Iisraeli-Hezbollahi sõjast
Siin on 1 artikkel Vene juhitavatest tankitõrjerelvadest, mida kasutasid ka Hezbollahi võtilejad.
http://rapidshare.de/files/35679205/Rus ... W.pdf.html
http://rapidshare.de/files/35679205/Rus ... W.pdf.html
"Israeli military evaluates tank vulnerability in Lebanon."
Üleval aknas lk 18-19.
http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/mh/dti0906/
Üleval aknas lk 18-19.
http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/mh/dti0906/
The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1196773316.pdfEdited by Shlomo Brom and Meir Elran, the book includes sixteen analytical essays and three appendices on the Second Lebanon War. Studying both the Israeli dimensions of the clash and the greater regional issues, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the war and posits the strategic conclusions that can be drawn from it.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080 ... -iswar.pdfThe dangers of “proliferating” advanced light weapons to asymmetric and insurgent forces: Another warning comes from the Hezbollah use of advanced anti-tank weapons; manportable and light surface-to-air missiles, and anti-ship missiles. The situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan would be very different if the US and its allies faced anything like the same threat. It could have a major impact on the use of tactical airpower, but it would raise far more serious questions about the value of uparmoring and the security of tactical and logistic movements.
Russian Anti-Armour Weapons and Israeli Tanks in Lebanon
Mikhail Barabanov
Mikhail Barabanov
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2007/item2/item1/According to various Israeli and Western sources, during the course of battle in Lebanon, between 46 and 50 Merkava main battle tanks (of the 400 deployed) and 14 APCs were hit by anti-tank weapons, including 22 incidents where tank armour and 5 cases where APC armour was penetrated. Another six tanks and at least one APC were blown up by mines and IDEs.
Of those tanks hit by anti-tank weapons, 18 were the newest Merkava Mk 4 version (from the 401st armoured brigade), and six of these had their armour penetrated. Twenty-three tank and five APC crew members were killed. A large number of anti-tank guide-missiles and RPG grenades hit the tanks, but in most cases these did little damage. It was reported that one of the Merkava Mk 4 tanks survived 23 hits from anti-tank guided—missiles before it was finally disabled and its armour penetrated. All penetrations of Merkava armour, according to Israeli statements, were achieved by the Konkurs, Metis-M and Kornet-E anti-tank guided—missiles, and the RPG-29 rocket-propelled grenades. If one considers that 22 of 50 tanks had their armour penetrated, that gives a penetration rate of 44% (and only 33% for the Merkava Mk 4). According to Israeli Army statistics, the penetration rate for tanks during the 1982 Lebanon War was 47%, and 60% during the 1973 War. The crew casualties rate was also much higher in 2006 at 0.5 crew member for each damaged tank, while the rate per disabled tank in 1973 War is one full crew member.
The number of irrecoverable tank losses among those damaged, according to recent Israeli publications, was five altogether, of which two (a Merkava Mk 2 and Mk 4) were destroyed by IDEs and three tanks were completely burned out after hits by guided anti-tank guided—missiles. This attests to the high degree of protection afforded by the most modern Merkava Mk 4 tanks, which could be damaged only by the most modern anti-tank weapons with powerful tandem HEAT warheads hitting, it would seem, weakened armoured zones.
The extremely low percentage of missile hits and the low percentage of armour penetration clearly shows that the vast majority of anti-tank guided—missiles were of the old type, most likely the completely obsolete Malyutka (and its many copies), with clumsy guidance systems (manual, on the oldest models), with no modern sights and a relatively small warhead, by modern standards.
It appears that non-modernized second generation anti-tank guided—missiles produced in the 1970s (Fagot, Konkurs, MILAN, TOW) were used in battle. The Kornet-E and Metis-M systems, with their much higher level of effectiveness, were clearly present in very small numbers, but accounted for the majority of Israeli losses. This allows one to conclude that Israel made an issue of the possession of these new systems by Hezbollah mostly for political, rather than strictly military, reasons. On the other hand, if Hezbollah had a large number of Kornet-E and Metis-M systems, the Israeli tank attack in Lebanon could have been completely repelled. Modern Russian weapons proved to be quite effective against the newest Western equipment.
The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... PUB882.pdf
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... PUB882.pdf
HOW HEZBOLLAH DEFEATED ISRAEL:
PART 1: Winning the intelligence war
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html
PART 2: Winning the ground war
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ13Ak01.html
PART 3: The political war
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ14Ak01.html
PART 1: Winning the intelligence war
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html
PART 2: Winning the ground war
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ13Ak01.html
PART 3: The political war
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ14Ak01.html
Paar lugu Hezbollahi sõjapidamise kohta.
http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Books/Arkin/arkin.pdf
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/MSPS71.pdf
http://airwolf.lmtonline.com/news/archi ... agea16.pdf
http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Books/Arkin/arkin.pdf
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/MSPS71.pdf
http://airwolf.lmtonline.com/news/archi ... agea16.pdf
Kuna IDF-Hamasi teema on suletus, siis panen loo siia. Head lugemist.
http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=367908
http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=367908
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