Väga huvitav artikkel sellest kuidas Tallinna lähedalt avastatud S-200 rajatised veensid USA luuret, et tegu on raketitõrjesüsteemiga. See omakorda viis konkreetselt USAl=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_ ... ry_vehicle]MIRV lõhkepeade[/url] väljatöötamiseni:
How the S-200 lead Americans to arm ICBMs with MIRV warheads
Näitab hästi kui ebatänuväärt kompamine see luuretöö ikka on. Ikka päris kaua läks aega (7 aastat) ennem kui veenduti, et süsteemil pigem ei ole ballistiliste rakettide vastast võimekust
Loomulikult (nagu ikka) oli kandev roll poliitikal. 60ndate keskpaigas oli Õhujõududel kindel soov MIRV raketid välja töötada ja seda seda tundmatut süsteemi sai kasutada hirmutamiseks ,et oma Minuteman III soove läbi suruda.
Lühikronoloogia:
- 1964. a. juulis avastati, et Tallinna juures ehitatakse mingit uut taristut raketikompleksile, mis võis omada raketitõrjevõimekust.
- Samal aastal leitakse et MIRV on ikka hädavajalik (muuhulgas põhjendatakse tugevalt Tallinna leiuga) ja alustatske vastavate rakettide väljatöötamist (Minuteman III ja Poseidon)
- 1965. a. august ilmus esimene dokument, mis pani tõrjevõimekuse kahtluse alla ja arvas, et tegu on vaid uue pikamaa-õhutõrjesüsteemiga.
- 1965 a. novembris vaidlesid CIA (kus oldi seisukohal, et süsteemi ballistiliste rakettide tõrjevõimekus on minimaalne) ja DIA, armee ja õhujõudude luure (kus omakorda arvati, et tegu on põhiliselt raketitõrje süsteemiga). CIA viitas esialgu põhiliselt süsteemi radaritele, mis olid selgelt suunatud lennukite vastu (polnud päratu suured PESA radarid, mida katsetati Moskva lähedal)
- 1967. aastaks avaldab CIA memorandumi, kus väidab juba kategooriliselt, et raketikompleks suudab rünnata ainult aerodünaamilisi sihtmärke (lennukid ka tiibraketid), tuues mitmeid lisatõendeid. "poliitika" siiski jätkub, iga aasta kompleksi väidetavat ABM võimekust "ratsitakse" aga ohust pasundatakse edasi.
- Alles 1971. aastaks nõustuvad kõik osapooled et tegu on ainult õhutõrjeraketiga.
- Esimesed MIRV rakettide operatiivtestid viiakse läbi aga juba 1968. aastal (4. aastat peale seda kui programm Tallinna "avastuse" tõttu kiiruga käima löödi) 1970. aastaks oli Minuteman III juba lahingvõimeline.
Mõned lisamärkused:
1. Minuteman III programm läks maksma $12 miljardit dollarit, ajal mil kogu kaitseeelarve oli suurusjärgus $51 miljardit.
2. S-200 NATO koodnimi oli esmalt SA-5 "Tallinn Missile", ning alles tükka aega hiljem nimetati ümber praeguseks SA-5 Gammon'iks.
Tallinna rajatise illustratsioon luureraportist:
Ja foto 2006. a:
Mõned väljavõtted (aga pigem soovitan lugeda originaalartiklit):
On July 18, 1964, KH-4A Corona satellite Mission 1008 released its second (and last) load of film, eight days after launch.[7] The capsule reentered the Earth’s atmosphere and its parachute was caught and winched in by an Air Force transport aircraft. When analysts examined the film, they quickly noticed two new missile launch sites under construction in a pattern never seen before. One was just outside the town of Tallinn, the capital of Soviet Estonia. Construction there was further along than another site of the same pattern near Cherepovets, a town about halfway between Leningrad and Moscow.
On July 22, just four days after the film capsule was recovered, an alert went out that a new missile system had been discovered. The alert described the site at Tallinn in some detail. There were preparations for five missile batteries, each with six missile launch positions and some unidentified buildings approximately 900 meters (3,000 feet) away, all enclosed by a
security fence.[8] Cherepovets seemed to be similar, but the details were not as clear.
...
The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) released the first in a series of studies in an attempt to answer these questions in September 1964, after KH-7 GAMBIT satellite Mission 4010 took high resolution images of the launch complexes in August.[11] The study drew no conclusions as to the purpose of the system, merely describing the construction, noting that “no missiles or missile-related equipment were identified.”[12] It was a new system, but with only satellite photos of the launch facility under construction—buildings, roads, fences—there was no way to know the technical parameters of the missile or radars.
...
One paragraph of the estimate discussed the possibility that the Tallinn System was part of an ABM deployment. The next discussed what was known about the missile as a SAM. The CIA was willing to state that there “are persuasive reasons for believing that these complexes are related to missile defense.”[15] It seemed a reasonable conclusion because the Soviets were known to be working on ABM technology and this was a new defensive system.
...
