possible to increase this figure if the Radar set was mounted ashore.
(xi) The Prime Minister, in summing up the discussion, said he was not alarmed by this new enemy U-boat threat, although it was perfectly proper to give urgent consideration to all possible counter-measures.
[...]

M. Simpson (ed.): The Cunningham papers vol. II.


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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
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Meeting of Anti-U-Boat Warfare Committee, 19.December 1944 [TNA CAB 119/133]

[...] As regards the new type U-boat, there was no definitive sign yet of their operational use but nearly 40 of the larger and 20 of the smaller type were believed to have been completed and in addition up to 90 large and 35 of the smaller type were building. It was thought that the enemy intended to withhold these new type U-boats until he had sufficient numbers to deliver a really telling attack and we might, therefore, have about two months' respite. The smaller type would probably operate against the East Coast and Continental traffic, and the larger type in focal areas and on Oceanic routes. In general U-boats at present appear to be feeling their way with new devices, particularly the 'Schnorkel' and when the fast U-boat campaign started it would have the experience of considerable 'Schnorkel' experience. This device, combined with the higher speeds would seriously reduce the power of surface craft and aircraft to take toll of the attacking forces.
In the course of a general discussion on the First Sea Lord's statement the following points arose:
1. Sir Sholto Douglas said that the targets were proving very elusive and that although about 35 U-boats were operating in Coastal Command's area, sightings other than smoke or swirls were rare. Aircraft were working in close collaboration with escort groups and homing them on to such sightings whenever possible.
2. Sir Max Horton agreed that enemy's new tactics were proving very difficult to combat and said that he had concentrated the majority of his escort groups in the Approaches to give safe passage rather than to seek to attack the enemy in the transit area. The enemy's use of shallow water was proving a severe handicap to the Asdic.
3. In reply to a question by the Prime Minister as to why the enemy was not achieving more success, Sir Max Horton said the chief factor was the human element; the enemy did not appear to have recovered his morale and very long periods submerged or proceeding by 'Schnorkel', no doubt had a depressing effect on submarine crews.
4. Lord Cherwell pointed out that whereas between third and half the number of U-boats were operational, compared with the height of the U-boat campaign, the sinkings were less than a tenth pf those achieved at that time. Sir Andrew Cunningham thought that this was accounted for by the fact that the enemy had been taking up inshore patrolling positions. While he was not unduly disturbed by the present campaign, the enemy undoubtedly hat it in his power to launch an intensive attack later which might be extremely difficult to counter.
5. It was explained that the enemy's use of shallow coastal waters handicapped surface forces using Asdics because of the presence of wrecks, the temperature gradations of the water and the reverberation suffered by Asdic under such conditions.

Allikas sama mis eelmises postituses.


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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
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Minutes of First Sea Lord's meeting to discuss methods of frustrating the U-boat campaign, 15.January 1945 [TNA ADM 205/44]

The First Sea Lord opened the meeting by saying that our present counter measures to the U-boat campaign were not effective and that he had called this meeting to review the proposals for the future.

Minelaying

The probabilities of an extensive minelaying campaign in the Coastal Waters of British Isles were then discussed. The Controller said that the present bottleneck was insufficient labour at the mine depots, but that he would take the necessary steps to remedy the situation. The First Sea Lord said he would speak the the Minister of Production and inform him of this requirement, and direct the Controller to examine the possibility of opening up an additional mine depot or depots. DDOD (M) said that the physical conditions were such that he doubted if a laying effort of more than 4000 mines per month could be maintained.
The mining proposals received from C-in-C, Western Approaches, were examined in detail and discussion followed as to the best method of laying the fields. First Sea Lord said that the first thing to do was to mine the enemy out of the Irish Sea. C-in-C, Western Approaches' proposals appeared the best means of achieving this with the laying of the inner fields first. First Sea Lord also directed that a signal should be sent asking COMINCH to release Ariadne to take part in these minelaying operations. The depth of fields was then discussed in the course of which the First Sea Lord said we did not want to incommode our own ships and that it was necessary to patrol as many deep minefields as possible. DDOD (M) said that from the technical point of view, a standard depth of 60 feet would have a favourable effect on the laying output.
First Sea Lord decided that the initial fields should be laid at a standard depth of 60 feet below chart datum, and experience may show later that a better comparative depth can be arrived at. The First Sea Lord said that this minelaying campaign was to have priority over minelaying by SHAEF and that he would mention this to Admiral Burrough. He also confirmed that the increase in defensive minefield was not to be at the expense of the defensive effort by Bomber Command.
The question of controlled minefields and indicator loops was finally discussed, and the possibility of their use is being further investigated by DAUD.

