About Russian Military Reform
Postitatud: 02 Mai, 2006 14:23
About Russian Military Reform
Mark Galeotti
Jane’s Intelligence Review
April, 2006
A few years ago, Russian officers would quietly refer to the military reform plans of the day as "communism". The reason, they would explain, is that the golden era always remained just over the horizon while today's realities guaranteed shortages and inefficiencies.
Following 15 years since the break up of the Soviet Union, in which "reform" has meant little more than decay, there is still considerable scepticism. However, there are some signs of progress, and with them a slight but perceptible optimism within the High Command.
In part, this stems from President Vladimir Putin's desire tr see Russia regain a meaningful military capability, which is apparent in the resurgence of nationalist propaganda about the armed forces and continued support given to Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, who was given the dual role of deputy prime minister responsible for the security agencies in November 2005.
Some lessons have been learned from years of failed piecemeal reforms, which were variously focused on personnel (but never considering how to equip them properly), armaments (disregarding whether new kit could be used effectively) and organisation (which became nothing more than a redrawing of organisation charts with no bearing on the reality on the ground).
The new reform process is built around the notion of simultaneous development along four axes: personnel, organisation, armament and doctrine. While this could seem an extravagantly ambitious ideal, it reflects the fact that (he Russian military is in systemic crisis and in desperate need of complete overhaul.
The implicit assumption was once that Russia's armed forces should seek to be a smaller equivalent of the Soviet military, capable of global power projection and
sustaining conventional wars in both Europe and Asia. Putin has now accepted more limited goals, of wanting to create modern armed forces that can sustain a coun-terinsurgency war (such as that in Chechnya) at the same time as a single substantial overseas mission outside Russia's borders (such as a peacekeeping operation in Central Asia), while still maintaining a nuclear deterrent and mobilisation capability to counter a single, major military challenge (the tacit assumption is that this would come from China).
This permits greater freedom of manoeuvre in addressing the four main areas for reform, although the rate of progress is likely to be variable across these areas.
Personnel; thankless tasks
The quality of Russian soldiers and officers, discipline within the ranks and the future of the draft were thrown into sharp focus in January by the case of Andrei Sychev, a conscript whose legs and genitals had to be amputated after being beaten by drunken fellow soldiers on New Year's Eve. Three soldiers have been disciplined over this incident so far. Ivanov initially attempted to dismiss the incident as "nothing serious", but faced with a rising tide of public anger he was called to answer to the State Duma session, where he admitted that it was an "outrageous occurrence". This case highlighted the plight of a military forced to depend on draftees who in the main do not wish to serve.
To be able to maintain a meaningful reserve base from which to mobilise mass armies for any conventional war with China, they need to retain the draft.
This remains central to Russian doctrine and rules out a complete shift to a professional army. In any case, service in the Russian military - especially with the likelihood of active duty in Chechnya - is an unappealing prospect and Moscow cannot afford to pay the level of salary that could attract volunteers of suitable quality in the necessary numbers.
The armed forces are being cut by another 100,000 over the next year, but for the foreseeable future Russia will have to rely on recalcitrant draftees and relatively low-quality contract recruits''
The plan is that by 2008, 70 per cent of the armed forces will be professional, and the length of draft then be reduced from two years to one year, but similar
promises have been made in the past and not been kept.
Organisation: chance for progress
The most recent organisational reform was formulated in December 2005. Developed by Colonel General Aleksandr Rukshin, head of the General Staff's primary think tank, its Main Operations Directorate, it was given powerful backing by Chief of the General Staff General Yury Baluyevsky. The plan uses the latest rounds of force reductions as the basis to propose a major reorganisation of the armed forces' territorial structure.
The Russian armed forces are currently composed of three arms of service (Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy) and three special arms (the Strategic Forces, the Airborne Forces, and the Space Forces). There are also geographical commands, with each of six military districts and four fleets having its own all-arm command structure. The proposal is to replace the military districts with three regional commands: European, Central Asian and Far Eastern, which would be all-arms structures. Only the Strategic Forces would remain outside this new territorial structure.
This would streamline a cumbersome command structure that appears little more than an excuse to maintain a sizeable pool of ageing generals in the manner to which they have become accustomed.
Baluyevsky has publicly expressed his belief that Russia faces no immediate conventional external enemy, and contends that the new structure will also rationalise the chain of command when dealing with terrorist and insurgent attacks. At present, for example, federal forces in Chechnya are under the Unified Federal Forces Commander who is subordinated to the North Caucasus Military District. The military district commander reports not only to the General Staff but also to the separate Ground Forces High Command (as this command has overall responsibility for the Chechen war).
When airborne and air forces are involved, their respective command structures in Moscow come into play, and the same is true of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (whose security troops play a major role in the conflict) and the Federal Security Service. By creating more powerful territorial command structures, the hope is that there will be fewer reporting lines within the armed forces while the military commander will be in a stronger position when dealing with other security agencies.
The newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta on 13 December 2005 cited an unnamed "military expert" as saying this reform would take between seven and eight years, would virtually paralyse the command structure during the transition and cost far more than anticipated, dashing hopes of further major procurement expenditures. It is almost certain that such a new structure would take up to five years to be properly bedded in, but the transitional problems are unlikely to be worse than the current mess, so this is an area in which Russia should be able to make
relatively quick progress if arid when Putin gives his assent.
Armament: new toys
For two decades, the Soviet and then Russian military has suffered materiel decay and a failure to rearm adequately. However, Putin's commitment to funding the military more generously is beginning to have an effect. According to Lieutenant-General Viktor Zavarzin, chair of the State Duma Defence Committee, 15.6 per cent (USD25.7 billion) of the 2006 federal budget will go to national defence, of which USD8.4 billion is slated to be spent on new equipment. Additional allocations of USD4.7 billion have been made available through other sections of the budget Even so, procurement is relatively modest. Over 2006, the armed forces are due to receive six Topol intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 31 T-90 tanks, 125 armoured personnel carriers, 3,770 other vehicles and 22 aircraft and helicopters. Although this represents an increase (in 2005, for example, only 17 new tanks were acquired), it remains uncertain as to whether the new equipment be properly utilised.
For instance, according to a January report in Nezavisimaya gazeta: "It would cost RUR360 million (USD12.8 million) just to have all servicemen fire 10 rounds from an assault rifle just once a year. They cannot master the use of the weapon, however, unless they go to the firing range twice a week and fire at least 30 rounds. Those were the standards in the Soviet era. Even if only one-fifth of the 1.2 million servicemen were to do this now, the ammunition alone would cost RUR22 billion a year (USD785 million) [which would equate to more than half the total annual training budget).
Doctrine: the missing link?
There is a gaping hole in the reform programme: doctrine. The Russian military inherited from the former Soviet Union a founding tenet that doctrine, a notion of what conflicts it would be likely to fight and how it would fight them, drives every other aspect of military planning. However, while the upper echelons of Russia's political and military elite comprehend the strategic underpinnings of reform, this has yet to be made concrete in any such detailed document. As such, Russia's existing national security concept and doctrine documents are outdated and of limited use.
There is no Russian counterpart to the US Quadrennial Defense Review, in part because there is still no single, generally accepted vision for reform. Perhaps for the moment this is a strength, as it means Ivanov can push forward a review agenda without the need for bureaucratic and political consensus. In the long term, the implicit assumptions on which the present programme are based will need to be institutionalised, not least if it is to survive the end of Putin's presidency in 2008, by which time it will certainly not have been completed. •
Mark Galeotti
Jane’s Intelligence Review
April, 2006
A few years ago, Russian officers would quietly refer to the military reform plans of the day as "communism". The reason, they would explain, is that the golden era always remained just over the horizon while today's realities guaranteed shortages and inefficiencies.
Following 15 years since the break up of the Soviet Union, in which "reform" has meant little more than decay, there is still considerable scepticism. However, there are some signs of progress, and with them a slight but perceptible optimism within the High Command.
In part, this stems from President Vladimir Putin's desire tr see Russia regain a meaningful military capability, which is apparent in the resurgence of nationalist propaganda about the armed forces and continued support given to Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, who was given the dual role of deputy prime minister responsible for the security agencies in November 2005.
Some lessons have been learned from years of failed piecemeal reforms, which were variously focused on personnel (but never considering how to equip them properly), armaments (disregarding whether new kit could be used effectively) and organisation (which became nothing more than a redrawing of organisation charts with no bearing on the reality on the ground).
The new reform process is built around the notion of simultaneous development along four axes: personnel, organisation, armament and doctrine. While this could seem an extravagantly ambitious ideal, it reflects the fact that (he Russian military is in systemic crisis and in desperate need of complete overhaul.
The implicit assumption was once that Russia's armed forces should seek to be a smaller equivalent of the Soviet military, capable of global power projection and
sustaining conventional wars in both Europe and Asia. Putin has now accepted more limited goals, of wanting to create modern armed forces that can sustain a coun-terinsurgency war (such as that in Chechnya) at the same time as a single substantial overseas mission outside Russia's borders (such as a peacekeeping operation in Central Asia), while still maintaining a nuclear deterrent and mobilisation capability to counter a single, major military challenge (the tacit assumption is that this would come from China).
This permits greater freedom of manoeuvre in addressing the four main areas for reform, although the rate of progress is likely to be variable across these areas.
Personnel; thankless tasks
The quality of Russian soldiers and officers, discipline within the ranks and the future of the draft were thrown into sharp focus in January by the case of Andrei Sychev, a conscript whose legs and genitals had to be amputated after being beaten by drunken fellow soldiers on New Year's Eve. Three soldiers have been disciplined over this incident so far. Ivanov initially attempted to dismiss the incident as "nothing serious", but faced with a rising tide of public anger he was called to answer to the State Duma session, where he admitted that it was an "outrageous occurrence". This case highlighted the plight of a military forced to depend on draftees who in the main do not wish to serve.
