laikar kirjutas: ↑25 Juul, 2023 14:05
Kelbas või mitte, aga ega ukrainlaste edenemine pole grammi võrragi kiirem, kui venkudel Bahmuti all oli. Mingi põhjus peab sellel ju olema?
Mõningaid põhjuseid toob Tom Cooper välja oma eilses
blogipostituses (leht palub sisselogimist aga "no thanks" vajutades pole seda tegelikult vaja).
Hetkel jah tungivadki Ukrainlased peale (reeglina öiste) jalaväerünnakutega, mis teebki edasiliikumise äärmiselt aeglaseks. See taktkika vähemasti töötab, ja palju väiksemate kadudega kui vattide "lihamäerünnakud". NATO stiilis Mehhaniseeritud üksustega läbimurdmiseks puudvad lihtsalt vajalikud vahendid mida näitas ka vastupealetungi algus (postituses pikemalt ja paremini kui ma oskaks refereerida). Robotyne all toimunut
täpsustab ta järgmise päeva postituses. Mingit kiiret edu seal oodata ei ole, aga tegelikult suudeti vattide tehnikat/ üksuseid eelmistel päevadel päris korralikult rappida (kuna viimased tegid vasturünnakuid) ja alasid hoida.
Natuke heidab varju ka Andrew Perpetuale kel oli segadus videomaterjalist "kuidas vatid saavad küll seal olla?":
Sufficient to ‘explain’ few bits and pieces, just as examples. The ZSU run a series of raids into the ‘flank’ of the ‘main’ Russian position north of Robotyne, then exploited the opportunity to raid further south. Contrary to the Klishchivka area, the Robotyne area is heavily mined: while Ukrainians were busy widening their secure lines through the minefields north-east and east of Robotyne, and bringing in their heavy gear (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles etc.), the Russians counterattacked into their western flank, and - between others - captured one Bradley. Moreover, the Russians then launched an even stronger counterattack five kilometres further east (mind the concentration of Russian forces in the Verbove area, which I’ve mentioned about a week ago) - and did so over two of their own minefields. Reason: they attempted to collapse the entire Ukrainian advance north and east of Robotyne. To spoil all the results of six weeks of - often troublesome - Ukrainian advances.
Result? Related ‘photos and videos’ are then puzzling people: ‘what are the Russians doing there?’ and - because Ukrainians meanwhile not only stopped, but also pushed back that Russian counterattack - are resulting in yet more ‘wrong war maps’…
Bottom line: it’s easy - but wrong - to think about what’s currently going on in this war as about ‘trench warfare’. That’s a massive oversimplification, at least. Together with the terrain, any kind of fortifications and any other sorts of obstacles are ‘just the base of the battlefield’. What matters is the movement of troops and vehicles. And these are moved as the commanders find that necessary in the given moment of time, on basis of their situational awareness (or the lack of the same). Indeed, in this war it is rather so that units that are not moving for much too long, are certain to suffer heavy losses. Thus, almost all the units are moving every few hours, at least once a day.
ja järgnevas postituses:
Tom Cooper kirjutas:Robotyne… in this area, the situation was particularly interesting, the last week, because of a Russian counterattack in, from what I understand, the form of a pincer: either from Kopani (roughly) in direction of Novodanylivka, or from Robotyne in northern direction, ‘on the western side’, and from Verbove, ‘on the eastern side’. Essentially, the Russians attempted to either encircle ZSU troops that were in the process of approaching their ‘2nd Defence Line’ east and south-east of Robotyne, or drive them back into minefields in the north. These counterattacks came at the time Ukrainians were busy widening their lanes through the deep minefields, plus recovering and repairing their equipment damaged during the last 5-6 weeks, so to enable a better flow of supplies forward, and gain more ground for manoeuvre. Now, no doubt, the 47th and 65th Mech have lost additional tanks and infantry fighting vehicles while repelling Russian counterattacks. However, declaring that for ‘successful Russian defence’ is really nonsense – especially considering Ukrainian 15th Mech then hit the northern flank of the eastern Russian advance and, using gaps in Russian minefields uncovered by the movement of VSRF units, drove it all the way back into Novofedorivka and about 1000m short of Verbove. And that Ukrainians are ‘back’ into northern and eastern fringes of Robotyne, while what was left of the VSRF artillery – especially the 165th Artillery Brigade in the Polohy area – was outright massacred by Ukrainian artillery and air strikes (deploying JDAMs). In ‘retaliation’, the Russians then ‘had to’ heavily shell Orikhiv and hit the place with numerous MPK/UMPKs: is a big enough target for them to hit. Several civilians were killed…
(ehk ka väide et JDAM'e ja HIMARSi ei kasutata on selge liialdus. Kasutatakse lihtsalt vähem kaugete strateegiliste sihtmärkide vastu, rinde lähedal ja kaudtulevahendite vastu aga päris aktiivselt ja edukalt)
Klishchivka kohta väidab, et ukraina otsus viimastel nädalatel mitte edasi liikuda oli taotuslik. Venelasid olid piisavalt ohmoonid et iga hinna eest ala hoidimise nimel vedasid regulaarselt uusi üksuseid äärmiselt halvasti kaitstavatele positsioonidele Linnas sees ja vahetus ümbruses. Sealt oli neid omakorda oli väga mõnus igapäevaselt omade väheste kaotustega nottida.