Nets

The various types of net were then discussed and the advantages and disadvantages of each explained.
The First Sea Lord said that the OB (bottom net) and the O (Jackstay on surface) have value, and directed ACNS (UT) to work out a plan for their use with C-in-C, Western Approaches. The First Sea Lord also said that the OP (piano wire on floats) was promising weapon and experiments were to be continued as fast as possible. ACNS (UT) was directed to report results.

Memorandum regarding Counter Measures taken and in hand

(a) Improvement of Radar detection of Schnorkel. Certain types of aircraft and surface vessel radar sets modified. Investigations and trials continuing.
(b) Automatic signalling wreck buoys. Designed and produced for purpose of assisting classification of contacts.
(c) Extension of GEE and SS Loran chains. In north western and south western approaches to facilitate accurate fixing and the plotting of wrecks and other non-subs. North west approaches completed; south west approaches in progress.
(d) Detection by infra-red. Investigations proceeding.
(e) Provision of additional training submarines, converted to fast underwater speed and Schnorkel-fitted.
(f) Provision of Schnorkel targets for training.
(g) Investigation into possibility of improved H/E detection. Proceeding.
(h) Laying of trap mines near convoy routes and in likely areas. Proceeding.
(i) Laying of wire obstructions for damaging Schnorkels. Proceeding.
(j) Re-institution of coastal convoys in Irish Sea.
(k) Inclusion of U-boat building yards, pens and operational bases in weekly Naval Targets priority list.
(l) Aircraft mining in Baltic, Kattegat and [off] Norwegian coast.
(m) Pure tone anti-Gnat. A noise-maker tuned to home the Gnat. Being developed to take the place of the existing Foxer noise-maker. It will cause less interference with asdics.
(n) Expendable noise-makers. Anti-Gnat, to reduce necessity for using Foxers. Being developed.
(o) Provision of three-dimensional radio sono buoys.

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Eelviimane dokument samast allikast.

Forecast of the U-boat Campaign during 1945 25.January 1945 [TNA ADM 205/44]

[...]
Counter Measures

8. The development of counter measures is proceeding at high priority. (Details are given in the Appendix.) Whether these will prove effective in time to prevent heavy losses of shipping remainst to be seen.

Bombing

9. The three main U-boat assembly and building yards are at Hamburg, Bremen and Danzig.
They are accorded the highest priority by Admiralty. Danzig is now threatened by the Russian advance and it estimated that the capture of this port will reduce U-boat production by about 30% but that the effect will not be felt at sea for four to five months afterwards.

Morale

10. Recent U-boat successes indicate improved morale of Commanders and, as their successes become more widely known by the U-boat arm, the offensive spirit generally will increase. On the other hand, morale will no doubt be influenced by:
a. the success or failure of land operations in Europe.
b. the ability of our A/S forces to kill and harry the U-boats.
c. the development of new allied technical equipment and counter measures.

Estimated Shipping Losses

11. On the assumption that each U-boat during a patrol will sink one ship, it has been estimated that our shipping losses may rise to about 200 ships a quarter from the beginning of the main offensive, later increasing to 250, compared with 180 a quarter during the worst period in the spring of 1943.
These figures, being based on surmise, may vary greatly. Sinking by midget U-boats, which are now operating off the coast of Low Countries, have not been taken into account.
Such high losses might well seriously interfere with the maintenance of our forces in Europe and the Far East.

Conclusions

12. The new U-boat offensive could begin about mid-February. Experience and confidence in the Schnorkel and improved GSR have considerably reduced the effectiveness of our air and surface forces in combating this new threat which is severe and may result in high shipping losses. Much depends, however, on the morale and offensive spirit of U-boat crews and the effectiveness of our counter measures.

Appendix

Counter Measures against U-boat Threat round British Isles

1. Convoys in the Irish sea

Daily convoys on the principal routes have been instituted in the Irish Sea for all shipping excluding coasters of less than 1,000 tons.

