www.militaar.net

While the Russian army definitely has the combat power to achieve these scenarios, does Russia have the logistics force structure to support these operations? The short answer is not in the timelines envisioned by Western wargames. In an initial offensive — depending on the fighting involved — Russian forces might reach early objectives, but logistics would impose requirements for operational pauses. As a result, a large land grab is unrealistic as a fait accompli. The Russian army has the combat power to capture the objectives envisioned in a fait accompli scenario, but it does not have the logistic forces to do it in a single push without a logistical pause to reset its sustainment infrastructure. The Russian Aerospace Forces (with a sizable tactical bomber and attack aircraft force) and attack helicopters can also pick up fire support to alleviate artillery ammunition consumption.

There are serious logistic challenges with large-scale fait accompli operations in the Baltics. Small scale fait accompli operations are feasible with small forces without a logistical challenge but on a large scale are far more challenging. Fait accompli requires Russian forces to overrun Baltic states and eliminate all resistance in less than 96 hours — before NATO’s Very High Readiness Task Force can reinforce the defenders. This force won’t stop a Russian attack, but it commits NATO to a land war, negating the very purpose of fait accompli.

Elements deployed there include three VDV (airborne divisions) along with the 2nd Motor Rifle Division of the 1st GTA. Why did they place all of these units there? No idea. Although the text above the units says that these formations were deployed to Belarus during Zapad-2021, I think it is too far-fetched at this point to assume they’ll be again deployed there now. Also, at present, there are no indications of any Russian units on the move towards Belarus. Nevertheless, if the 2nd MRD is to go there, I expect it to happen relatively soon.

To sum up, apart from strange deployments to Belarus and a high number of BTGs in Crimea, my BTG count corresponds with what is on the map.

My BTG count: 29

Kyiv’s BTG count: 40. The largest difference comes from me not including the LPR and DPR forces and the difference in the number of BTGs deployed to Crimea.

I also want to stress that it is too early to say whether the attack (if it happens) will look like this. Russian forces are still prepositioning. The current concentration areas are in Crimea and near Valuyki. Belarus appears quiet. So does Pogonovo.

The situation is dynamic.

Reports in Russian outlets that Russian subs sailed out hastily from bases.

Source is not very credible so needs further info, just heads up and keep an eye on this.

Российские атомные подводные лодки, базирующиеся в Вилючинске, экстренно отправлены в море. Об этом сообщает портал avia.pro. В «MilitaryMaps» сообщается, что на фоне обострения ситуации между Россией и НАТО все АПЛ Тихоокеанского флота ВМФ РФ в состоянии боеготовности покинули места дислокации и вышли на боевые дежурства. Такая ситуация наблюдается на нескольких российских базах. В отношении военно-морской базы в Вилючинске на Камчатке имеются снимки со спутников, которые подтверждают информацию о том, что АПЛ поочередно в течение нескольких дней покинули базу.

АПЛ проектов 955 «Борей», 955А «Борей-А» и 949А «Антей» начали оперативно покидать место своего постоянного базирования и выходить в море, теряясь на просторах Мирового океана с начала этого месяца, говорится в сводках систем GPS слежения. Подробности такого массового выхода в море российских атомных подлодок в министерстве обороны РФ не комментируют.

So apparently those are the elements of the 98th Guards Airborne Division from Ivanovo. Recognized by tactical signs.

Based on the number of trains apparently headed to this area, and the lack of changes in the garrisons of the 20th CAA units permanently stationed there, I believe we are looking at a potential undetected consentration of forces in the area indicated.

Lukashenko said Belarus will not remain on the sidelines if there is a new war in the Donbas, "and it is clear whose side we will be on."

On Monday, we spotted a video of a train carrying trucks and Tigr armored cars somewhere in Russia. We logged in to GdeVagon railcar tracking database — only to find our account effectively blocked.

Other fellow researchers reported similar issues yesterday.

We did have a spare account, which gave us the train's route from Abakan in Siberia to Elnya, where the vehicles of the 41st Army are currently based.

Soon, that account was blocked too.

We believe the unit to be the 55th Motorized Brigade based in Kyzyl. It is also part of the 41st Army, which seems to be still moving to Western Russia from its bases in Siberia.

Coupled with the attempts to hide the movements, this is extremely concerning.

I can confirm that my account also seems to be blocked after searching for a train transporting military vehicles. I will only be drinking tea that I make from now on.

Large increase in BALFLT activity coming up:

"The crews of the ships of the Baltic Fleet practice combat training missions in the basing areas"

"over 50 ships and support ships"

"the ships of the Baltic Fleet will enter the naval training grounds"

“Russia has been decreasing bandwidth on railways for commercial firms since Oct., which might suggest logistical preparations for war. ISW also recorded mobilization of Donbas militant reserve forces under guidance of Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army.”

The storm is thickening — the Kremlin keeps advancing new threats of a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in the near future.

