www.militaar.net

Well, I'm old enough to be of the "kids today could use some military experience" ilk myself. I have to add that from German sources, the bit about amending the constitution appears to be further pursuant to the intention of creating a general duty beyond the military realm and substitute service for same. Which leads straight to a major problem in that it's likely to run headlong into international and European law banning forced labor, military conscription being the only exception as a possibly vital element of national security.



I've dealt with this all of my political "career". First of all, military service, or at least national security, needs to be the base of all such schemes. You cannot just oblige people to spend a year of their life on some undetermined character-building civic service with a free choice between all sorts of stuff including caring for the old and infirm, helping out in underdeveloped countries, or saving the rain forest.



What would probably work is a model we developed early in the millenium, based on a wide interpretation of homeland defense including against terrorist attacks, where you could have served in the military, police, firefighters, THW or any other first-responder organization. That was really not terribly original, since it was just giving equal emphasis to options that existed under the original system of conscription. People could actually be drafted into the Federal Border Guard long before it became today's Federal Police, and folks who enlisted as volunteers with first responder organizations for a certain length (I want to say seven years) were exempt.



Another model was similar to what France is now doing, which we termed "extended compulsory education"; kids in Germany are after all required by law to attend school until age 18 (including vocational schools in parallel to job training if going into the work market from age 15-16), so it would be easy to add a month or so where everybody is exposed to the options of military or civilian security service hands-on. You could even integrate it into the curriculum; there are already mandatory work internships in 9th grade IIRC. This was mostly aimed at making up for conscription's volunteer-generating function by internal recruiting.



There are several rather specifically German issues. One is the obsession with justice and equality, which means a compulsory service would need to apply to a sufficiently broad part of each class so not too many people are unfairly burdened or favored. That means selective service models like in Scandinavia, where you pick only the required number of the fittest, recommended early by a blue-ribbon committee under former President Richard von Weizsäcker, are right out.



Lack of Wehrgerechtigkeit is in fact mostly what led to the death of conscription; with a shrinking need for draftees, less and less people were inducted (in part by applying stricter fitness standards combined with declining fitness standards in society - but an increasing part of each class wasn't even examined anymore). Substitute service had long since become a choice rather than the exception based upon conscious objection anyway. Including women in the draft, another justice issue from the view of their male classmates, would increase the problem.



Attempts to compensate led to subsequent reductions of terms from twelve to ten to nine months, in a period where the focus went to foreign deployments for which draftees could only be used on a voluntary basis. Eventually it was felt that they were just tying up ressources in training, equipment etc. while providing no worthwhile service. Even with the change back to alliance defense, the question is how short you can make service terms to still get useful soldiers.



We discussed Swiss-type militia models with very short basic training terms and the rest of the obligation to be served in regular fiurther training, but there were economic worries. Employers don't like their staff getting off work for reserve service ever so often, and Germany is short on workforce anyway - which is a reason why professional military service is so incompetitive with the high-paying civilian sector in the first place. A lot is (post-Cold War) cultural of course, with little respect for military or even civilian first responder volunteers despite lip service. Even volunteer firefighters often find their employer pissed if they get called out too often.



This social/political issues collide with the sheer size of the German frame. We're finding it hard to recruit enough volunteers for a force suitable to our population and economic strength, but a "just" military conscription system producing useful soldiers would result in a force likely in excess of the 370,000 limit of the Two-plus-Four Treaty, and probably more expensive than we are prepared to pay for. So a cultural change is needed more than all else, and while there are some slow indications for this, it will need an extended period of a seriously perceived threat for substantial development - something our Eastern neighbors have over us, of course.

Some outlines are emerging for the defense planning until 2031. It’s all still pretty rough and full of buzzwords, but a direction is visible.



It has already been mentioned earlier that the level of ambition is



- fielding three fully equipped mechanized divisions with a total of eight to ten brigades, fully deployable within three months’ time;



- leading a multi-national air task force generating 350 combat and reconnaissance missions per day, three quarters of which by the Bundeswehr;



- ability to deploy at least 15 naval vessels at any time and giving the Marine the capability for maritime air warfare back.



