Venemaa sõjaline võimekus ja armeereform(id)

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kaur3
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About Russian Military Reform

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About Russian Military Reform
Mark Galeotti
Jane’s Intelligence Review
April, 2006


A few years ago, Russian officers would quietly refer to the military reform plans of the day as "communism". The reason, they would explain, is that the golden era always remained just over the horizon while today's realities guaranteed shortages and inefficiencies.
Following 15 years since the break up of the Soviet Union, in which "reform" has meant little more than decay, there is still considerable scepticism. However, there are some signs of progress, and with them a slight but perceptible optimism within the High Command.
In part, this stems from President Vladimir Putin's desire tr see Russia regain a meaningful military capability, which is apparent in the resurgence of nationalist propaganda about the armed forces and continued support given to Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, who was given the dual role of deputy prime minister responsible for the security agencies in November 2005.
Some lessons have been learned from years of failed piecemeal reforms, which were variously focused on personnel (but never considering how to equip them properly), armaments (disregarding whether new kit could be used effectively) and organisation (which became nothing more than a redrawing of organisation charts with no bearing on the reality on the ground).
The new reform process is built around the notion of simultaneous development along four axes: personnel, organisation, armament and doctrine. While this could seem an extravagantly ambitious ideal, it reflects the fact that (he Russian military is in systemic crisis and in desperate need of complete overhaul.
The implicit assumption was once that Russia's armed forces should seek to be a smaller equivalent of the Soviet military, capable of global power projection and
sustaining conventional wars in both Europe and Asia. Putin has now accepted more limited goals, of wanting to create modern armed forces that can sustain a coun-terinsurgency war (such as that in Chechnya) at the same time as a single substantial overseas mission outside Russia's borders (such as a peacekeeping operation in Central Asia), while still maintaining a nuclear deterrent and mobilisation capability to counter a single, major military challenge (the tacit assumption is that this would come from China).
This permits greater freedom of manoeuvre in addressing the four main areas for reform, although the rate of progress is likely to be variable across these areas.

Personnel; thankless tasks
The quality of Russian soldiers and officers, discipline within the ranks and the future of the draft were thrown into sharp focus in January by the case of Andrei Sychev, a conscript whose legs and genitals had to be amputated after being beaten by drunken fellow soldiers on New Year's Eve. Three soldiers have been disciplined over this incident so far. Ivanov initially attempted to dismiss the incident as "nothing serious", but faced with a rising tide of public anger he was called to answer to the State Duma session, where he admitted that it was an "outrageous occurrence". This case highlighted the plight of a military forced to depend on draftees who in the main do not wish to serve.
To be able to maintain a meaningful reserve base from which to mobilise mass armies for any conventional war with China, they need to retain the draft.
This remains central to Russian doctrine and rules out a complete shift to a professional army. In any case, service in the Russian military - especially with the likelihood of active duty in Chechnya - is an unappealing prospect and Moscow cannot afford to pay the level of salary that could attract volunteers of suitable quality in the necessary numbers.
The armed forces are being cut by another 100,000 over the next year, but for the foreseeable future Russia will have to rely on recalcitrant draftees and relatively low-quality contract recruits''
The plan is that by 2008, 70 per cent of the armed forces will be professional, and the length of draft then be reduced from two years to one year, but similar
promises have been made in the past and not been kept.

Organisation: chance for progress
The most recent organisational reform was formulated in December 2005. Developed by Colonel General Aleksandr Rukshin, head of the General Staff's primary think tank, its Main Operations Directorate, it was given powerful backing by Chief of the General Staff General Yury Baluyevsky. The plan uses the latest rounds of force reductions as the basis to propose a major reorganisation of the armed forces' territorial structure.
The Russian armed forces are currently composed of three arms of service (Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy) and three special arms (the Strategic Forces, the Airborne Forces, and the Space Forces). There are also geographical commands, with each of six military districts and four fleets having its own all-arm command structure. The proposal is to replace the military districts with three regional commands: European, Central Asian and Far Eastern, which would be all-arms structures. Only the Strategic Forces would remain outside this new territorial structure.
This would streamline a cumbersome command structure that appears little more than an excuse to maintain a sizeable pool of ageing generals in the manner to which they have become accustomed.
Baluyevsky has publicly expressed his belief that Russia faces no immediate conventional external enemy, and contends that the new structure will also rationalise the chain of command when dealing with terrorist and insurgent attacks. At present, for example, federal forces in Chechnya are under the Unified Federal Forces Commander who is subordinated to the North Caucasus Military District. The military district commander reports not only to the General Staff but also to the separate Ground Forces High Command (as this command has overall responsibility for the Chechen war).
When airborne and air forces are involved, their respective command structures in Moscow come into play, and the same is true of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (whose security troops play a major role in the conflict) and the Federal Security Service. By creating more powerful territorial command structures, the hope is that there will be fewer reporting lines within the armed forces while the military commander will be in a stronger position when dealing with other security agencies.
The newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta on 13 December 2005 cited an unnamed "military expert" as saying this reform would take between seven and eight years, would virtually paralyse the command structure during the transition and cost far more than anticipated, dashing hopes of further major procurement expenditures. It is almost certain that such a new structure would take up to five years to be properly bedded in, but the transitional problems are unlikely to be worse than the current mess, so this is an area in which Russia should be able to make
relatively quick progress if arid when Putin gives his assent.