Tänaseks tundub, et viimaks said
ka vatid aru, et sealt tuleb taganeda (väga ülevaatlik tänane postitus hetkeseisust sealkandis):
Jah, tema sõnul on ZSU nädalaid ka Klischivkas sees askeldanud. Põhjuseid, miks sinna positsioone ei tahetud võtta selgitab siin:
Tom Cooper kirjutas:Today, you’re going to ‘hear’ (i.e. read in the social media) about ‘fighting inside Klishchivka’, and ‘fighting inside Andriivka’.
Actually, the ZSU is mopping up the remaining Russians along the eastern side of Klishchivka, and - especially - de-mining the place and clearing the wreckage and bodies sufficiently to enable a free movement of its own troops (and their hygienic survival there).
…..because, and just like after the withdrawal of the Wagner PMC from south-eastern Tripoli, back in 2019, the place is full of mines and booby-traps, and full of wreckage of destroyed vehicles, decomposting bodies (and body-pieces) of the Russian troops, many of which are booby-trapped, too.
Meanwhile, surviving remnants of the 83rd VDV Brigade, the 57th and 72nd Motor Rifle Brigades are falling back towards the east: only their rearguards are still offering resistance.
Diletandile oli üldse väga hea lugemine tema 3-osaline ülevaade sellest kui lollakalt igasugu OSINT kontod konflikti kajastavad. Soovitan väga 3 osa läbi lugeda (nõretav sarkasm on küll tüütu, aga sisu on omajagu, mis kompenseerib):
(tänud sellele akf'ile kes linkas, aegajalt olen tema blogi lugenud, aga ilmselgelt peaks seda rohkem tegema)
1. osa
2. osa
3. osa
Tema 20. juulil kirjutatud kolmanda osa jutt seal Andriivka kohta on eriti hästi aegunud, arvestades et needsamas OSINT kontod keda ta seal mõnitab, täpselt nii (nüüd siis nädal aega hiljem) pasundavadki kuidas "Ukraina on ootamatult edasi liikunud"
Tema 2. osa analüüs Ukraina tehnika hävimise videode kohta (ja vene propavideode kohta millest Juuni omasid võetakse tihti kui uusi) oli ka minusugusele lollile päris silmiavav (see MRAPide hävitamise jutt näiteks). Ühesõnaga tasub lugeda!
Juba varasematest postitustest kumab läbi et mehel on kindlasti mingid kontaktid Ukraina Armee üksustes. Igatahes üks analüütik kes oskab vaadata kaugemale Telegrammi videodest ja nende kaardilekandmisest.
EDIT: Robotnye kohta on seis tänaseks väidetavalt selline:
Tom Cooper kirjutas:
Of course, since ‘there are no videos’, nothing of this has ever happened…. or ‘is going to happen’ in a few days…
Ehk kui igasugu OSINT kaardid nüüd paari päeva jooksul (esimeste videode ilmumisel) oma "jooni"sinnapoole nihutama hakkavad, eks siis ole näha kas rääkis õiget juttu. Senimaani ei näe põhjust kahelda.