Kriku kirjutas:
Küsimus on IMHO selles, et mida ülekaal õhus siinkohal tähendab.
Kriku kirjutas:
Teema juurde tagasi tulles - kui palju liitlaste ülekaal õhus seda muudaks?
Keegi ei oma täpset vastust sellele küsele - mida sa, Kriku, siin (miskipärast) nii jonnakalt raiud..
Siiski siiski. Vaatan, et kaur3 on postitanud uurimuse, mis osaliselt vastab Kriku küsimusele.
Lingi all on kahjuks veel vaid rootsikeelne raport. Viimane lause on hea.
Abstract
Russia currently has a decided advantage over NATO in terms of mechanised ground
forces in Eastern and Central Europe. However, NATO has an advantage over Russia in
terms of air power, raising the question whether NATO's weakness on the ground could
be compensated by stronger air power.
This study attempts to approach this issue by the creation and application of a simple
analytic model, proceeding in two stages. In the first stage, the long-range strike assets
that might be available in Europe in case of a limited war in the Baltic region are listed,
including the payloads they could deliver. After setting forces aside for air defence etc,
some 350 sorties per 24 hours could be used over time for strikes against ground targets.
The second stage deals with the effects of the application of this airpower against
attacking manoeuvre units and also against strategic air defence missiles in Kaliningrad.
The result is that a saturation attack on the air defence batteries could very well succeed,
while the results against manoeuvre units varies with the probability of target
identification and of successful prosecution.
But even under pessimistic assumptions,
Western air forces might destroy seven battalion combat teams every 24 hours.https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4798--SE Ehk siis ka kõige pessimistlikumate hinnangute põhjal on lääne õhujõuülekaal võrdne seitsme kustutatud pataljoni lahinggrupiga iga 24 h kohta.