Armament: new toys
For two decades, the Soviet and then Russian military has suffered materiel decay and a failure to rearm adequately. However, Putin's commitment to funding the military more generously is beginning to have an effect. According to Lieutenant-General Viktor Zavarzin, chair of the State Duma Defence Committee, 15.6 per cent (USD25.7 billion) of the 2006 federal budget will go to national defence, of which USD8.4 billion is slated to be spent on new equipment. Additional allocations of USD4.7 billion have been made available through other sections of the budget Even so, procurement is relatively modest. Over 2006, the armed forces are due to receive six Topol intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 31 T-90 tanks, 125 armoured personnel carriers, 3,770 other vehicles and 22 aircraft and helicopters. Although this represents an increase (in 2005, for example, only 17 new tanks were acquired), it remains uncertain as to whether the new equipment be properly utilised.
For instance, according to a January report in Nezavisimaya gazeta: "It would cost RUR360 million (USD12.8 million) just to have all servicemen fire 10 rounds from an assault rifle just once a year. They cannot master the use of the weapon, however, unless they go to the firing range twice a week and fire at least 30 rounds. Those were the standards in the Soviet era. Even if only one-fifth of the 1.2 million servicemen were to do this now, the ammunition alone would cost RUR22 billion a year (USD785 million) [which would equate to more than half the total annual training budget).

Doctrine: the missing link?
There is a gaping hole in the reform programme: doctrine. The Russian military inherited from the former Soviet Union a founding tenet that doctrine, a notion of what conflicts it would be likely to fight and how it would fight them, drives every other aspect of military planning. However, while the upper echelons of Russia's political and military elite comprehend the strategic underpinnings of reform, this has yet to be made concrete in any such detailed document. As such, Russia's existing national security concept and doctrine documents are outdated and of limited use.
There is no Russian counterpart to the US Quadrennial Defense Review, in part because there is still no single, generally accepted vision for reform. Perhaps for the moment this is a strength, as it means Ivanov can push forward a review agenda without the need for bureaucratic and political consensus. In the long term, the implicit assumptions on which the present programme are based will need to be institutionalised, not least if it is to survive the end of Putin's presidency in 2008, by which time it will certainly not have been completed. •
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/haldussuutlikkuse etalon MO RF/

President Putin küsis 2004. aasta augustis valitsuse istungil Ivanovilt, kuidas edeneb määruse täitmine, mis sätestas kutselistest mägiküttidest koosnevate üksuste loomise. Ivanov lubas pärast väikest keerutamist, et asi saab tehtud kuu jooksul.

:shock: :shock: :shock:
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VF sõjalisest võimekusest

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Rootslased kirjutavad VF sõjaliselst võimekusest 2005. aastal muu hulgas nii.
If necessary priorities to fulfil military reform materialise, an armed forces numbering a
total of 500,000-750,000 men is conceivable. Russia could also maintain a force of
150,000 contracted soldiers with reasonable capability for offensive operations in
local/regional conflicts. Conscript-based units would mainly be assigned for defensive
operations.
With its conventional forces Russia will be able to keep and increase its capability to
operate on parts of the Eurasian land mass. It will thus develop a considerable regional
power projection capability.
Russia will likely be able to develop a capability to perform single, limited preventive/preemptive
strikes in more remote corners of the world. In the near future Russia is however
limited to carry out such attacks in areas bordering on the Russian Federation.
http://www.foi.se/upload/rapporter/foi- ... bility.pdf
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To effectively respond to terrorists we would need to assemble a force of at least 65,000 men. But of all the military land forces, only 55,000 were in battle-ready condition,” recalled Putin, referring to the level of federal forces in 2006. “The Army has 1.4 million personnel, but none of them can fight. So they sent unseasoned kids into battle.”
And here is why the figures do not add up. For exactly the reason that the figures from any organizer of a pyramid scheme will not add up. In private conversation, senior military leaders admit: in recent years they have hardly succeeded in bringing in as many new recruits as those that have left the army. It would appear that the number of military service members in contract units hovers somewhere around 50,000.
http://russophobe.blogspot.com/2008/01/ ... golts.html
araterI
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Mulle jäi analoogiline teema näppu veidi teisest vaatevinkilist
138, 200 motolaskurbrigaadid + 76 õhudessantdiviis + näpuotsaga laevastikku ja muud eksterritoriaalset tegelaskonda peaks Leningradi Sõjaväeringkonnas tegema 30-40 tuhat nägu, mida ei ole sugugi palju.
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"Russia's Security Policy Grows "Muscular": Should the West Be Worried?"

