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Kapten Trumm kirjutas: S-400 tehnika
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The scale of forced displacements, coupled with widespread political upheaval, signals a historic turning point for the region, the likes of which have not been seen since the end of World War I. As international borders between Iraq and Syria have crumbled under the onslaught of the Islamic State, parties to the various conflicts are seeking to reshape state geographies and ensure control of territories by targeting individuals and communities based solely on identity in what amounts to acts of ethnic cleansing.

These forced population movements represent a demographic undoing of the Sykes-Picot agreement, the French-British treaty that drew the borders of countries in the Arab Levant. Ongoing identity-based population displacements are not only reconstituting Syrian and Iraqi societies but also affecting neighboring countries, namely Lebanon and Jordan. Furthermore, this process is dismantling the ethnic and sectarian diversity that has characterized these societies for millennia. It is also driving the militarization of society as some ethnic and sectarian communities seek to arm themselves for protection.

For example, in 1972, the Syrian government began an intense campaign to appropriate land owned by the Kurds, many of whom had previously been stripped of Syrian nationality, under an agricultural reform plan and settled thousands of Arab farmers in model villages in the area.9 In Iraq, the Arabization campaign that began in 1975 displaced Kurdish, Assyrian, and Yazidi Iraqis from predominantly Kurdish provinces, particularly Kirkuk, in a bid to undermine Kurdish national aspirations and to control oil fields. The government also moved many poor Arab families, enticed by offers of cheap housing, into this region.

The regimes of both Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein also instigated brutal attacks against select population groups as part of a broader drive to suppress opposition movements and consolidate power. These actions set the scene for broader contemporary grievances. In Syria, the most notorious incident was the crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood in a 1982 military operation, including a three-week-long siege that laid waste to the city of Hama, destroyed most of its historic center, and left 10,000 to 25,000 Syrians dead.11 In Iraq, attacks against Kurdish populations culminated in the Anfal campaign and a genocidal strike involving chemical weapons against the town of Halabja in 1988 that left thousands dead. In 1991, Saddam Hussein’s forces also attacked and killed thousands of Shia, particularly the marshlands community of some 250,000 individuals that had occupied a unique habitat for close to five thousand years.

Since 2014, Iraqi policymakers have based some of their decisions about the type of support extended to communities displaced by the Islamic State on sectarian and ethnic considerations. For example, authorities in Iraq’s Kurdish region, where close to 1.45 million internally displaced persons sought refuge, have provided support to Kurdish, Christian, and Yazidi communities while keeping Sunni, Shia, and Turkomans on the borders of Kurdistan and even flying some Shia to other parts of the country. Additionally, some 611,700 Sunnis displaced from areas controlled by the Islamic State have been denied entry into areas controlled by the government of Iraq and the Kurdish peshmerga forces, leaving them with few options to seek safety.

Recent news reports point to an even more insidious and deliberate strategy of sectarian engineering—the replacement of one sectarian population group with another—in strategic areas such as Zabadani, where ferocious battles are taking place.

These actions are in line with the increasingly dominant sectarian narrative of the unfolding war. This narrative was deliberately perpetuated by the Syrian regime as part of its wider war strategy and to paint a picture of the civilian uprising as paving the way for a takeover of the country by fundamentalist Sunnis such as the Islamic State. In such a narrative, the regime is presented as the sole protector of ethnic and religious minorities and a key partner for the international community in fighting the terrorism undertaken by such entities.

As of 2013, the escalation of conflict and the deliberate targeting of religious and ethnic minorities, through systematic bombardment by the regime or by extremist groups such as the Islamic State, the Nusra Front, the Tawhid Brigade, and the Islamic Front, forced members of these communities to seek refuge with relatives in different parts of the country. Kurds who fled Sheikh Maqsoud, near Aleppo, in 2014 sought refuge with their kinfolk in the city of Hasakah, which is under Kurdish control. Meanwhile, Christians and Alawis escaping the conflict in the central regions of Syria have moved to the coastal towns of Tartus and Latakia, which are under the control of the regime. Such patterns of displacement bode ill for longer-term societal reconciliation, particularly when the perpetrators may be former neighbors or government forces.