The first of the newly reorganized divisions is to be combat ready by 2027. This “Division 2027” is supposed to comprise about 20,000 troops total, one Panzer and two Panzergrenadier brigades plus an organic helicopter force, with the capability to additionally integrate up to two allied partner brigades. The national brigades will have three mechanized and one infantry battalion each, organic artillery, enhanced capabilities against new air threats like sUAS, and a mixed reconnaissance company.



The division will additionally have a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion covering ranges out to 300 kilometers, engineers equipped with a future blocking system, increased NBC defense and of course organic C4ISR and logistics capabilities which can be modularly used within the division as well as the brigade system. Add lots of terms like comprehensive digitalization, plug-in interoperability, sensor-to-shooter concept, joint and combined cyber and information operations, highly automated logistics possibly including autonomous driving, ad-hoc networked signature-reduced high-mobility command posts with increased reachback share, etc.



The necessary increase in personnel is to be reached partially through more use of reservists. Materially, it is expected that the number of Boxers alone will have to be at least tripled over the 200 already in service and 130 authorized for procurement. There will likely be more Pumas, too, and German-French cooperation for new artillery systems in addition to the future Main Ground Combat System project. Tiger is to be successively upgraded and supplemented by a light recce/attack helicopter, including for urban operations.



The way for the Luftwaffe is already mostly mapped out with the Future Air Combat System and Future Transport Helicopter, UAVs, the joint French-German C-130 squadron and possibly a multi-national A400M outfit (or alternately taking over the previously surplus-to-requirement aircraft again). Same for the Marine with F125, more K130s, additional U212s jointly procured with Norway, and MKS 180/F126. The minehunter fleet will have to be replaced, and it’s not yet clear how the future maritime air warfare capability will look. The government has allegedly agreed on the procurement of two new command and supply ships, though.



Then there’s finances.

On the thought that capabilities, not money should be the focus for German contributions to NATO:

Germany is no longer a frontline country rather than an essential rear area/logistics hub within the alliance, including lots of important headquarters and other installations. Most reinforcements and supplies for the new frontline countries from about anywhere in Western Europe and North America must pass across or by its territory. There are two main national missions following from this. We are arguably making much more progress in preparing for the second than the first one.

The first mission is protecting those installations and lines of communication. There are four main threat vectors:

- By air, including conventional aircraft and UAVs, ballistic and cruise missiles, and airborne operations. The conventional threat is the least problematic; with the dual-capability fleet of 140 Eurofighters, the chief issue is overcoming availability problems via sufficient stocks of spare parts and ammunition, and crew readiness via budgeted flight hours. Ground-based air defense however is sparse and in need of capability updates.

The replacement of Patriot (twelve squadrons of eight) by MEADS is still in limbo, with completion planned for 2031. While MEADS will use the PAC-3 MSE missile, an emerging threat of new IRBMs may require additional capabilities; despite housing NATO's missile defense headquarters at Ramstein, there are currently none nationally. Aster 30 Block 1 NT/Block 2 is unlikely, since Germany seems to be somewhat hitched to the US wagon with MEADS and separately, Standard for the Marine. PAAC-4/Stunner/David's Sling doesn't seem to be an improvement regarding target range (300 km). THAAD or SM-3/6, the latter for land and/or sea use, are more likely. So far though, the Type 124 frigates are at best envisioned to supply target data rather than provide effectors within the allied missile defense scheme.

Low-level AD is limited to two Ozelot platoons and two MANTIS firing units, now also operated by the Luftwaffe - though subordinated to the Dutch Defensie Grondgebonden Luchtverdedigingscommando as part of the bi-national cooperation with the Netherlands, which has a few additional Patriots, NASAMS and Stinger Fenneks. Ozelot and MANTIS have long planned to be replaced by SysFla involving a mobile 35 mm platform and the LFK NG missile; however, no procurement decision has even been made. It would make sense to revive the Heer's defunct anti-air branch for it.

