ABC news kirjutas: Thirty-five years ago, Dale G. Bridenbaugh and two of his colleagues at General Electric resigned from their jobs after becoming increasingly convinced that the nuclear reactor design they were reviewing -- the Mark 1 -- was so flawed it could lead to a devastating accident.
Questions persisted for decades about the ability of the Mark 1 to handle the immense pressures that would result if the reactor lost cooling power, and today that design is being put to the ultimate test in Japan. Five of the six reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, which has been wracked since Friday's earthquake with explosions and radiation leaks, are Mark 1s.
"The problems we identified in 1975 were that, in doing the design of the containment, they did not take into account the dynamic loads that could be experienced with a loss of coolant," Bridenbaugh told ABC News in an interview. "The impact loads the containment would receive by this very rapid release of energy could tear the containment apart and create an uncontrolled release."
The situation on the ground at the Fukushima Daiichi plant is so fluid, and the details of what is unfolding are so murky, that it may be days or even weeks before anyone knows how the Mark 1 containment system performed in the face of a devastating combination of natural disasters.
But the ability of the containment to withstand the events that have cascaded from what nuclear experts call a "station blackout" -- where the loss of power has crippled the reactor's cooling system -- will be a crucial question as policy makers re-examine the safety issues that surround nuclear power, and specifically the continued use of what is now one of the oldest types of nuclear reactors still operating.
GE told ABC News the reactors have "a proven track record of performing reliably and safely for more than 40 years" and "performed as designed," even after the shock of a 9.0 earthquake.
Still, concerns about the Mark 1 design have resurfaced occasionally in the years since Bridenbaugh came forward. In 1986, for instance, Harold Denton, then the director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, spoke critically about the design during an industry conference.
"I don't have the same warm feeling about GE containment that I do about the larger dry containments,'' he said, according to a report at the time that was referenced Tuesday in The Washington Post.
"There is a wide spectrum of ability to cope with severe accidents at GE plants,'' Denton said. "And I urge you to think seriously about the ability to cope with such an event if it occurred at your plant.''
Bridenbaugh told ABC News that he believes the design flaws that prompted his resignation from GE were eventually addressed at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Bridenbaugh said GE agreed to a series of retrofits at Mark 1 reactors around the globe. He compared the retooling to the bolstering of highway bridges in California to better withstand earthquakes.
"Like with seismic refitting, they went back and re-analyzed the loads the structures might receive and beefed up the ability of the containment to handle greater loads," he said.
When asked if that was sufficient, he paused. "What I would say is, the Mark 1 is still a little more susceptible to an accident that would result in a loss of containment."
ABC News asked GE for more detail about how the company responded to critiques of its Mark 1 design. GE spokesman Michael Tetuan said in an email that, over the past 40 years, the company has made several modifications to its Mark 1 reactors in the U.S., including installing "quenchers" and fortifying the steel structures "to accommodate the loads that were generated." He said that GE's responses to modifications ordered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were also shared with the Japanese nuclear industry.
Bridenbaugh told ABC News that he is watching the events in Japan with a mix of anxiety and deep reflection. Many years have passed since he and fellow GE colleagues Gregory C Minor and Richard B. Hubbard publicly resigned, joined the anti-nuclear movement, and became known as the "GE Three."
Undoubtedly, he said, the containment structures at that Fukushima Daiichi plant are facing significant amounts of pressure -- and testing the very questions he was studying on paper more than three decades earlier. While he knew then that the Mark 1 had design limits, he said, no one knows now whether those limits will be surpassed.
Lisaks sellele tuleb välja, et see reaktor on loodud töötama uraani ja plutooniumi põhisel kütusesegul, seega kui see vigane saastekaitsekest seal järele annab ja neid ühendeid õhku paiskab on meil Tšernobõl II ootamas. Plutoonium on ka üliväikeses koguses inimese sanaselt polooniumile kehas ülitappev, olles: 1. raskesti eemaldatav organismist ning 2. ka väike kogus seda jätkab organismi "kiiritamist" olulisel tasemel:
Midagi kahtlast on toimumas, sest täna käis uudistest läbi, et viimasest plahvatusest ei teavitatud Jaapani valitsust jaamu opereeriva Tokyo Electricu poolt ning peaminister sai sellest teada alles meedia vahendusel 1h peale plahvatusi, mis lõppes sellega, et ta tegi "jõuga omale teed" Tokyo Electriku nõupidamisele. Räägitakse, et see cover-up toimub just selle firma tasemel, kes ei ole tegeliku olukorra tõsidust avaldanud.Scientists warned this week of yet another wrinkle to Japan’s evolving nuclear crisis: one of the doomed reactors is loaded with mixed-oxide fuel that contains plutonium.
“This sort of plutonium fuel is more difficult to control than uranium fuel,” said Arjun Makhijani, a nuclear scientist and president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.
The fuel, known generically as “MOX,” was made by nuclear giant AREVA in France, where MOX technology has been used for almost two decades.
The rods, made by blending small amounts of plutonium with traditional uranium, were loaded into unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant last September.
Makhijani said the unit contains 32 MOX assemblies—or about 5 percent of the fuel now in the reactor, where an explosion this week kindled fears of a radiation release.
“With this fuel, the risks of accidental criticality are different,” he said. “You have the same kinds of problems, they are just more intense with plutonium.”
AREVA is also part of Shaw AREVA MOX Services—the group building the National Nuclear Security Administration’s $4.86 billion MOX plant at Savannah River Site.
The MOX fuels used in the Japan reactor and several dozen others are a mixture of uranium and plutonium reprocessed from spent uranium, but the facility at Savannah River Site is designed to use weapons grade plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads to make fuels usable in commercial nuclear power reactors.
The plant’s mission is to dispose of the weapons grade material to prevent exploitation by terrorists. But the search for utilities willing to use the fuel when production starts in 2018 has moved slowly.
Currently, Tennessee Valley Authority is evaluating the use of MOX fuel in as many as five of its reactors, and a Richland, Wash., utility is mulling its use in one unit, but no formal user agreements have been signed.
Safety officials have pointed out that the problems in Japan were caused by the catastrophic, combined effects of the tsunami and earthquake—not by the type of fuel in the affected reactors.
In an emailed statement Tuesday, a National Nuclear Security Administration spokesman said U.S. officials remain confident in the safety of existing programs.
“The American people should have full confidence that the U.S. has rigorous safety regulations in place to ensure that our nuclear power is generated safely and responsibly,” the spokesman said. “Information is still coming in about the events unfolding in Japan, but the Administration is committed to learning from Japan’s experience as we work to continue to strengthen America’s nuclear industry.”
Alles nüüd tunnistatakse ametlikul tasandil, et 2. reaktori saastekaitseümbris on purunenud.