To be able to maintain a meaningful reserve base from which to mobilise mass armies for any conventional war with China, they need to retain the draft.
This remains central to Russian doctrine and rules out a complete shift to a professional army. In any case, service in the Russian military - especially with the likelihood of active duty in Chechnya - is an unappealing prospect and Moscow cannot afford to pay the level of salary that could attract volunteers of suitable quality in the necessary numbers.
The armed forces are being cut by another 100,000 over the next year, but for the foreseeable future Russia will have to rely on recalcitrant draftees and relatively low-quality contract recruits''
The plan is that by 2008, 70 per cent of the armed forces will be professional, and the length of draft then be reduced from two years to one year, but similar
promises have been made in the past and not been kept.
Organisation: chance for progress
The most recent organisational reform was formulated in December 2005. Developed by Colonel General Aleksandr Rukshin, head of the General Staff's primary think tank, its Main Operations Directorate, it was given powerful backing by Chief of the General Staff General Yury Baluyevsky. The plan uses the latest rounds of force reductions as the basis to propose a major reorganisation of the armed forces' territorial structure.
The Russian armed forces are currently composed of three arms of service (Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy) and three special arms (the Strategic Forces, the Airborne Forces, and the Space Forces). There are also geographical commands, with each of six military districts and four fleets having its own all-arm command structure. The proposal is to replace the military districts with three regional commands: European, Central Asian and Far Eastern, which would be all-arms structures. Only the Strategic Forces would remain outside this new territorial structure.
This would streamline a cumbersome command structure that appears little more than an excuse to maintain a sizeable pool of ageing generals in the manner to which they have become accustomed.
Baluyevsky has publicly expressed his belief that Russia faces no immediate conventional external enemy, and contends that the new structure will also rationalise the chain of command when dealing with terrorist and insurgent attacks. At present, for example, federal forces in Chechnya are under the Unified Federal Forces Commander who is subordinated to the North Caucasus Military District. The military district commander reports not only to the General Staff but also to the separate Ground Forces High Command (as this command has overall responsibility for the Chechen war).
When airborne and air forces are involved, their respective command structures in Moscow come into play, and the same is true of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (whose security troops play a major role in the conflict) and the Federal Security Service. By creating more powerful territorial command structures, the hope is that there will be fewer reporting lines within the armed forces while the military commander will be in a stronger position when dealing with other security agencies.
The newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta on 13 December 2005 cited an unnamed "military expert" as saying this reform would take between seven and eight years, would virtually paralyse the command structure during the transition and cost far more than anticipated, dashing hopes of further major procurement expenditures. It is almost certain that such a new structure would take up to five years to be properly bedded in, but the transitional problems are unlikely to be worse than the current mess, so this is an area in which Russia should be able to make
relatively quick progress if arid when Putin gives his assent.
Armament: new toys
For two decades, the Soviet and then Russian military has suffered materiel decay and a failure to rearm adequately. However, Putin's commitment to funding the military more generously is beginning to have an effect. According to Lieutenant-General Viktor Zavarzin, chair of the State Duma Defence Committee, 15.6 per cent (USD25.7 billion) of the 2006 federal budget will go to national defence, of which USD8.4 billion is slated to be spent on new equipment. Additional allocations of USD4.7 billion have been made available through other sections of the budget Even so, procurement is relatively modest. Over 2006, the armed forces are due to receive six Topol intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 31 T-90 tanks, 125 armoured personnel carriers, 3,770 other vehicles and 22 aircraft and helicopters. Although this represents an increase (in 2005, for example, only 17 new tanks were acquired), it remains uncertain as to whether the new equipment be properly utilised.
For instance, according to a January report in Nezavisimaya gazeta: "It would cost RUR360 million (USD12.8 million) just to have all servicemen fire 10 rounds from an assault rifle just once a year. They cannot master the use of the weapon, however, unless they go to the firing range twice a week and fire at least 30 rounds. Those were the standards in the Soviet era. Even if only one-fifth of the 1.2 million servicemen were to do this now, the ammunition alone would cost RUR22 billion a year (USD785 million) [which would equate to more than half the total annual training budget).
Doctrine: the missing link?
There is a gaping hole in the reform programme: doctrine. The Russian military inherited from the former Soviet Union a founding tenet that doctrine, a notion of what conflicts it would be likely to fight and how it would fight them, drives every other aspect of military planning. However, while the upper echelons of Russia's political and military elite comprehend the strategic underpinnings of reform, this has yet to be made concrete in any such detailed document. As such, Russia's existing national security concept and doctrine documents are outdated and of limited use.
There is no Russian counterpart to the US Quadrennial Defense Review, in part because there is still no single, generally accepted vision for reform. Perhaps for the moment this is a strength, as it means Ivanov can push forward a review agenda without the need for bureaucratic and political consensus. In the long term, the implicit assumptions on which the present programme are based will need to be institutionalised, not least if it is to survive the end of Putin's presidency in 2008, by which time it will certainly not have been completed. •