http://www.upi-fiia.fi/document.php?DOC ... 5_Baev.pdf
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Победные реляции и густой пиар не компенсируют упадок оборонно-промышленного комплекса и неэффективность ассигнований по гособоронзаказу. Как заявил на днях генерал-лейтенант Владимир Шаманов, число выходов российских подлодок на боевую службу в 2007 году сократилось на 20% по сравнению с 2006 годом. Оно вызвано ухудшением технического состояния кораблей, большинство которых построено в 1985–1991 годах.
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2008-02-15/1_ ... l?mthree=3
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Kapten Trumm
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araterl kirjutas:Mulle jäi analoogiline teema näppu veidi teisest vaatevinkilist
138, 200 motolaskurbrigaadid + 76 õhudessantdiviis + näpuotsaga laevastikku ja muud eksterritoriaalset tegelaskonda peaks Leningradi Sõjaväeringkonnas tegema 30-40 tuhat nägu, mida ei ole sugugi palju.
Peamine oht on selles, et stepirahval on olemas päris arvestatav kogus ladustatud sõjatehnikat. Näiteks lõviosa vene tankidest viidi tavarelvastuse piiramise leppe raames teisele poole Uuraleid ja enamik neist on ladustatud Põhja-Kasahstani piirkonnas hiigelsuurtel laoplatsidel (kuiv kliima - ei roosteta). Need väeosad on kavas komplekteerida sõja korral reservistidega.

Lahingusse paisatakse need siin kindla arvestusega - tankide arv on suurem kui meie võimekus neid ära kustutada. Selleks kõlbab mobiliseeritud kahuriliha suurepäraselt - selliselt mehitatud sõjamasina peamine ülesanne on olla üks paljudest sihtmärkidest, millega spämmitakse vastase kaitse.

Milline on selliste väeosade lahinguvõime ja milline on üldse tehnika korrasolek - ongi võtmeküsimus. Tankide arvu hinnatakse vähemalt 20 000-le. Palju neist töökoras on, on iseasi.

Nende Peterburi sõjaväeringkonna vägedega siia nagunii ei tulda. Selleks sõidutatakse väed raudteel kohale nt Uuralite tagant.

Seepärast ei ole mõtet eufooriasse sattuda, et Peterburi SR-is pole ühtegi tankidiviisi - need tuuakse vajadusel raudteed mööda mujalt - nt mõne õppuse sildi all.

See on juba NSVL traditsioon, et sõjas territoriaalseid üksusi ei kasutata, kuna nende sõdimistahe ei pruugi kindel olla - üksused tuuakse lahingusse rotatsiooni põhimõttel üle terve riigi.

Näiteks Tsetseenias sõdisid isegi Põhjalaevastiku merejalaväelased.
/Veelgi hullem on see, et koos kohustusliku patriootliku riigioptimismi kehtestamisega nõrgeneks paratamatult ka meie ohutaju, mis on enesealalhoiuks vältimatult vajalik instinkt/ S. Mikser 2014.
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The russian military at present is far more frightening on paper than in reality, but even on paper it is not a force that could pose a credible threat to the U.S and its nato allies in the foreseeable future. As was widely noted, a significant shortcoming of Putin ’s first term was the failure to carry out his pledge to comprehensively rebuild the Russian armed forces. Nearing the end of his second term and the 16-year mark after the Soviet collapse, the radical reform the military needs has not been implemented.

Nevertheless, the period of deterioration and stagnation seems to have ended and the recovery has begun. Even if all the new defense minister achieves is curbing corruption and rooting out hazing, he will have surpassed his predecessor ’s lackluster record in transforming the military and will have increased both societal support for and the prestige of the armed forces.

In the meantime, Western supporters of nato expansion may congratulate themselves for prevailing in the face of opponents’ arguments throughout the past decade that Russia was unable and disinclined to threaten the countries on its western borders. Thanks to the recent rounds of the Atlantic Alliance ’s expansion, the nations suppressed by the Soviet Union for half a century no longer need to face an aggressive Russia on their own. Little wonder that they are the most enthusiastic American allies in Europe.

