Hannu Hännise doktoritöö, 2007 kirjutas:The Meyer Yard’s Various ExplanationsAs described, the Investigation Commission was critical of the Estonia's design which
had been a direct cause for her capsizing. The Commission did not blame any marine
groups for having caused the accident, but their findings inevitably pointed in the
direction of the organizations that had planned, built, and inspected the Estonia's
deficient design. The investigation by the Commission also showed the shortcomings of
the regulatory agencies.
So, the Investigation Commission apportioned indirect responsibility of the accident
to Meyer Werft shipyard, the Bureau Veritas classification society, various Baltic
maritime administrations and the international regulatory system. The flag
administrations had not upgraded local visor requirements after visor incidents and the
international regulatory system had been slow to upgrade the visor requirements. The
local administrations had relied too much on the French classification society Bureau
Veritas in safety matters. Bureau Veritas had inspected the Estonia for insurability and
had monitored her throughout her history.
Of all interests groups, however, the findings of the Commission were maybe most
unfavorable to the German shipyard Meyer Werft who was responsible for the Estonia's
inadequate design and substandard construction. The Meyer yard did want to take
responsibility for the accident and therefore it produced alternative explanations for the
accident ranging from wild bomb theories to the incompetence of Estonian mariners.
The Meyers wanted to attract the media attention by these alternative explanations, and
by doing so show that their actions had not been the reason for the Estonia's capsizing.
Meyer Werft was at the time of the accident an old and well-established familyowned
shipyard. The Meyer family had built ships for more than two hundred years on
their yard in Papenburg on the Germany’s northern coast (Langewiesche 2004). They
had started from sailing ships and later built modem emise liners and ferries.
The Meyer
representatives had first cooperated straightforwardly with the Commission, but when
they realized that their actions were put in the spotlight, their attitudes changed
dramatically. After recognizing that their reputation was going to be threatened by the
findings of the Commission, the Meyer Werft started a ‘counter campaign’, which
aimed to change public risk perceptions. Another reason for their counter campaign was
the upcoming trials. In Stockholm the families of the victims had sued the Estonia's
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shipping company which again had sued the Meyer yard and the classification society,
Bureau Veritas. And the families of the Estonia victims had sued the Meyer yard and
Bureau Veritas also in France. The yard prepared carefully for its counter strike. From
the beginning, the Meyer campaign was well planned and showed that their
representatives understood the workings of the media. The campaign eventually caused
plenty of confusion in the public debate on the causes of the Estonia tragedy.
The head of the Meyer’s campaign was a senior attorney, Peter Holtappels, from
Hamburg. He had been a trusted associate of the yard for years. This time Holtappels
had a demanding task of putting together a group of technical experts to investigate the
accident on their own terms. However, there was an inherent contradiction in the whole
process.
The investigation group, which was named the “German Group of Experts”,
was supposed to carry a completely independent investigation free from the Meyer
Werff s interference, although the Meyer yard was going to fund the entire exercise.
The actions of the German Group of Experts showed from the very start that the main
purpose of the group was not, after all, to investigate the accident but rather to cause
confusion by presenting alternative explanations and thereby calling into question the
findings of the Commission of the accident. The Group of Experts based their
description of the accident events selectively on underwater video recordings, expert
statements, and the work of the Investigation Commission.
Thus, it seems warranted to argue that the German Group of Experts was clearly
created for propaganda purposes. Their work may be described as quasi-scientific
because it aimed at appearing scientific at the surface but a closer inspection reveals that
there was not any real research behind the arguments. Instead of thoroughly
investigating the case and providing a coherent and empirically supported explanation
for the case, the Group of Experts presented separate speculative claims about possible
accident causes. Their actions would have been harmless had not their speculative
theories gathered so much attention in the media. Holtappels and other Meyer
representatives also managed to reach out to the families of the dead accident victims.
Many families of the dead had sought for some type of justification for what had
happened in the accident. Their sorrow and loss were a fruitful ground for the
alternative interpretations of the accident and its causes. Many of these families allied
with the German Group of Experts adding a moral element to the Meyer campaign. This
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again only got the media more interested in the case and thereby opened a channel for
the Group of Experts to reach a wider audience.
The Meyer representatives held two weeklong “exhibitions” in Stockholm, Sweden
for the families of the victims and the media (Langewiesche 2004). These very
emotional gatherings lured the media and thus worked as had been planned. The point
was that, allegedly, there had not been anything wrong with the Estonia's design, but
the real problem had been the vessel’s poor maintenance and incorrect handling. This of
course would have meant that the Meyer yard would have played no part in causing the
Estonia accident. The Group of Experts tried to illustrate how the Estonia's claimed
poor maintaining and incorrect handling had been so obvious that the Investigation
Commission must have understood them and therefore their upcoming research findings
were part of a cover-up operation to hide to the real causes.
The second of the Meyer exhibitions was timed to coincide with the publication of
the final investigation report by the Commission in December 1997. At the exhibition
Holtappels criticized the Investigation Commission’s final report by claiming that it was
not even worth its weight in paper. Other Meyer representatives speculated that besides
the proven ramp opening, there had been a hole on the Estonia's starboard side, which
had contributed to the rapid capsizing. Yet, this could not be proven because the Estonia
happened to lie on that side.