It is impossible to guarantee that most methods for defeating ABM systems, like decoys to confuse or active signals to jam the defensive radars, will work. If the defenses were more capable than the Americans realized, then an American retaliation strike would be defeated and the Soviets would not be deterred from attack. The only way to absolutely guarantee penetration of the Soviet defenses was to launch more warheads than the Soviets had defensive missiles. This was the exhaustion method: if the Soviets had 100 ABM missiles around Moscow, then the Americans would launch 150 warheads at it and be sure of getting at least 50 through.[18] The only way to make that work economically was to fit multiple warheads onto a single missile.[19]
Before 1964, there was reluctance on the part of many in the military to deploy MIRV. Many felt that MIRV technology was nothing more than a cost-saving measure: if the US needed 200 ICBM warheads to deter Soviet attack, and it could put 10 warheads on a single missile, then the US only needed 20 missiles rather than 200, a substantial cost savings. It would be an inferior deterrent, though, because 20 missiles are substantially easier to attack than 200, so a greater percentage of the American warheads would likely be destroyed by an enemy first strike.
After the discovery of the Tallinn System, the defense establishment embraced MIRV technology. “Primary among these [reasons] was the renewed development of missile defense installations observed in the Soviet Union,” wrote one scholar afterwards.[20] Thanks to the requirement to exhaust any potential Soviet ABM system, deploying MIRV technology would now mean that there would still be 200 missiles, only they would carry 2,000 warheads rather than 200, a substantial increase in deterrence—and cost. The decision to deploy MIRV technology was made a few weeks before the NIE was published, in November 1964.[21] It would upgrade the backbone of the American missile force, the land-based Minuteman (the upgrade was designated Minuteman III) and the submarine-based Polaris (the upgraded Polaris was known as Poseidon.)[22]
With two Soviet missile systems under development, it soon became apparent that the system around Moscow (where the Galosh missile would go) was easy to defeat. It simply didn’t have enough missiles to successfully protect Moscow. The never-built full system that the Soviets intended to build would have had only 128 interceptor missiles. This might have been sufficient in 1961, when the US had less than 200 ICBMs, but not nearly sufficient in 1966, when the US deployed over 800 land-based Minuteman missiles and a further 650 sea-based Polaris missiles. In the end, the Soviets only ever built half of the launchers, just 64, because they could see the futility of the system.[23] The Tallinn System was deployed at over 100 locations around the Soviet Union, each with between 18 and 30 individual missile launchers, so even a very modest ABM capability across that many missiles might be able to alter the balance of terror.
...
Because there were no installed equipment or missiles in the new installations at Tallinn, Cherepovets, and Leningrad, US Intelligence had to turn to other sources of information in their hunt for the missiles. In April 1965, the Photographic Intelligence Division of the CIA issued a new study on the Tallinn System, which found that the size of the buildings did not match up with any known Soviet missile to that point. The report noted “the Galosh appears to be too large, and the Ganef [another Soviet missile observed but with an unknown launcher, later designated SA-4] too small, suggesting that the Soviets have one or more missiles we have yet to see in the Moscow parade.”[26] They could not rule out that the Galosh would go into the Tallinn emplacements though, only that it seemed unlikely.[27] Parades were not the only source of information that the CIA tapped. A Soviet propaganda film named “Rockets on Guard for Peace” showed a missile launch, and CIA analysis determined that the missile was a Galosh and geolocated the launch site to SSATC.[28]
missiles
...
By the November 1965 NIE, more information had been gathered and the battle lines of the debate over the Tallinn System were clearly drawn. The head of the CIA, in charge of the main text of the NIE, presented the Tallinn System as having very limited, if any, capability against ballistic missiles. The DIA, Army, and Air Force intelligence leaders, however, offered footnotes that expressed their belief that “it is more likely that the systems being deployed… are primarily for defense against ballistic missiles.”[31]
Early arguments were over the capabilities of the Back Net and Side Net radar systems associated with the Tallinn System. These were primitive, mechanically scanned radars clearly closely related to other SAM radars. The CIA argued that electronically scanned radars like the enormous fixed phased-array radars then under construction around Moscow for use by the Galosh missile (known in the US by the names Cat House and Dog House) were necessary for any ABM system. Many of the Tallinn System missiles were being deployed beyond the reach of those radars, therefore the missile likely did not have a significant ABM capability, according to CIA analysts.[32]
The defense services, by contrast, argued that:
it is more accurate to state that the Tallinn System is seriously degraded in an area defense role when off-site radar is not provided, but that this degradation does not apply to the Tallinn System operating in terminal defense mode. In the terminal defense mode the defended area is considerably reduced, but the firepower of the complexes and the performance of the on-site radar may be such that the capability to defend the terminal area targets would remain significant.[33]
In February 1966, CIA analysts finally found evidence of a missile at one of the SSATC sites that seemed to be prototypes of the Tallinn System. This missile had a “cluster of at least 3 booster sections” and was about 10 meters (35 feet) long.[34] This suggested that the missile was an ABM: a cluster of boosters suggested great speeds and range, far more than necessary for defending against airplanes. The document also noted at the same time that the Tallinn System sites at Sary Shagan had replaced the SA-2 systems around the SSATC: as the Tallinn style sites came online, SA-2 systems were deactivated.[35]35 This was suggestive that the Soviets expected the Tallinn System to deal with aircraft, as the SA-2 missile was their primary anti-aircraft missile, but did not rule out a secondary capability as a ABM.
The critical year of the Tallinn System debate was 1967. The CIA no longer would admit that the missile, as deployed, had even a modest ABM capability. In August, the CIA released an intelligence memorandum outlining and supporting its position that the Tallinn System was only capable of defending against aerodynamic threats, either airplanes or cruise missiles.