Venemaa sõjaline võimekus ja armeereform(id)

[Turist 47]

" Venemaa hoiatab Suurbritanniat: seilake uuesti Krimmi lähedal ja teie meremehed saavad haiget "
https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia- ... e=homepage
Venemaa Julgeolekunõukogu asekantsleri Mihhail Popovi tehtud tänane hoiatus järgnes eelmisel kuul juhtunule,
kui Suurbritannia sõjalaev HMS Defender oli Krimmi lähedal Ukraina territoriaalvetes, mis Moskva väitel kuulub Venemaale.

[ruger]

Venelaste tehnikat liigub Ukraina suunas. Nende hulgas ka sisevägesid üsna palju.

Tankid ja jalaväe lahingumasinad rongiešelonis Krasnodari krais. Tunnusmärgid üle värvitud.
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 0218727430
Siseväed Krasnodari krais.
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 6103343110
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 7041523713
Siseväed Rostovi äärelinnas Aksais
https://twitter.com/tom_bullock_/status ... 9626770433
https://twitter.com/tom_bullock_/status ... 3697012752
Veel tankiešelon, mille hulgas ka BMPT-Terminator'id.
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 0118808576
Soomukid ja muu tehnika Stavropoli krais.
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 3088822275
Mingi üksuse väljasõidukolonn(võib olla vanem video)
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 7586862084
Kaitseminister Zhoigu käis renoveeritud üksuses Rostovis
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1415393510522605569
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1415398727746035712

Lääne-SVR harjutab

Video of a Western Military District live-fire exercise with 2S23 Nona-SVK 120mm mortars, Msta-B howitzers, Orlan-10 UAVs, and Mi-24 helicopters.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1415354306002407430

Soomustatud Typhoon MRAP veoautod strateegiliste raketivägede üksuste koosseisus

I think this is the first time I’ve seen a K-53949 Typhoon-K MRAP in service with an Iskander-M Brigade (20th Missile Brigade in Ussuriysk). I would expect to see more MRAPs with Iskander and Yars units.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1415387829098659843

Kasakaüksused lähevad Rosgvardija koosseisu ja saavad relvastatud

Dmitry Peskov said that units of Cossacks will become part of Rosgvardia in a number of regions, and they will be armed.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1415359030743216132

EDIT-15.07.2021
Vägede liikumisi veidi. 2 videot.
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 3047761927

[ruger]

Vene armee kriminaalsemast poolest 2021 aastal.

The Investigative Committee of Russia announced an increase in crimes committed by servicemen in 2021.
-32.6% increase in serious and especially serious crimes
-35.5% increase in robbery cases
-35.4% increase in extortion
-1.5 times more corruption cases

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1415717421202264065
https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/60f01df69a7947a0416c77a2

[ruger]

Tehnikast Venemaal puudus ei tule.
Eile 15.07.2021 Tuulas rongiešelon tankide ja soomukitega.
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 9007852545
Täna 16.07.2021 kolonn tee ääres-palju kütuseautosid. Lisaks 2 suitsukatte või desinfitseerimise masinat.
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 5930261510

[ermot]

Ehk pakub huvi. Venelased on paralleelselt T-90 arendamisega võtnud ette saatemasina arendamise, mida nad ise kutsuvad tankihävitajaks või siis tanki ihukaitsjaks. Näha saab seda imelooma järgmisest kohast:
Военная приёмка. БМПТ «Терминатор». Телохранитель для танка
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6B8ZJlLqXtY&t=1s

[ruger]

Venelased siis katsetasid Tsirkoon ülehelikiirusel liikuvat tiibraketti. Kas ta nüüd MACH7 saavutas on küsimus...

”The Admiral Gorshkov frigate has successfully test-fired the Tsirkon hypersonic missile against a surface target at the range of over 350 km and the flight speed reached 7 Mach”

https://twitter.com/balticjam/status/14 ... 4357328897
Video ka laskmisest
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1417131944333152259

Britid hindavad Vene armee võimekust. Meiegi oleme nende jaoks olulised.