According to numerous reports from the intelligence community and media, Russia has currently concentrated between 94,000 and 100,000 combat-ready troops in close proximity to the Ukrainian border.

Russia upped the stakes on Dec. 1. President Vladimir Putin demanded for NATO to guarantee that it wouldn’t expand to include Ukraine. On the same day, the Kremlin launched military exercises with 10,000 troops in the country’s Southern Military District adjacent to Ukraine, as well as the Russian-occupied Crimea.

Right now, nobody can say for sure whether this is bluff.

What if the Kremlin does decide to invade Ukraine? Here’s what the intelligence and expert community think can happen.

What would the new war’s first hours look like?

Speaking to the Military Times on Nov. 21, Ukraine’s military intelligence Chief Brigade General Kyrylo Budanov said Russia is probably preparing to launch a new blitzkrieg in late January or early February.

The first step would likely include massive psychological warfare action, such as instigating “unrest, through protests and meetings” to undermine the country’s ability to fight back, the general told the Military Times.

The military action would likely involve airstrikes, artillery, and armor attacks followed by airborne assaults in Ukraine’s east, as well as amphibious offensives in Odesa and Mariupol, according to the Ukrainian intelligence.

On top of that, a smaller advance may be expected across the northwestern border with Belarus.

The outlet published a map by Ukraine’s military intelligence showing the most probable Russian strike directions coming from occupied Donbas, Crimea, and Russia’s southwestern regions bordering Ukraine.

The blitz may be aimed at seizing most of Ukraine’s territory east of the Dnipro River, as well as the Black Sea coastline.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, as of Nov. 20 Russia had deployed 40 battalion tactical groups, including 94,000 troops, 1,200 tanks, 2,900 armored fighting vehicles, 1,600 artillery pieces, 330 airplanes, 240 helicopters, 75 maritime vessels, and six submarines.

Right now, according to intelligence, Russia is able to immediately deploy at least 3,500 airborne and special operations troops.

This whole force may soon rush into Ukraine.

According to General Budanov, nasty winter weather would not be a significant obstacle to the Russian troops or the Ukrainian defenders.

Is a full-scale invasion the only scenario of escalation?

Not at all.

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a Washington D.C.-based think-tank, there are three potential scenarios: Russia’s massive military deployment to Belarus to counter an alleged NATO invasion, a massive deployment to Donbas against an alleged Ukrainian attack — and a full-scale invasion beyond Crimea and Donbas, which is envisaged by the Ukrainian intelligence.

The ISW considers the full-scale offensive the least likely of the possible scenarios.

What are other signs of Russia preparing for escalation?

In its Nov. 30 report, the ISW reported an increase of Russian command and control elements in Donbas or southern or western Russia near the Russian-Ukrainian border in November.

Russia has also been seen decreasing its bandwidth on railways for commercial enterprises since October, which might also potentially suggest logistical preparations for war. The ISW has also recorded the mobilization of the Donbas militant reserve forces under the guidance of Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army.

If Russia is preparing so thoroughly, why is the full-scale invasion less likely than other scenarios?

The ISW is not recording many crucial indicators of a full-fledged, combined arms operation being prepared by Russia.

In particular, the Russian troops concentrated at the border seemingly fall short of the mobilization of artillery at the regiment and brigade level. The same goes for airborne forces and the Caspian Sea elements in the Black Sea.

And the migrant crisis in Belarus is intensifying, probably to set conditions for a Russian military deployment in Belarus, as the ISW estimates. But so far, as of late November, no additional Russian ground forces have been seen being deployed to Belarus.

And last but not least, the ISW does not indicate the mobilization of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, in other words, the nuclear stockpile, which is also might be “an indicator that an operation is imminent or already underway.”

This image by @tweetsNV illustrates the disposition of Russian military near Ukraine borders: 115,000 soldiers, 40 battalion tactical groups, 1200 tanks, 2900 armoured vehicles, 1600 artillery systems, 28 missile complexes, 330 planes, 240 helicopters, 75 ships, 6 submarines

The word mobilization is something that the Russian training bulletins use very sparingly. Even snap drill to full combat readiness are usually not called that, even though they are actually that.

"A mobilization training session with gunners of the KPVT of the Taman Motorized Rifle Division began in the Moscow region"

Had to check the wording in Russian here, and yes, the press release does say mobilization training in the 2nd GMRD / 1st GTA...

https://function.mil.ru/news_page/count ... 997@egNews

500 #Russia|n Black Sea Fleet Marines have begun exercises at training ranges in #Crimea - TASS

"Effective methods for the operational creation of groupings of troops in operational areas will be discussed at the meeting with the command staff of the Southern Military District"

"More than 300 officers and generals will be involved"

More than 700 snipers from the Western Military District are conducting training exercises in Voronezh, Belgorod, Bryansk, and Smolensk, including with Strelets-M KRUS systems, which are used to transmit target coordinates for air/arty strikes.