This dramatic unraveling of borders and the disintegration of the state into multiple entities means that for many refugees the chance of going back to their homes is slim at best. As in Iraq, the likelihood the displaced may eventually return depends on who controls their homes and towns of origin. Provincial military leaders often view the presence of specific communities as a disruption of the power balance in the areas they control. In cities such as Homs, for example, the return of Sunni families to their homes has not taken place; in many instances, these homes were either turned to rubble or occupied by Alawi families fleeing conflict in their own towns.34 Claims that the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (the armed wing of the Democratic Union Party) displaced 23,000 Arabs after the liberation of the strategic border town of Tal Abyad from the Islamic State in late June 2015 generated accusations of large-scale population transfers as part of a larger plan to consolidate Kurdish-controlled territories.

In this larger context, concerns are increasing over the most vulnerable of refugees: children trapped in a life they did not choose. In a recent interview, in the Zaatari camp in Jordan, a young Syrian refugee responded to a question from the Globe and Mail about the progress of the war in his country with “I think we will not get freedom, Bashar will win.” He continued, “My dream is we will win. But my second dream is . . . when I turn 16 or 18, I will go to Syria and join the jihad.”

This dream is a tragic emblem of a lost generation of youth growing up in the shadow of conflict. For them, the consequences of war and protracted displacement with the congruent push to the fringe are even more devastating. Many are firsthand witnesses to violence and unimaginable horrors that touched their families and communities. They have lost their friends, their homes, and their futures.

What extends the tragedy of these children is their loss of education. Today, the Arab region is host to some 21 million children who are either out of school or at risk of dropping out of school. The great majority of those children are Syrian and Iraqi refugees or from displaced populations. For example, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that in 2014 about 2.8 million Syrian children and about 50 percent of Syrian refugees aged six to seventeen were not in school.

In Lebanon, of the 300,000 Syrian refugee children of school age, only 30,000 are attending school and 88,000 are enrolled in informal education that is not recognized by the government or other entities. In Jordan, half the refugees are under the age of eighteen yet only 62 percent are attending school.

Väidetavalt on parempoolne pataljonitaseme sihtmärgi tuvastamise radar 96L6, mis võib olla integreeritud S-300 süsteemiga.

Martin Peeter kirjutas:SÜÜRIA peale 2011 - LIIBÜA peale 2011
Hukkunuid 330381 - 5777
Põgenikke 4 088 078 - 8087
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Kõigile Vene trollide ja obamarama uskujatele ajude liigutamiseks!

kordo kirjutas:Ükski ajudega inimene ei saa tõsiselt võtta sellist kontekstist välja rebitud, võrreldamatuid numbreid. Rääkimata, kas saab üldse tõeseks pidada numbreid, mille esitajaks on keegi, kes kõigi näitajate poolest (päritolu, usuline kuuluvus, tegevusala) hoiab pigem pöialt neile, kes "Allahu Akbar!" karjudes kurdi naisi auku ajavad?

Avatar kirjutas:

kordo kirjutas:Ükski ajudega inimene ei saa tõsiselt võtta sellist kontekstist välja rebitud, võrreldamatuid numbreid. Rääkimata, kas saab üldse tõeseks pidada numbreid, mille esitajaks on keegi, kes kõigi näitajate poolest (päritolu, usuline kuuluvus, tegevusala) hoiab pigem pöialt neile, kes "Allahu Akbar!" karjudes kurdi naisi auku ajavad?

Kas palun lahkelt postitad need kontekstis olevad võrreldavad numbrid, selmet argumenteerida info vahendaja päritolu ja naiste auku ajamisega.

virguja kirjutas:Fotod kohapealt on liiga jäledad et postitada

Martin Peeter kirjutas: SÜÜRIA peale 2011 - LIIBÜA peale 2011
Hukkunuid 330381 - 5777
Põgenikke 4 088 078 - 8087

SÜÜRIA peale 2011 - LIIBÜA peale 2011
Hukkunuid 330381 - 5777
Põgenikke 4 088 078 - 8087

Mulle lihtsalt tundus, et ajudega inimene ei pea kontekstist väljarebitud ja võrreldamatute andmete ümberlükkamiseks infoallika usutunnistust või kurdi naisi kasutama.