2. Mining

A large mining policy has been embarked on with the object of protecting our shipping in the Irish Sea and the English Channel, and eventually of driving the U-boats out of coastal areas. Lines of mines are being laid across the north and south approaches to the Irish Sea. In the English Channel, trap minefields near selected focal areas are being laid.
All available resources, both as regards the production of the mines and vessels to lay them have been brought to bear.

3. Escorts

A diversion of escorts from foreign waters has been ordered, which, together with new construction, by early next month will have added substantially to our resources at home.

4. Inshore Patrols

A collection of various types of small patrol craft, capable of keeping the sea in our inshore focal areas, is being made in the Western Approaches Command, with the idea of flooding likely areas to the maximum density. These craft, few of which will be asdic-fitted, are more in the nature of an embarrassment to U-boats than of killing groups, but the great majority will mount lethal weapons.

5. Non-Lethal Traps

Devices to snare U-boats with wire obstructions and indicating devices, are being produced, and a first lay of 30 miles of wire across the U-boat route north-east of the Shetlands is already being laid.
Another device is floating lengths of piano wire, with indicating floats, to catch the Schnorkel and so disclose the submarine's presence. Experiments are proceeding.

6. Schnorkel Detection

Experiments are proceeding at highest priority to improve radar and Thermal detection of Schnorkel by aircraft and surface forces.


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CCD Directive 2 February 1945 [TNA CAB 119/133]

The CCS consider that the current German U-boat programme, if not countered, will present a serious threat to our North Atlantic shipping lanes.
It is therefore directed that the following counter measures be taken by all appropriate commanders:
(a) Build up as much as practicable the strength of surface hunting groups and anti-U-boat air squadrons.
(b) Maintain, and if possible increase, 'marginal' bomber effort on assembly yards, concentrated as far as is practicable against Hamburg and Bremen.
(c) Maintain 'marginal' effort against operating bases, be ready to increase this when bases become crowded beyond the capacity of concrete pens.
(d) Increase, by 100% if possible, the air mining effort against U-boats, including the training areas.
(e) Mine waters beyond the range of (d) above by using surface minelayers and carrier-borne aircraft.
(f) Intensify operations against enemy minesweepers.
(g) Maintain and intensify operations against the enemy shipping used to supply U-boat bases.

CCS - Combined Chiefs of Staff [UK-US]

M. Simpson (ed.): The Cunningham papers vol. II.


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Torpeedokriisi kohta ka üks uurimus:

Wolves without teeth: the German torpedo crisis in World War Two
by David Habersham Wright
B.A., University of Alabama, 2004

http://hdl.handle.net/10518/3627

Täiendus 7.juuli 2013.a.:
Rüstung und Rüstungserprobung in der deutschen Marinegeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Torpedoversuchsanstalt (TVA)
Krauß, Oliver
Kiel, Univ., Diss., 2006

http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:8-diss-18054


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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 07 Juul, 2013 23:42 
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T-5 statistika, kokku pandud 1964.a. Dr. J. Rohweri poolt "Auswertung der Zaunkönig-Frontschüsse September 1943-Mai 1945". Tsiteeritud raamatust Eberhard Rössler: Die Torpedos der deutschen U-Boote.
Kood:
09.43 25  5 20
10.43 26  5 19
11.43 26  1  4
12.43 45  9 20

01.44 68  3  4
02.44 53  5  9
03.44 47  7 15
04.44 44  0  0
05.44 34  8 24
06.44 41  6 15
07.44 28  5 18
08.44 52  8 15
09.44 42  7 17
10.44 38  3  8
11.44 25  5 20
12.44 60 11 18

01.45 30  5 17
02.45 26  7 27
03.45 27  5 19
04.45 20  5 25
05.45  4  2 50
Veerud: kuu, kasutatud torpeedosid, tabamusi, tabamuste protsent.
761 torpeedost tabas 112 (14,7%). 10 tabamust olid niinimetatud halastuslasud (Fangschuß).
Statistika tegemisest möödunud poole sajandi jooksul on arvatavasti numbrid pisut muutunud, aga arvatavasti üldpilt jääb samaks.

Liitlaste tõrjeabinõudest antud torpeedo vastu saab hea pildi eespool viidatud aruande "OEG REPORT No. 51 ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II" ühest peatükist: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... SW-15.html
Pisikese märkusena ütleksin, et uurimus on kirjutatud liiga värskelt sündmuste järel ja tõenäoliselt pildi saksa pool pole seal veel täiesti selge.