The one problem would be Kalibr missiles launched from Russian warships in the Baltic. And this justifies the British Army deployment in Estonia. As long as NATO holds the northwest coast of Estonia, the Russian Baltic fleet would be unable to undertake sustained operations, split between its forward operating base at Kaliningrad and its dockyards at St Petersburg and unable to move between the two.

This suggests that Estonia should be the British Army’s main focus in Nato, a place where a small force can exercise great strategic effect.

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/how-strong-is-russia/

Peterburgis sõitis 2 Vene mereväealust kokku. Venelaste ametliku info järgi midagi sellist ei juhtunud.
https://www.dialog.ua/russia/233126_1626699083

[Crispy]

Ehk pakub huvi. Venelased on paralleelselt T-90 arendamisega võtnud ette saatemasina arendamise, mida nad ise kutsuvad tankihävitajaks või siis tanki ihukaitsjaks. Näha saab seda imelooma järgmisest kohast:
Военная приёмка. БМПТ «Терминатор». Телохранитель для танка
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6B8ZJlLqXtY&t=1s

See masin pärineb juba vist 2010 aastate algusest. Muuhulgas müüdud ka Alžeeriale.

[kaugeltuuriv]

Nagu ma aru saan,siis Vene Välisministeerium olevat kritiseerinud eilset Pentagoni pressikat,kus USA Kaitseministeeriumi pressisekretär arutles Venemaa hüperrakettide üle.
Ma ei ole ise Pentagoni materjale näinud,kuid Venemaa Välisministeeriumi pressinaine(ma ei oskagi seda pidutsevat ja väidetavalt alkoholi liigpruukivat daami muudmoodi nimetada) olevat õhku täis läinud ning teatanud,et kui USA soovib tuua omad hüperkiirusel liikuvad raketid Euroopasse,siis Venemaa on valmis sõjaks.
Usun,et Pentagon kommenteeris seda planeeritavat Avangard raketikatsetust,võimalik isegi,et hoiatati Venemaad selle eest,et USA ja temna liitlased vastavad advekaatsete meetmetega.

[kaugeltuuriv]

Ehk pakub huvi. Venelased on paralleelselt T-90 arendamisega võtnud ette saatemasina arendamise, mida nad ise kutsuvad tankihävitajaks või siis tanki ihukaitsjaks. Näha saab seda imelooma järgmisest kohast:
Военная приёмка. БМПТ «Терминатор». Телохранитель для танка
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6B8ZJlLqXtY&t=1s

See masin pärineb juba vist 2010 aastate algusest. Muuhulgas müüdud ka Alžeeriale.

Kas see ei ole see masin,mida pidavat treidama T-55 alusele,milliseid on Venemaa NZ ladudes veel alles ning peaksid minema utiili vanuse tõttu.Kuskil 2000 keskpaigas tekkis küsimus,kas mitte kasutada neid masina jaoks,mis oleks nagu soomuse poolt parem,kui BMP.Väidetavalt olid nad just eksporditurule algselt mõeldudki aga kundede huvipuuduse tõttu pidi Venemaa kaitseministeerium osaliselt neid ise ostma.
Ega idee iseenesest pole originaalne,Israel on ju ka kasutanud sõjasaagiks saadud T-55 aluseid soomustatud toetusmasinate valmistamiseks ning näiteks II Maailmasõja ajal tegid kanadalased enam vähem samasugust asja,tõsi mitte T-55-tega, mida tollal ei olnud vaid Shermanite vankritega.kuplit ei pandud peale,selle asemel tehti jalaväerühma jaoks selline BMP taoline asi.Tõsi,kahurit nagu venelaste BMP-del ei olnud ja kaetud polnud ka tankitorni jaoks ettenähtud ava.relvastatud oli vist 2 kuulipildujaga Browning.