- On the ground, though mostly by commando raids and hybrid warfare, including fomenting public unrest directed against NATO operations, all the way from civil disobedience by blocking bases and transports with peaceful protests to terrorist acts, as seen in the 70s/80s. The possible use of NBC agents against military targets or society at large shouldn't be neglected. This is partly a question of intelligence and policing, but constitutes a situation where civil means quickly meet their limits.

In the Cold War, there was an extensive territorial defense and host nation support system. Very little of that remains. Each of the current two mechanized divisions has a reserve support battalion with a somewhat cloudy mission, but including security tasks and support of domestic disaster relief. The inter-service force support base has been raising a total of 30 regional security and support companies of about 100 reservists each since 2012, with one each security, support and NBC/engineer platoon.

This April, three Bavarian companies were used as the initial building blocks for a new pilot territorial defense regiment that will be trialed until 2021. Of course if Bremen and the Saarland with their population of about 700,000 and one million respectively can raise a company each, we should really be able to field five regional regiments of 13-17 each - less a question of money than willing reservists, which should be the smaller problem.

The above doesn't include rebuilding the material, legal and administrative means for enabling quick military transports across German territory, another Cold War capability largely lost. Authorizing and securing military convoys has devolved to the state level, for example. Work is underway to improve the situation, but it will take some time.

- By sea. During the Cold War, Germany along with Denmark and Norway was the guardian of the Baltic Approaches, which expressed itself in a large fleet of fast attack craft, mine warfare craft, and coastal submarines. The mission then was to deny Warsaw Pact forces a breakout into the Atlantic. Today it is to enable NATO to operate in the Baltic Sea though most transports by sea will doubtlessly unload in North Sea ports and take the safer land route from there. But while Germany will have to contribute to it, then as now others are better positioned to secure the transatlantic link.

The customized Cold War fleet of course is long gone, though the Type 212A submarines remain capable of operating in the confined Baltic waters they were still designed in the 80s after all. Germany used to be NATOs center of competence for anti-mine warfare, but this capability has atrophied in the last expeditionary-focused decades. Of nearly 60 units, only ten dating from the 90s remain active in the mission. A follow-on system has been long debated, but nothing concrete has emerged so far.

The days of the FAC, another German chief competence, are probably gone. Even in the late 80s, thoughts for follow-on systems went towards either more smaller platforms, a complete change to shore-based missiles or, in view of the Cold War thaw, bigger units which could also be deployed in other European littorals, and eventually materialized as the Type 130 corvette. We are actually building a second lot of five now, which is probably the most cost-effective solution for control of Baltic waters, though the design could use some updates.

The most important measure for anti-surface warfare might be giving the Marine its own aerial warfare capability back, or at least make the Luftwaffe finally take it serious after promptly letting it slide after assuming it in 2005. The Kormoran AShM has been gone since 2012 without successor.

- Cyber warfare, not just against military installations but the civilian infrastructure enabling them, and the population via information warfare (also see above under hybrid warfare). Not exclusively a military mission either, and we've been making some steps to address this threat. The Bundeswehr established its Cyber and Information Space branch as its third inter-service branch in 2017, combining signals and electronic warfare troops with military intelligence, operative communication and cyber security (plus geographic information). The German capabilities and legalities of cyber warfare remain a little fuzzy and under debate.

Various other authorities are involved in the cyber security field, chiefly the Federal Office for Security in Information Technology, which also runs the small National Cyber Defense Center supposed to coordinate between other federal agencies - the foreign and domestic intelligence services, the Bundeswehr's counter-intelligence agency, Federal Police, the Customs Criminal Investigations Office, and the Federal Office for Public Protection and Disaster Relief. Operators of critical infrastructures (water, electricity, communications etc.) are also supposed to cooperate.

The second mission is of course providing quick backup/reinforcements to the frontline countries. Germanys traditional role here is in mechanized warfare, and the plans for NATO's 2031 defense posture have been widely depicted here. A lot remains to be done, but I think too little (at least public) attention is paid to the first mission - which needs to be secured to enable the second.