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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 17 Nov, 2013 18:18 
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Natuke saksa paberitest, aprill 1943.a.

Sakslased said 25.aprilliks valmis ühe kokkuvõtte vaenlasele kasutada olnud transpordilaevastiku suurusest. Lõpus märgitakse ka ära, et alates 1943.a. algusest ehitab vaenlane rohkem laevu, kui tal neid uputatakse.

V. Handelsschiffahrt.
3/Skl hat eine Übersicht über die Schiffsraumlage des Gegners am 1.4.43 aufgestellt. (s. 1/Skl 12021/43 Gkdos. in KTB Teil C Heft XI).
Wesentliche Feststellungen sind:
Die Gesamttonnage des Gegners bestand am 1.4.aus 30,938 Mill. BRT, davon 6,715 Mill. BRT Tankraum. Aus dieser Zahl stehen für den Überseeverkehr zur Verfügung 23,1 Mill. BRT, davon 4,7 Mill. BRT Tanker.
Der vorhandene Bestand an Truppentransportern oder für solche geeignete Fahrgastschiffe wird bei zusätzlicher Inanspruchnahme von Hilfskreuzern, Kriegsschiffen und Kühlschiffen als ausreichend beurteilt.
Der für den Überseeverkehr zur Verfügung stehende Tankraum hat sich durch die freigewordene Küstentonnage erhöht, obwohl die Versenkungen des ersten Vierteljahres 1943 die Neubauten überstiegen.
An Fracht- und Kühlschiffen stehen 16,3 Mill. BRT zur Verfügung.
Zum Geräte- und Materialtransport neuer Truppenbewegungen können rund 3,6 Mill. BRT durch Einsparungen an anderer Stelle eingesetzt werden. Dieser Frachtraum entspricht bei einmaligem Einsatz einer Beförderungsmöglichkeit von Gerät und Material für etwa 450000 Mann.
Die Neubaukapazität im englischen Mutterland und in Kanada ist mit etwa 150000 BRT im Monat anzusetzen, während in den USA im Jahre 1943 voraussichtlich 10 – 11 Mill. BRT gebaut werden können.
Mit Beginn des Jahres 1943 liegt erstmalig die Neubaukurve des Gegners über der Versenkungskurve.

KTB Skl Teil A, Bd.44 S.487-488



Kuu lõpus kirjeldas mereväe ülem allveesõja hetkeolukorda järgnevalt:

