Mida Ukrainast õppida?

[EOD]

Siitsamast foorumist jooksis mõni aeg tagasi läbi Sementšenko väljaöelduna, et "Donbass" otsib ülikerglennuki piloote. Üks võimalus on, et ülikergeid plaanitaksegi droonide vastu kasutada. Kiirus 100-150 km/t on piisav lihtsamate droonide püüdmiseks oma positsioonide kohal. Hävitada saab droone ka tavalisest haavlipüssist tulistades.
Samas väikese bensiinimootori soojusjälg on "Igla" jaoks liiga nõrk. Kuulipildujate laskeulatusest on kolme kilomeetri kaugusel vastase positsioonidest lendav UL õhusõiduk praktiliselt väljas, "tõsist" õhutõrjeraketti ülikerge lennuki vastu kasutada oleks kahjudega kauplemine. Jäävad veel õhutõrjesuurtükid, kuid teatavasti "töötavad" trasserid mõlemas suunas ja ülihästi manööverdav ülikergõhusõiduk on võimeline rünnakut märgates tule alt väljuma.

[Kapten Trumm]

Selleks, et see panna legaalselt relvastust kandma on vaja käia oi kui pikk tee

Kui tegemist on sõjaliseks otstarbeks loodud relvaga, siis jäävad vaid tehnilised küsimused (mingid kinnimaja asjad pole sellisel juhul teema). Loomulikult ei mõelnud ma, et hakkame nüüd relvastatud drooniga linna kohal niisama lendama. 5,56 mm moona sülitav automaatrelv on võimalik näljutada 2 kg-ni, selline kaasa võetav kasulik veos eeldab muidugi kaunis suurt lennukit (see, mis seal kihutas, on liiga väike), kuid kui seda teha nt antud armees kasutatavate relvade baasil, on kergeks nuditud automaat kõige odavam lahendus.

[Jaanus2]

Lennukil võib peal olla ka ühe- või kahetoruline (lasuline) haavlipüss - lihtsalt toru. Sihib lähedale jõudes kogu kerega ja ei pea tingimata isegi tagasilööki üle elama.
Need vene droonid seal ei ole ka mingid tehnikaimed, samuti propelleri ja sisepõlemismootoriga. Jäi hiljuti ette netis lihtne mudellennuki kuumpeamootor, mille valmistamiseks on vaja ainult treipinki, oli mõeldud iseehitajatele. Selliseid lihtsaid lennukeid võib ühe drooni peale isegi mitu lahti lasta, üks jõuab ikka kohale, kui peaks lastama.

[Kulibin]

Need mudellennukid ei kannata relva tagasilööki, muidu paar kilo kandevõimet ei ole probleemiks.
Pakuks siis raketipüstoli sarnast lahendust, tagasilöök minimaalne ja kahju teeb tabamuse korral küll.

[diesel]

hiljuti vaatsi juutuubist vilmi, kus prooviti kõikvõimalike edevate kuulipritside ja lahjemate riistadega seukseid pisema drooni mõõtu lennukeid alla lasta.
laskjad olivad mäenõlval reas ja lennuk lendas allpool orus edasi-tagasi. suht lähedal laskjaile. no ja ei saadud pihta. tina saadeti teele vägagi tõsises koguses.
siit julgeks järeldada, et pisikese drooni alla laskmine on kuulide-haavlitega üsna juhuslik asi.
vähegi kindla peale minek eeldaks vist miskit sihtmärgi lähedal lõhkevat, mis arvatavasti pole kulu ja kasu võrdluses väga jätkusuutlik tegevus.

[Kulibin]

Tegelikult on mudellennuk nii odav, et võib taraanida seda vaenlase drooni. Pihtasaamine on lihtne, tuleb vaid operaatoril sellega suht ligidale saada vastasele ja siis läheb käiku audiolokatsioon suundmikrofoni abil. Kallim variant oleks mõni smartcam tööstuskaamera ehk siis machine vision. Viimase hind muidugi suht kõrge ühekordseks kasutuseks. Iseasi oleks mingi tõsisema sihtmärgi pihta.

[MMX]

The Telegraph: Kuidas me kaitseme Balti riike?
Hea kui selle peale mõeldakse.

How do we protect the Baltic States?
Vladimir Putin has dismembered Ukraine with a masterly use of 'hybrid warfare' – any repetition along the Baltic must be stamped on immediately by Nato, writes David Blair

By David Blair, graphic by Sam Dodge

8:00PM GMT 19 Feb 2015



The trap was laid with meticulous precision. The target was a senior officer in Estonia’s version of MI5 and the bait was supposedly vital information about organised crime. Eston Kohver was lured to a meeting in a lonely woodland at 9am on a Friday. Lest the spy be thought foolish or naive, he went to the assignation with a posse of bodyguards. Yet his erstwhile contact was accompanied by an armed snatch squad from Russia’s FSB intelligence service. Mr Kohver’s escort was swiftly neutralised with stun grenades; for good measure, their communications were also jammed. Then the spy was spirited at gunpoint across the Russian border five miles away.