[ruger]

Rootsi sõjaväeakadeemia analüüs-Venemaa valmistub lokaalseteks pikaajalisteks sõdadeks.

”Russia is preparing for a protracted conflict with the West. The importance of military force to achieve geopolitical goals in international relations is increasing (§34). There is a growing danger that armed conflicts will escalate from local to…

Back to the future - Russia's national security strategy 2021

It finally steams down, the new revised Russian national security strategy - announced in the Russian media throughout the spring. The new document is largely based on the 2015 version but contains some significant news.

Russia is preparing for a protracted conflict with the West. The importance of military force to achieve geopolitical goals in international relations is increasing (§34). There is a growing danger that armed conflicts will escalate from local to regional wars, in which, for example, nuclear-weapon states participate (§17).

It should first be said that the national security strategy is the most important strategy document - also according to Russian law on strategic planning - and this year's edition is the third in the series or possibly the fifth. In 1997 and 2000, the document was called a concept. As in previous years, this strategy document deals with nine different policy areas. Like previous documents, it is characterized by the spirit of the times - the experiences from the pandemic are reminiscent and also the protests in Belarus. However, this is not a strategy document with precise schedules and reconciliation points. Much of what is written in this document is not implemented, but its message shows a direction of travel and a pronounced political will on where Russia is headed.

Most of it is about domestic security and the need for the state to shape good and healthy Russian citizens. The message is even stronger in the 2021 edition of the national security strategy compared with 2015. The state's socio-economic policy must thus ensure that Russia's population has a dignified life, develops freely, has better health and lives longer. The purpose is to shape "a harmoniously developed and socially responsible citizen" (§32). And the section that deals with state and social security prescribes that the state's role as guarantor of the individual's security shall be strengthened (§41). As in 2015, the strategy points to “destructive forces abroad and within the country” that interfere in Russia's internal affairs and try to undermine the stability of the Russian interior (§44).

The document depicts a Russia that is admittedly more cohesive and that has managed to resist attempts to destabilize the country, but also a Russia where problems remain. The country's population must increase and the state of health must improve; the quality of life of the population needs to be improved, the proportion of the poor must be reduced and social inequality must be combated. It is also clear that Russia intends to be better prepared for a possible new pandemic - a system for monitoring "biological risks" will be developed and the population's "sanitary-epidemiological prosperity" will be guaranteed (§33: 8-9). Eliminating these problems is also important because forces inside and outside the country can use Russia's "objective socio-economic difficulties" to destabilize society and the country as a whole (§44).

Information security and scientific and technological development

Information security has its own section as in 2015, and here Russia continues on the already established line. The writings about the need to create a sovereign Russian sphere of information have been strengthened somewhat - "correct" information about Russia and Russia's official view of the country's actions internationally should benefit the population. As before, both technical information security (cyber security) and psychological information security are treated in parallel in the section, and not least young people are considered susceptible to “destructive influence” (§52). The actions of multinational companies are criticized and they are accused of censorship.

The strategy paper further states that Russia does not receive support for its view of international information security from certain other countries. This reflects the development that has taken place within the UN, where Russia has achieved some success through the adoption of Moscow's proposals for resolutions on international information security and cybercrime, respectively, in the UN General Assembly. Countries in the West, however, have a different view than Russia and the resolutions are not binding agreements either, which Russia and countries like China want to achieve.

For the first time, encryption and anonymity on the Internet are also specifically mentioned as a problem in the strategy. Artificial intelligence and quantum computers are also appearing for the first time in the strategy and are being touted as promising technologies to strengthen Russian information security.

Already the introduction states that Russia will reach a new level of economic development and that it will do so by developing the country's scientific potential, a commitment that is recognized from, for example, Putin's annual line figures 2018. The section dealing with scientific and technological development also repeats a a number of intentions that are also contained in the country's separate strategy for scientific and technological development and in related documents. Being one of the leading countries technologically in the world is, according to the strategy, also one of the key factors for the country's national security (§68).