Chef Skl. gibt eine Lagebetrachtung über den derzeitigen Stand des U-Bootskrieges:
1) Feindlage:
Die Steuerung des feindlichen Schiffsverkehrs ist seit Kriegsbeginn nach unveränderten Grundsätzen erfolgt; der Gegner hat in dem durch die verfügbaren Geleitfahrzeuge möglichen Umfange das Geleitzugsystem eingeführt und daran festgehalten. Er ist bestrebt, die Geleitzüge zur Zeitersparnis auf möglichst kurzen Wegen zu führen und versucht, von ihm vermutete oder erkannte U-Bootspositionen lehnig zu umgehen und im ganzen den Verkehr auf dauernd wechselnden Wegen zu streuen.
Zu diesem Zweck hat er sich die Luftwaffe, die Funkaufklärung und die Möglichkeiten der Funkortung zunutze gemacht; besonders bei der Funkortung liegt der Vorteil z.Zt. eindeutig auf der Feindseite.
Neben den Geleitzügen laufen nach wie vor einzelne schnelle Schiffe auf wechselnden Kurzen auch im Nordatlantik.
Der starke Einfluss der feindlichen Luftwaffe wird noch zunehmen, da der Gegner alle Anstrengungen macht, die bisher noch in der Luftüberwachung bestehenden Lücken zu schließen, indem außer dem Einsatz von Langstreckenflugzeugen von den Küsten aus in zunehmendem Umfang Flugzeuge bei den Geleitzügen selbst mitgeführt werden (Hilfsflugzeugträger).
2) Eigene Lage:
Es ist als besonders glücklich anzusehen, daß Entwicklung und Bau der deutschen U-Bootstypen, von denen besonders das mittlere (500 t) Boot bevorzugt gebaut wurde, richtig gelegen hat. Dieses Boot ist auch heute der günstigste Typ für den Geleitzugkampf. Noch heute ist das U-Boot zum Finden seines Ziels allein auf sich selbst angewiesen. Das bisherige Fehlen der Feindaufklärung durch Flugzeuge ist ein schwerer und im 4.Kriegsjahr fast unverständlicher Nachteil.
Die laufend zunehmende Feindabwehr hat dazu geführt, daß heute eine unvergleichlich viel höhere Bootzahl als 1939 Voraussetzung für Erfolge am Geleitzug ist. Nur große Zahlen angesetzter Boote können einen Ausgleich für die schwere Behinderung bilden, die das U-Boot beim Angriff durch die feindliche Luftwaffe und die mit Fu.M.G. ortenden Seestreitkräfte der Nah- und Fernsicherung vorfindet.
Es steht dabei außer Zweifel, daß diese Lage immer schwieriger wird, da auch eine Verstärkung der Flakbewaffnung der U-Boote nur eine vorübergehende Erleichterung, aber keine grundsätzliche Änderung bringen kann.
3) Folgerungen:
Es muß daher Ziel der U-Bootskriegführung sein, die Wirksamkeit des einzelnen U-Boots am Geleitzug wieder zu steigern. Hierzu sind folgende Maßnahmen vordringlich:
a) Verhindern der gegnerischen Funkortung durch technische Maßnahmen am U-Boot selbst (Reflektionsvernichtung).
b) Einführung eines sicher wirkenden Kampfmittels gegen verfolgende Sicherungsstreitkräfte.
c) Verbesserung der eigenen Funkmessung und Funkmeßbeobachten.
d) Beschleunigte Ausnutzung des Fernaufklärungsflugzeuges als Auge des U-Bootes.
e) Intensivierung des Funkentzifferung, um Anhalte für den operativen Ansatz zu gewinnen.
f) Vorantreiben des U-Boots mit hoher Unterwassergeschwindigkeit (Walther-U-Boot), mit dem mit einem Schlage völlig neue taktische Möglichkeiten durch schnelles Überwinden der Geleitsicherung gegeben sind.
g) Darüber hinaus muß die U-Bootskriegführung anstreben, neben dem Schwerpunkt auf der Hautverkehrsstraße des Nordatlantik U-Boote mit großer Seeausdauer in den abwehrarmen Seegebieten laufend einzusetzen, um die feindliche Abwehr zu zersplittern und dadurch zu schwächen.

KTB Skl Teil A, Bd.44 S.574-576

Antud sõjapäeviku inglisekeelne tõlge on saadaval siin: https://archive.org/details/wardiarygermann441943germ kahjuks küll ainult kuu esimene pool.

Aprill BdU sõjapäevikus:
http://www.uboatarchive.net/BDUKTB30321.htm
http://www.uboatarchive.net/BDUKTB30322.htm


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 Teema pealkiri: Re: Allveelaevad Kolmanda Reichi võiduvõimalusena?
PostitusPostitatud: 29 Nov, 2013 14:38 
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Mai esimene pool BdU sõjapäevikus:
http://www.uboatarchive.net/BDUKTB30323.htm

Mereväe olukorra hinnang 20. mail 1943.a.

