Large Russian enterprises are switching to three- and four-day work weeks, Russian media outlets report.
Uralvagonzavod - one of the world’s leading manufacturers of armored vehicles (including T-72 tanks) and Russia’s largest producer of freight railcars - is now operating below full capacity.
Part of the workforce has been moved to a four-day week, allegedly due to falling demand for rolling stock. In reality, this effectively means a halt in the production of railcars and civilian goods.
Putin’s officials are rushing to reassure the public, claiming that defense orders are keeping the situation under control. But behind this supposed "versatility" lies a simple truth: factories are surviving from one military contract to the next, while the civilian sector remains empty - disguised as "retraining employees for new professions."
Rostselmash, Russia’s flagship agricultural machinery producer, has been operating three days a week since August. This year, the company will manufacture only 2,700 harvesters - its worst result in 25 years.
In the first seven months of 2025, domestic shipments of agricultural machinery fell by 30% in monetary terms, and harvester sales dropped by 59%.
The St. Petersburg Tractor Plant (producer of the Kirovets tractor) first sent its workers on extended leave and then introduced a shortened work week. According to management, tractor sales in Russia have fallen by 20-25%.
At KAMAZ, units operating below capacity have been on reduced schedules since August. Sales of trucks over 14 tons have plummeted by almost 60%, and warehouses are filled with thousands of unsold vehicles.
AvtoVAZ, which was expected to experience a "renaissance" after Western brands left the Russian market, has found itself in the same trap. Despite protectionism and subsidies, Lada sales have fallen by nearly 25%. The plant, unable to withstand price competition from Chinese cars, now operates four days a week.
And after the start of the fuel crisis - triggered by drone strikes on oil refineries - it turned out that Russians no longer even have enough fuel to drive their vehicles.
Metallurgists and machine builders are also "switching to flexible schedules."
The Chelyabinsk Electrometallurgical Plant has introduced a four-day week for 1,200 employees since September; the same applies to the motor and diesel plants in Yaroslavl. The Tikhvin Railcar Plant has also implemented a reduced schedule until the end of November.
Companies explain these decisions as a way to "preserve jobs." But in reality, the fewer working days there are, the emptier people’s wallets become.
As usual, the Kremlin pretends everything is going according to plan. Deputy Minister of Economic Development Zaselsky claims that workers are idle 30-40% of the time anyway.
Therefore, he argues, the goal is not to reduce working hours but to make them more "efficient." Putin’s officials point to Western countries that have also experimented with shorter work weeks - though there, it is done for citizens’ well-being, not for statistical manipulation.
Russia’s three- and four-day work weeks have nothing to do with humanism. They are a direct consequence of the crisis in non-military sectors of the economy and an attempt by the Russian authorities to conceal the scale of the problem.
Mass layoffs would mean admitting an economic catastrophe - something the Kremlin is unwilling to do. Instead, authorities pressure enterprises to keep people formally employed while effectively sending them on "short weeks" or unpaid leave.
But no amount of cover-up will make the problem disappear. The degradation of Russian industry cannot be stopped by a shorter work week. Sooner or later, the systemic collapse of entire sectors will become even more deafening.
The deeper the militarization of the Russian economy, the faster Russia destroys its own future.
Uralvagonzavod - one of the world’s leading manufacturers of armored vehicles (including T-72 tanks) and Russia’s largest producer of freight railcars - is now operating below full capacity.