As for the United States, it is time to focus on Russian deeds rather than words. Notwithstanding its frequent declarations of cooperation and partnership, the Kremlin’s actions show that it has, for quite some time now, viewed Russian-American relations as a zero-sum game: Whatever is bad for the U.S. must be good for Russia. There are many examples. A rift develops between the United States and some of its nato allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq? Moscow steps into the fray to forge new ties with France and Germany. The U.S. — and the West — strongly objects to Iran’s nuclear program? Russia insists on continuing to supply Iran, even though an unstable nuclear power on Russia ’s border might not be the wisest policy. Hamas — an organization that openly repudiates Israel’s right to exist and with whose leaders the U.S. refuses to bargain — wins the Palestinian elections? Russia is quick to hold talks with its leaders in Moscow. Venezuela ’s virulently anti-American president, Hugo Chávez, wants to re-arm to “deter or repel any invasion by U.S. forces”? Russia is happy to oblige with a sale of 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, a new Kalashnikov factory, and 24 Sukhoi-30 fighter jets. Calling Putin “our friend” does not alter the fact that Moscow considers Washington its primary potential enemy.

Still, despite the recent infusions of resources, Russia’s army remains a pale shadow of its former self. If it is, indeed, on the road to recovery, it has a very long way to go considering its present condition, confusion about its future direction, and the enormous advances the U.S. armed forces have made since the Cold War.
http://www.hoover.org/publications/poli ... 30596.html
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kaur3
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The russian military at present is far more frightening on paper than in reality, but even on paper it is not a force that could pose a credible threat to the U.S and its nato allies in the foreseeable future. As was widely noted, a significant shortcoming of Putin ’s first term was the failure to carry out his pledge to comprehensively rebuild the Russian armed forces. Nearing the end of his second term and the 16-year mark after the Soviet collapse, the radical reform the military needs has not been implemented.

Nevertheless, the period of deterioration and stagnation seems to have ended and the recovery has begun. Even if all the new defense minister achieves is curbing corruption and rooting out hazing, he will have surpassed his predecessor ’s lackluster record in transforming the military and will have increased both societal support for and the prestige of the armed forces.

In the meantime, Western supporters of nato expansion may congratulate themselves for prevailing in the face of opponents’ arguments throughout the past decade that Russia was unable and disinclined to threaten the countries on its western borders. Thanks to the recent rounds of the Atlantic Alliance ’s expansion, the nations suppressed by the Soviet Union for half a century no longer need to face an aggressive Russia on their own. Little wonder that they are the most enthusiastic American allies in Europe.

As for the United States, it is time to focus on Russian deeds rather than words. Notwithstanding its frequent declarations of cooperation and partnership, the Kremlin’s actions show that it has, for quite some time now, viewed Russian-American relations as a zero-sum game: Whatever is bad for the U.S. must be good for Russia. There are many examples. A rift develops between the United States and some of its nato allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq? Moscow steps into the fray to forge new ties with France and Germany. The U.S. — and the West — strongly objects to Iran’s nuclear program? Russia insists on continuing to supply Iran, even though an unstable nuclear power on Russia ’s border might not be the wisest policy. Hamas — an organization that openly repudiates Israel’s right to exist and with whose leaders the U.S. refuses to bargain — wins the Palestinian elections? Russia is quick to hold talks with its leaders in Moscow. Venezuela ’s virulently anti-American president, Hugo Chávez, wants to re-arm to “deter or repel any invasion by U.S. forces”? Russia is happy to oblige with a sale of 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, a new Kalashnikov factory, and 24 Sukhoi-30 fighter jets. Calling Putin “our friend” does not alter the fact that Moscow considers Washington its primary potential enemy.

Still, despite the recent infusions of resources, Russia’s army remains a pale shadow of its former self. If it is, indeed, on the road to recovery, it has a very long way to go considering its present condition, confusion about its future direction, and the enormous advances the U.S. armed forces have made since the Cold War.
http://www.hoover.org/publications/poli ... 30596.html
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При сохранении существующих тенденций силы общего назначения РФ в течение ближайших 8–10 лет достигнут размеров вооруженных сил средней европейской страны, что не позволит обеспечить обороноспособность РФ, особенно в условиях параллельной деградации СЯС.
http://www.ng.ru/nvo/2008-02-13/9_degradatsia.html
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В результате с 2000 года было истрачено до 50 млрд долл., а реально, скажем для ВВС, закуплено всего 2 новых бомбардировщика Су-34 и 2 новых боевых вертолета Ми-28Н. Кстати, первые Су-34 и Ми-28Н до сих пор фактически обкатываются в центрах боевого применения и переучивания летного состава.
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/14/04.html
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