Lagebetrachtung der Seekriegsleitung vom 20. Mai 1943

[...]
6. In der Tonnageschlacht geht das erbitterte Ringen mit wechselndem Erfolg weiter. Während Deutschland die Wirksamkeit der U-Bootskrieges mit allen Mitteln zu steigern bestrebt ist, versuchen die Angelsachsen den bereits auf große Leistungsfähigkeit gesteigerten Handelsschiffsbau noch erheblich zu vermehren und haben im Augenblick durch ihre Überlegenheit in der Ortung unserer U-Boote die Versenkungserfolge so beeinträchtigt, daß die Ortungsabwehr zum wichtigsten Problem der U-Bootskriegführung geworden ist.
Es ist ihnen z. Zt. wohl gelungen, im Durchschnitt die Versenkungen auszugleichen bzw. in einzelnen Monaten zu überholen. Auch der Gewinn der französischen Handelsschiffe in Nordafrika hat einen Zuwachs von etwa 350 000 BRT gebracht. Trotzdem kann als erwiesen gelten, daß der Frachtraum auf der Feindseite knapp ist, daß das Nordafrika-Unternehmen nur unter Einschränkung der Zufuhren nach England und Zugriff auf die Vorräte durchführbar war und damit eine schwere Belastung des Transportproblems für den Feind bedeutet.
Das Tonnageproblem war deshalb zweifellos einer der Hauptgründe für die Landung in Nordafrika; das Aufbrechen des Mittelmeerweges bringt den Angelsachsen einen Tonnagegewinn von ca. 1,7 mill. BRT und hat vor allem zur Folge, daß ein wesentlicher Teil ihrer Schiffahrt, der bisher im freien Ozean dem Zugriff unserer U-Boote ausgesetzt war, nunmehr auf stark gesicherten Küstenwegen laufen kann. Die augenblickliche Tonnagelage läßt es allerdings höchst unwahrscheinlich erscheinen, daß der Gegner in der Lage ist, die für Großaktionen notwendigen, umfangreichen Personal- und Materialmengen kurzfristig aus den Aufmarschräumen zu verlegen. Er ist vielmehr gezwungen, seine strategischen Planungen von langer Hand vorzubereiten und muß an den einmal begonnenen Vorhaben festhalten, wenn er nicht erneute, längere Verzögerungen in Kauf nehmen will.
[...]
10. Lage und Aufgaben der deutschen Kriegsmarine:
Die der Kriegsmarine zufallenden Aufgaben in dieser Lage sind:
a) Verteidigung der europäischen Küsten, ihrer Seeverbindungen und Ausbildungsgebiete und des Seenachschubs für die Operationen des Heeres.
b) Fortführung und Intensivierung des Tonnagekrieges.
[...]
Die Schwerpunktaufgabe des Seekrieges ist der Tonnagekrieg, der zugleich in der heutigen Lage die einzige Offensive der deutschen Kriegsführung ist. Sein Ziel ist es, die Entfaltung der personellen und materiellen Kampfkräfte des Feindes zu hemmen und diese vor Erreichen ihrer Bestimmungsräume zu schädigen, in denen sie sonst unter erheblich höherem Einsatz von deutschem Blut und Material bekämpft werden müssen.
Jedes Mittel, das zur Förderung dieser Aufgabe geeignet ist, muß in ihren Dienst gestellt werden.
Die zur Verstärkung des U-Bootskrieges als der Hauptträgers des Tonnagekrieges möglichen Maßnahmen sind getroffen; dir Abwehr von Luftangriffen gegen die Stützpunkte und Bauwerften bleibt eine Hauptaufgabe der Küsten- und Flakverteidigung. Die Ortungsfrage hat, wie unter 6. erwähnt, eine entscheidende Bedeutung gewonnen.
Freihalten der Ein- und Auslaufwege im Küstenvorfeld ist heute von gleicher Bedeutung wie im 1. Weltkrieg.
Der U-Bootskrieg bedarf aber auch die Ergänzung durch alle übrigen im Tonnagekrieg wirksamen Kampfmittel.
Der Verstärkung der Schnellbootswaffe ist daher notwendig und eingeleitet.
Die Mine muß so bald wie möglich wieder Wirksamkeit gegen das feindliche Handelsschiff im Küstenvorfeld des Gegners erhalten, das besonders im Raum um die englische Insel günstige Bedingungen für den Mineneinsatz bietet.
Jede durch die Luftwaffe erzielte Schädigung der feindlichen Schiffahrt ist von größter Bedeutung, da angesichts der gegnerischen Anstrengungen nur der konsequente Ansatz aller Mittel auf die Schwäche des Gegners den größtmöglichen Erfolg für die ganze Kriegsführung zu bringen vermag.
Von entscheidender Wichtigkeit für den Fortgang des Tonnagekrieges wird dabei die Frage, ob dem Gegner die Erzwingung der freien Durchfahrt durch das Mittelmeer gelingen wird. Erreicht er es, das Mittelmeer als Seeverbindung zu benutzen, so gewinnt er nicht nur eine beträchtliche Tonnage durch Ersparung des Umweges um das Kap, sondern vermindert zugleich fortlaufend die Erfolgsaussichten der U-Boote, weil die Schiffahrt im Mittelmeer und Roten Meer in unvergleichlich viel höherem Maße besonders durch die Luftwaffe gesichert werden kann als im Atlantischen und Indischen Ozean.
[...]

M. Salewski: Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945 Bd. III, S.351-356

Allveelaevadega tonnaažisõja lõpetamiseni Põhja-Atlandil oli jäänud mõni päev...


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