This brazen abduction of an intelligence officer from his homeland took place on September 5 last year, only two days after President Barack Obama had visited Estonia to offer reassurance about America’s commitment to its security. Mr Kohver was later paraded on Russian television and charged with subverting the very state that had carried out his kidnapping.

This incident passed largely unnoticed in the West, but Estonia and its Baltic neighbours, Latvia and Lithuania, drew a stark conclusion. Instead of observing the normal rules, Russia was prepared to do exactly what it wished on their territory. All three countries fall into the uniquely sensitive category of being former Soviet republics that are now members of Nato and the European Union. For over a decade, the Baltic states have been paid-up members of the Atlantic Alliance, but they take incidents like Mr Kohver’s kidnapping as proof that, deep down, Russia still views them as vassals.

And the fate of Ukraine makes them feel acutely vulnerable. Day by day, President Vladimir Putin is dismembering his neighbour. If he concludes that his adventure in Ukraine has served Russia’s interests, then he will turn on new targets – and the trio of countries along the Baltic coast would probably be next. Michael Fallon, the Defence Secretary, describes a “real and present danger”.

If Russia were to threaten Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, there is one simple reason why the ensuing crisis would dwarf everything in Ukraine.

As members of Nato, all three countries are protected by the North Atlantic Treaty. Article V of this agreement states that “an armed attack” against any signatory “shall be considered an attack against them all”, requiring any counter-measures “including the use of armed force”.

Put bluntly, Britain is legally obliged to defend Estonia’s 203-mile border with Russia just as surely as we would fight for the White Cliffs of Dover. In case this needs to be spelt out any further, this would entail going to war with a country that possesses the world’s biggest arsenal of nuclear weapons. So conflict that begins on the shores of the Baltic could, in extremis, escalate into one that threatens the survival of humanity.

For this reason, a Russian invasion remains highly unlikely. The greatest danger is that Mr Putin would use methods that fall short of classic invasion. Look no further than Ukraine, which provides vivid proof of Russia’s mastery of “hybrid warfare”, namely the use of every method of force and coercion except full-scale conflict.

The crisis in eastern Ukraine began with the occupation of public buildings by people who proclaimed their loyalty to Russia. At first, these masked men were armed with sticks and baseball bats. When they took over City Hall in Donetsk, everything continued around them, with officials holding a meeting on the municipal drains as the first barricade went up. But these occupations spread like wildfire, leading to the birth of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”. From the beginning, Russian special forces and military intelligence were providing the planning, muscle and logistics. Soon, Russia was supplying the weapons and volunteers that allowed the “People’s Republic” to wage war on Ukraine.

And all the while, the Kremlin’s media mounted a furious propaganda campaign, absurdly labelling the government in Kiev a “fascist junta” bent on murdering Russians and creating a “Western colony for gays and paedophiles”.

This artful combination of propaganda, street unrest, subversion and brutal guerrilla warfare wrested a large slice of eastern Ukraine from Kiev. Mr Putin and his allies are de facto masters of a region holding about three million people and Ukraine’s industrial heartland. True, thousands of Russian troops did enter Ukraine, but they came in carefully managed trickles rather than a flood. This invasion-in-the-shadows achieved the goals of a classic invasion – but without ever looking like one.

If Mr Putin turns on the Baltic states, he will probably use the same model. The aim will be to mount a creeping assault in a way that falls below the threshold for Nato’s security guarantee to be invoked. In particular, Mr Putin would try to conceal Russia’s involvement.

How should Nato respond to any such challenge? The best answer would be to stamp on the first sparks from the first embers, says Jonathan Eyal, the head of security studies at the Royal United Services Institute. “If you have the first indication of self-proclaimed groups beginning to ask for autonomy or independence within one of the three countries, then you have to be involved immediately,” he says. “The key is to maintain an element of ambiguity: to say to Putin 'if you try it, then you might get a response which you never bargained for’. If you play some games in Latvia, then you might find 20,000 Nato troops arriving in the country.”

Ukraine lacked the will or the means to suppress the first occupations in Donetsk. With Nato’s help, the Baltic states could, in theory, bring them to an end immediately. In other words, the first challenge should be met with a disproportionately tough response.

But there is also no substitute for old-style deployments to demonstrate resolve. Between them, Nato’s Baltic members do not possess a single jet fighter. They are entirely reliant on the alliance’s “Baltic Air Policing Mission” to guard their airspace. The strength of this force was quadrupled last year – but only from four to 16 Nato fighters. Russia’s air force, meanwhile, has 1,201 combat-capable aircraft.

Nato has created a rapid reaction force of 4,000 troops that could arrive in the Baltic states at short notice, but the alliance is still observing a treaty signed with Russia in 1997 that forbids the permanent deployment of foreign troops in any member east of Germany.

General Jonathan Shaw, a former assistant chief of the defence staff, believes this commitment should now be dropped to allow a “forward deployment” of Nato soldiers in the Baltic states. “The agreement not to do that was part and parcel of the agreement to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine,” he says. “It’s had its time.”

But that still leaves Mr Putin with options. The internet opens up new vistas. In 2007, Estonia suffered a series of cyber attacks on its banks, media and government ministries. Russia could try this form of assault with the aim of inflicting damage both remotely and anonymously.