Edited to expand on the territorial regiment concept. Edited again to put the long hyphens and apostrophes back in which the mobile board version killed during the first edit.

Berliin ja Pariis, mis jätsid Poola oma ühistest kaitseprojektidest välja, sundisid Varssavi keskenduma Ameerika relvadele, kirjutab Die Welt. Nüüd plaanib Poola osta kaasaegsemaid tanke, kui Saksamaal ja Prantsusmaal on kokku, väidab Saksamaa väljaanne.

Poola on sõlminud Ameerika Ühendriikidega lepingu osta enam kui 400 miljoni dollari eest 20 Ameerika kaasaskantavat raketiheitjat ja sellega seotud varustust. Lisaks kavatseb Varssavi asendada Saksa tankid teiste moodsamatega, vahendab InoTV Die Welti artikli sisu.

Väljaande viidatud ekspertide sõnul on Poola Saudi Araabia järel suuruselt teine ​​Ameerika relvade ostja.

Väljaande autor näeb selles Pariisi ja Berliini vastutust, kes on Varssavi ees „suletud“ kaitseküsimustes. Saksamaa ja Prantsusmaa teevad selles valdkonnas koostööd, kuid ei luba Poolal koostööd teha, ehkki Varssavi osaleks hea meelega uute tankide väljatöötamises, öeldakse artiklis.

Berliini ja Pariisi sarnasel positsioonil on kaugeleulatuvad tagajärjed Euroopa ühisele kaitsepoliitikale ja seega ka Euroopa julgeolekule, hoiatab Saksa ajaleht. Autor väidab, et Poola tagab NATO niinimetatud idapoolse külje turvalisuse. Euroopa armeede integreerimist muudavad keeruliseks kahepoolsed lepingud Poola ja USA vahel, on artikli autor kindel.

Poola “võõrandumine” olulise partnerina julgeolekupoliitikas on ohtlik, hoiatab väljaanne. Poola soovib, et temas ei nähtaks mitte ainult potentsiaalset sõjatehnika ostjat, vaid ka partnerit ning seetõttu on ta huvitatud osalemisest Euroopa tanki väljatöötamisel. Kuid Berliini kurb kogemus näitas, et suured Euroopa projektid suurendavad kulusid ja suurendavad viivituse tõenäosust.

Sellest vaatenurgast jääb lahtiseks küsimus, kui mõistlik on Poolat sellistesse projektidesse tööstuspoliitika osas kaasata, kirjutab ajaleht. „Kui Berliin ei hoolitse Varssavi edukama integratsiooni eest Euroopa kaitseprojektidesse, surub see Poola Donald Trumpi kätte. See on täpselt see, mis praegu toimub, ”öeldakse artiklis.

Autor märgib, et mitte ainult USA, vaid ka Lõuna-Korea on valmis tegema koostööd Poolaga, kes on valmis pakkuma Poola vajadustele kohandatud K2 mudeli versiooni ja viima läbi isegi Varssavi soovitud tehnoloogiasiirde. Läbirääkimised sellel teemal on küll algfaasis, kuid me räägime juba 800 eksemplarist.

"Pärast sellist kindlat tehingut on Poolas rohkem kaasaegseid soomukeid kui Saksamaal ja Prantsusmaal kokku," lõpetab Die Welt.

Aga see oli juba ka ajateenistuse ajal mõnes üksuses suht vene keelne.

nimetu kirjutas:See korea K2 võib tulevikus ka paljude teiste Euroopa riikide valikusse sattuda. Juba praegu on näha K9 haubitsa edu välismaal. K2 on igati modernne ja tõenäoliselt taskukohasem kui saksa-prantsuse uus leiutis, sest enamus selliseid ühisprojekte muutuvad ajapikku rahaauguks. Tuletagem ka meelde, et prantslaste Leclerc on tegelikult üks kalleimaid tanke tänu oma eksootilisele soomusele.