Once again, the view is that state governance should be central to stimulating technological development and the innovation climate. Nor is this news but goals that have long existed and that seem difficult to achieve except in limited areas of technology and mainly in military research and development. The goal of increasing exchanges and cooperation between the civilian and military R&D sectors is far from new, but there are also no signs that this will happen. Russia has strong basic research and a well-educated population, but the climate of innovation will be difficult, if not impossible, to change without economic reforms. And economic reforms do not seem to be on the way. Even less political ones.

Uncertainty grows - the rhetoric hardens

All formulations about working with the United States and NATO to maintain strategic stability are gone, as are details of Russia's cooperation with the EU. The foreign policy part has been shortened from 20 paragraphs to seven. Anti-Western rhetoric, on the other hand, has been sharpened further, and now there is talk of "unfriendly states" and the West's attempt to "preserve its hegemony". At the same time, it is said that the Western, liberal model is in crisis and that the West is trying to undermine traditional values, distort history, revise the view of Russia's role and place in the world and rehabilitate fascism (§ 19). All references to Ukraine have been removed, except in the wording that Russia wants to strengthen relations with the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples. "Some countries" are accused of trying to "initiate disintegration processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States" in order to destroy these countries' traditional relations with Russia (§17). For Russia, the protests in Belarus are organized by the West and not the result of internal dissatisfaction with Lukashenko or stolen elections. And it is doing so to the detriment of Russia and its relations with countries that have traditionally been allied with Moscow.

The country's defense, previously mentioned first in Russia's national strategic priorities, has now been given a foothold in favor of "the protection of Russia's people and the development of human potential." But that does not mean that the role of defense has been degraded. The document is permeated by the need for Russia to defend itself by all means, to strengthen its readiness for mobilization, including putting the economy at war. The piece about the traditional Russian spiritual and moral values ​​has been expanded to a completely separate section. The purpose is to ensure "Russia's cultural sovereignty and to preserve a unified cultural sphere" (§93.7).

The US missile defense and NATO at Russia's borders are described as a threat. Furthermore, according to the document, the United States plans to place medium-range robots in Europe and the Pacific region, which is described as a threat to strategic stability (§36). To secure Russia's defense of the country, the Armed Forces and other armed forces have fourteen priority tasks (§40). Among the most important are: improving the system of military planning in order to develop interconnected means, ie political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information-related and other means. The wording on nuclear weapons that "nuclear deterrence should be maintained at a sufficient level" is the same as in 2015. The term "sufficient level" derives from Soviet military theory from the late Soviet era under Mikhail Gorbachev.

The "Westernization" (vesternizatsija) of culture is seen as a threat. The United States and its allies are said to be actively attacking traditional Russian spiritual, moral, and cultural-historical values. So do foreign NGOs, multinational corporations, and religious, terrorist, and extremist organizations. So what are these values ​​that are being attacked? Several things are said to be characteristic, including patriotism, to serve the Fatherland and take responsibility for its fate, to prioritize the spiritual over the material, collectivism and historical memory and continuity between generations, and the unity among the people of Russia (§91). As far as generations are concerned, however, it is noted that the gap between them is growing (§86).

Finally: the word God is not mentioned at all despite the fact that both the constitution (after the amendments in 2020) and the national anthem do.

The image of a Russia that has - once again - turned away from the West and that at the same time defends the whole of European civilization is fading. It echoes the myth of Moscow as the third Rome. This is certainly nothing new or particularly original. President Vladimir Putin was very clear, not least in 2012:

"Russia can and must play a worthy role, dictated by its model of civilization, great history, geography and its cultural set-up, which organically unites the foundations of European civilization and the experience of cooperation with the East."