Yet such an event would still leave fingerprints, warns Sir David Omand, formerly the head of GCHQ, Britain’s biggest intelligence agency. “The Russians would have to be very careful,” he says. “They’re very good at cyber – they’ve invested a lot in cyber – but they must know that there’s a very good chance that the Americans would be able to pin something on them.”

If Russia was found to have carried out a damaging cyber attack on a Nato member, this would demand a “very robust” diplomatic response, adds Sir David.

And responding to everything is the key. If Mr Putin ever feels that he can act without consequence, then he will ratchet up his aggression. When it comes to defending the Baltic states, the safest option would be to pour cold water on the first sparks of unrest. The abduction of an Estonian official from his homeland should never again pass unremarked.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... tates.html

[kaur3]

Saksa bloger

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.be/ ... raine.html

[Otto K]

Vabandust kui see on siin olnud aga on (kuulu)jutud, et Eesti saab Saksamaalt Pantzerhaubitze 2000 liikursuurtükid.
Praegust Ukrainat vaadates on need ülimalt vajalikud asjad.

[Taaniel Tina]

Vabandust kui see on siin olnud aga on (kuulu)jutud, et Eesti saab Saksamaalt Pantzerhaubitze 2000 liikursuurtükid.
Praegust Ukrainat vaadates on need ülimalt vajalikud asjad.

See oleks küll meeldiv.
Hakkasin siin ise ka veidi mõtlema, et lähtudes Ukr kogemusest oleks neid suuri torusid juurde vaja kindlasti. Aga kuna meil on juba piisavalt kogemusi 155 mm raudadega, akki võiks unistada juba ka suuremast kaliibrist või MRLS-st. Kui muidugi tulevad liikursuurtükid, siis mitut süsteemi korraga juurutada on paras pähkel, aga vaadates tulevikku oleks need vajalikud. Liigutavad ju nad suuremaid rauatükki ja ka kaugemale.

[Otto K]

Ja Saksamaa lükkas eile ümber selle väite nagu nad ei oleks valmis Leedule soomukeid tarnima... Tundub, et mingid Pantzerid tulevad ka Leedu eesliinile.
Ütleme nii, et me ei tea kolmveeranditki neist asjadest siin foorumis.... aga pooled neist asjadest tulevad....

[kaugeltuuriv]

Siin mainiti ka enne,et üllatavalt hästi kasutavad ukrainlased oma vähest Gradide parki,mis viib mind mõttele,et selle hirmkallite MLRS süsteemide asemel võiks ju otsida samasugust analoogi kas poolakate,tsehhide-slovakkide juurest.Ukrainlastel vahest neid hetkel rohkem vaja ja tõõstused toodavad seal oma armeele.
Küll aga võib poolakatel või tsehhidel-slovakkidel olla peal ka kaasaegne,Nato standardiga sihtimissüsteemid.

[mart2]

On olemas ka väiksemad (tasku kohasemad), kuid sama mõjusad variandid:
http://www.combatreform.org/groundrockets.htm
http://www.hmmwvinscale.com/apps/photos ... =103780010
http://weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/D ... %2063.html
http://www.jedsite.info/artillery-golf/ ... intro.html

Küsimus on eelkõige täpsuses ja efektiivsuses.

[kaugeltuuriv]

Saan aru,et väiksemad omavad ka väiksemat tuleulatust ja kattev ala on ka pisem aga kuidas nende väiksemate täpsusega on?
Mulle tundub ka,et need vähesed miiniväljad,mida ukrainlased on paigutanud toimivad üsna edukalt.Venelaste liigutused näiteks lennujaama juures olid selle tõttu tükk aega piiratud ja ka vastase kolonnid on aeg ajalt miinide otsas küllalt efektiivselt otsa saanud.
Miinimajandust tuleks selles valguses kindlasti suurendada,kaasaarvatud hankida meremiine,et dessandiohtlikud paigad merelt ebamugavaks teha,kuigi vist meie mereväel pole isegi võimet neid paigaldada.
Mis viib mind mõttele,et Eesti peaks püüdlema anda tööd kohalikele laevaehitajatele.
Kes kindlasti suudaks vähemalt aluse kindlat välja ehitada,mis oleks jääklassiga,parajalt suur,et kanda mineerimisvõimet ja ka mingit rauda,et tõrjuda lendavaid sihtmärke.Boonus oleks muidugi veel variant,kus ka mingi raketilaske võimekus klassis laev-laev oleks.
Relvastus sellele,ei tohiks ju olla probleem,viimaste sündmuste valguses pakun,et isegi prantslased pakuks oma laev-laev klassi rakette ning raskema raua saaks ju hankida näiteks Rootsist,Boforsist.

[kaugeltuuriv]

Ja otse loomulikult oleks aeg hakata ette valmistama reaalse õhuväe loomist,pilootide koolitamise plaane pidama nii ründehelikopterite jaoks,mis oleks heidutus nii rannakaitses,kuid ka vajalik maaväetoetuseks ning samm sammult tuleks alustada ka hävitajate ostu planeerimist.