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"Olukord on küll tõsine, aga mitte selline, et Taliban on sõda võitmas, mis kindlasti on täiesti vale. Vastupidi, Taliban on läinud üle niinimetatud miinisõjale. See näitab tema nõrkust, et ta ei ole enam võimeline relvaga käes sõda ja lahinguid võitma," rääkis Laaneots.

Makeshift bomb attacks in Afghanistan killed three times as many coalition troops in the first two months of 2009 compared with the same period last year. The increase points to a strengthening insurgency and potentially more violence as warmer weather arrives along with intensified fighting.

The same insurgent movement may be in different phases in different regions of a country. Insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure. Indeed, this is the key strength of a phased approach, which provides fallback positions for the insurgents when threatened. They then resume development when favorable conditions return. While the traditional Maoist phases may not provide a complete template for understanding contemporary insurgencies, they do explain a shifting mosaic of activities that are usually present in some form.

Theirs not to reason why

Oct 1st 2009

Danger Close: Commanding 3 Para in Afghanistan. By Colonel Stuart Tootal. John Murray; £18.99. Buy from Amazon.co.uk

Desperate Glory: At War in Helmand with Britain’s 16 Air Assault Brigade. By Sam Kiley. Bloomsbury; £18.99. Buy from Amazon.co.uk

THE arrival of British forces in Helmand in 2006 “stirred up a hornet’s nest in a province that many had considered quiet until then.” Such is the admission of the man who commanded 3 Para, the lead element of the first British contingent in Afghanistan. Yet, writes Stuart Tootal, it had been a fake kind of calm, prevailing only because the Taliban and drug lords went unmolested and together imposed “tyranny and corruption” on the population. Unfortunately, the British forces were strong enough to cause mayhem—but not strong enough to impose a new order.

The British mission was at first sold as a “peace-support” operation, whose focus would be to promote economic development in a small area of central Helmand between the province’s capital, Lashkar Gah, and its economic hub, Gereshk. But there has been precious little reconstruction—and far too much destruction.

The small British force was soon parcelled out in smaller detachments, scattered across the province, which fought countless desperate actions to avoid being overrun by the Taliban. As Colonel Tootal tells it, this strategy emerged more by accident than by design. British commanders understood the danger of being “fixed” in static defence but could not ignore requests by the governor of Helmand to defend endangered government centres.

Colonel Tootal describes the bravery of British soldiers, “the remarkable valour of simple men”. There is little self-criticism; soldiers and officers are courageous, and nobody makes mistakes. Fault lies elsewhere: with the British government for taking on a huge task without giving the troops the resources to match it and with the diplomats and aid agencies for failing to build on the soldiers’ hard-won gains.

After their initial six-month tour, the Paras returned to Helmand in 2008. Their experience is the subject of Sam Kiley’s “Desperate Glory”, a vivid rifle-sight’s view of the war, and probably the best battlefield account yet of the British in Afghanistan.

A veteran journalist, Mr Kiley spent the full six-month tour with the paratroopers and the rest of 16 Air Assault Brigade. His book is full of memorable detail: the pizza-oven heat in armoured vehicles; the Afghan security man insulting the manhood of the Taliban over a megaphone during a firefight; the soldier whose legs have been blown off checking instinctively to make sure his testicles are intact; the tenderness of fighting men recovering dead comrades in the midst of battle.

Mr Kiley, like Colonel Tootal, has a healthy respect for the Taliban as “clever bastards”. Two years on from the Paras’ first deployment, the British had substantially more forces and better equipment. But they were still “fixed” in many of the places where Colonel Tootal had taken up position. For Mr Kiley: “British influence extends only as far as the soldiers can walk and fight—which is no more than 2km.”

Both Mr Kiley and Colonel Tootal insist that the war is “winnable”, given the means and political commitment. But such views feel more like a declaration of faith than a considered assessment. What is most striking is the way British soldiers will fight and risk their lives despite the confusion over war aims and the shortage of men and resources. Why? In part, says Mr Kiley, it comes from “a basic male instinct” to prove yourself. In part it is about fighting for your friends and, when they are killed, about avenging them. Above all, it is about sheer thrill. As one Para quoted by Mr Kiley says during a battle: “Living the fucking dream mate.”

man21 kirjutas:Ahahh, ette jõudsid, just tahtsin seda Laaneotsaga intervjuud postitama hakata. Huvitav artikkel, kus meie kaitseväe juhataja on järjekordselt, talle omaselt, otsekohane.