The document also reflects an internal contradiction. Russia must strive for a leading position in a dangerous world, a world in change and which thus also offers opportunities for the strong to be a driving force in a high-tech race. At the same time, the greatness of the nation-state and the empire is evoked from the past. State governance and control are key words and repression against independent political forces is a necessity. The freedom, loyalty and creativity of the population must be promoted in a straightforward, controlled manner while at the same time fighting enemies within and outside the country. The idea of ​​a dynamic future nation is reflected in the past - a paradox that challenges not only Russia.
Gudrun Persson is an associate professor, research leader and member of KKrVA. Carolona Vendil Pallin is a PhD, research leader and member of KKrVA.

https://kkrva.se/tillbaka-till-framtide ... tegi-2021/

[nimetu]

Kas see ei ole see masin,mida pidavat treidama T-55 alusele,milliseid on Venemaa NZ ladudes veel alles ning peaksid minema utiili vanuse tõttu

Antud masin põhineb siiski T-72-el.


Mis puudutab aga seda Venemaa kaitsepoliitikat... Arvestades, et seal ohtralt tähelepanu saava sotsiaalmajandusliku olukorra parandamiseks ei ole tehtud ja tõenäoliselt ei tehta ka tulevikus reaalselt midagi, siis võib selle dokumendiga põhimõtteliselt tagumikku pühkida, sest enamus sellest on sisutu sõnavaht.

[ruger]

Veidi venelaste liigutamisi

Krasnodari(Kertši piirkonnas) asub Vene armee BTG, millel osal tehnikal juba tuttavad ülevärvitud üksuse tunnused. Lisaks samas piirkonnas oleval üksusel TOS-1 ja GRAD laskeseadeldised.
https://twitter.com/pmakela1/status/1417522425596719107
https://twitter.com/pmakela1/status/1417522493385019393

Kolonn tehnikaga Krasnodari krais
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 3777277954

Brjanski oblastis MSTA-S liikursuurtükid
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 3585086466
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 9196814338

Voronežhi oblastis
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 3989620737

Väidetavalt Peterburgi oblastis TOS-1 ja muud tehnikat
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 0461380610

Lipetski oblastis
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 9140700171

Kurski oblastis
https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status ... 1743456261

[Tundmatu sõdur nr. 4]

Ehk pakub huvi. Venelased on paralleelselt T-90 arendamisega võtnud ette saatemasina arendamise, mida nad ise kutsuvad tankihävitajaks või siis tanki ihukaitsjaks. Näha saab seda imelooma järgmisest kohast:
Военная приёмка. БМПТ «Терминатор». Телохранитель для танка
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6B8ZJlLqXtY&t=1s

BMPT - Bojevaja Mašina Podderžki Tankov..
Aint too "imemasin" on ju vana nagu surm - kogu konstrui pärit sajandivahetusest..
Turgu pole seniajani leidnud // erilist kasutust ka mitte - "analooge mitteomav" ühesõnaga..
Kindlasti on ka siitsamast foorumist juba ammu läbi käind..

P.S.
kooskõlas selle "analooge mitteomava" masinaga võtavad venelased toda T90 tanki ju ka "ette" juba vähemalt 30a

[ruger]

Venelased lubavad veel 2021 aasta jooksul vägedele anda hulga tehnikat.

The Russian Ground Forces will receive more than 800 armored vehicles this year, including >90 T-72B3 and T-72B3M tanks, ~80 T-80BVM, a batch of T-90M, >120 BMP-3, BMP-2M with the Berezhok turrets, and ~300 BTR-82A/AM vehicles.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1417593591933939718

[nimetu]

kooskõlas selle "analooge mitteomava" masinaga võtavad venelased toda T90 tanki ju ka "ette" juba vähemalt 30a

Erinevalt BMPT-st on T-90 ikka mingil määral toodetud ka. Kuigi eks ta paras nali ole jah, et muudkui leiutavad uusi asju, kuid reaalse tootmiseni ei jõua praktiliselt ükski.