Meyer representatives started later to speculate with bomb theories. Werner
Hummel, who was one of the main figures in the Group of Experts, argued in the TV4
news in Sweden in August, 1999 that the Estonia had been bombed during her accident.
He insisted that visor had come off because of poor maintenance but the bomb had
accelerated this process. The same bomb theory was also presented in the Estonian
newspaper, Eesti Päevaleht.
The bomb explanation was at least the fifth alternative
explanation for the Estonia accident that the Group of Experts had produced by 1999.
Hummel had earlier speculated in the British Naval Architect magazine that one of the
Estonia's fin stabilizers had come loose causing a hole in the vessel’s hull. The
speculated hole was according to Hummel also on the Estonia's hidden starboard side.
After Finnish investigators Kari Lehtola and Tuomo Karppinen from the Commission of
the accident had proven this theory impossible, Hummel had developed the bomb
theory.
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At this point, the researchers of the Investigation Commission felt it necessary to
correct the various alternative explanations emerging to challenge those of the
Commission. Kari Lehtola, who had been the head of the Finnish delegation in the
Investigation Commission, stated for the Helsingin Sanomat newspaper in August 1999
that “
After one theory is proven wrong he (Hummel) comes up with another like lifting
a rabbit out of a hat”. In the same newspaper article the Commission’s investigator
Tuomo Karppinen was quoted saying: “The Germans (the Group of Experts) should
write down in black and white specifically what they claim, where the bombs were,
what damage they caused, and why they would have been there." Reacting to the
Meyers’ explanations caused extra work to some of the Commission’s investigators but
they were able to prove these unwarranted explanations wrong one by one. The Group
of Experts again reacted to these corrections by introducing another explanation of their
own. This caused harm to the Commission’s investigators, who had really examined
and analyzed the Estonia case.
The Group of Experts eventually came up with their own final report, which they
published in the spring of 2000. The report was also posted on the Internet. The report
was very different from typical accident investigation reports and academic failure
analyses in that it had no clear focus, nor was it based on clearly indicated and reported
facts and reasoning. The report was a combination of alternative claims without
systematic empirical support, rumors, and even personal attacks. The final report
emphasized the earlier claims that the Estonians had handled the vessel brutally and
maintained and serviced her poorly. Therefore, the vessel’s visor and its parts were said
to have been in poor condition at the time of the accident. It was also pointed out that
the rubber seal around the visor had gone bad, allowing water leaks. In addition, the
Group of Experts argued that the Estonia's visor was not only leaking but was also
badly misaligned and that the ramp had been severely twisted. It was thus contended
that the visor and the ramp could not have been fully closed and sealed. Curiously, it
was claimed that the Estonia's crew had used mattresses, clothes, and ropes in sealing
the leaks.
The Investigation Commission had noticed the erosion on the rubber seal and they
concluded that the leaks were undesirable but that they had been irrelevant to the
Estonia's capsizing. With regard to the alleged conditions of the visor and ramp, the
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Commission stated that the Estonians had inspected the vessel before her final voyage
and would certainly have noticed if these parts had been in such a poor condition. The
Commission’s findings do not support the claims that the visor could not have been
properly closed, nor that mattresses and ropes would have been used in sealing.
There were also direct accusations in the Meyer report. The Group of Experts
attacked the Finnish accident investigators by claiming that they had found the
Estonia's bow visor already on December 2, 1994 from beneath the vessel’s wreck.
They stated that the vessel’s bow had been on top of the visor. They also blamed the
Finnish investigators for hiding the alleged fact that they had found the visor earlier and
for pretending to continue the visor search. The alleged motivation for this was said to
be buying time to clean the surrounding of the wreck from Swedish mines together with
Swedish minesweepers. The Experts also suspected that the Commission had hidden
parts of the Estonia evidence. Yet, no evidence was presented to support these
allegations.
Although the report by the Group of Experts was obviously self-serving, it did its
job. It succeeded in creating lots of confusion and directing the public attention away
from the findings by the Investigation Commission. The effects were enduring. Still
today, many people are confused about the true causes for the Estonia accident.
Miraculously, the Meyer Werft shipyard was able to limit its losses. Largely because of
the company’s counter campaign, its reputation and finances did not suffer much from
the Estonia accident. The efforts by Holtappels and other Meyer representatives had
paid off. Escaping the responsibility had not been guaranteed at all. After all, it was the
Meyer Werft shipyard that had designed and built the Estonia and her bow structures
including the failed bow visor. They had been responsible for the Estonia's failed visor
attachments, which had even been constructed with less strength than the simplistic
strength calculations had required.
The Meyer’s counter campaign turned many of the Estonia's survivors and the
families of the dead against the Investigation Commission. These survivors and families
of the dead did not understand that the Commission had been the only group who had
thoroughly investigated the case and whose interest was to improve safety. The
Investigation Commission made several safety recommendations in their final report,
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many of which led to practical improvements later,
whereas no recommendations were
made in the thick Meyer report.
