Re: Mis Ukrainas toimub? vol.3
Postitatud: 02 Veebr, 2015 23:23
Raport, mille põhjal nüüd arutatakse, kas ja milliseid relvi USA peaks andma. Tahetakse, et oleks kohal enne aprilli/mai võimalikku uut vene pealetungi. Ukrainlased ise tahtsid veel snaiperrelvi, Javeline ja moodsaid õhutõrjesüsteeme (eeldatakse, et vene pool võtab oma lennuväe peatselt kasutusele), aga korraliku õhutõrje andmist nii lühikese ajaga ei peeta võimalikuks.
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/ ... _FINAL.pdf
Asjad, mis võiks tulla:
Counter-battery radars that can detect and locate
the origin of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)
launches and artillery firings out to a range of 30-40
kilometers. These will enable the Ukrainian military to
identify ceasefire violations and potentially to target
the Russian/separatist weapons that have thus far
caused the greatest number of Ukrainian casualties.
(Approximately 70 percent of Ukrainian casualties are
from rocket and artillery fire.)
• Medium altitude/medium range UAVs. These will
assist the Ukrainian military to increase its tactical
situational awareness, identify opposing troop
deployments, and locate opposing MLRS and artillery.
• Electronic counter-measures for use against opposing
UAVs. This will give the Ukrainian military capabilities
to disrupt opposition UAVs conducting missions
against Ukrainian forces.
• Secure communications capabilities. Much Ukrainian
tactical communication currently is conducted over
non-secure radios or cell phones and thus is extremely
vulnerable to interception by Russian intelligencegathering
systems.
Armored Humvees. With Russian UAVs patrolling the
skies and the persistent threat of Russian precision
rocket and artillery fire, Ukrainian forces require
all-weather mobility, speed, reliability and a measure
of protection as they move between positions on
the battlefield.
• Medical support equipment. Ukrainian casualties are
greater because of their relatively underdeveloped
and severely under resourced military medical system.
The provision of field hospitals would greatly improve
their soldiers’ survival rate.
• In addition to the above non-lethal items, the U.S.
government should immediately change its policy
from prohibiting lethal assistance to allowing
provision of defensive military assistance, which may
include lethal assistance, most importantly, light antiarmor
missiles. Ukrainian light anti-armor capabilities
are severely lacking at a time when the Russians have
moved large numbers of tanks and armored personnel
carriers into the Donbas (70 percent of their existing
stocks of light anti-armor weapons reportedly do not
work). Any major Russian/separatist advance beyond
the line of contact would presumably make heavy use
of tanks and armored personnel carriers. Anti-armor
missiles would give the Ukrainian army the capability
to impose heavier costs and support the disruption of
such attacks. Raising the risks and costs will help deter
further Russian offensive operations.
Given the urgency of the situation—some fear that a new
offensive could be launched once the spring arrives in
April/May—consideration should be given to drawing
equipment from U.S. stocks and using assistance funds to
replenish U.S. inventories.
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/ ... _FINAL.pdf
Asjad, mis võiks tulla:
Counter-battery radars that can detect and locate
the origin of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)
launches and artillery firings out to a range of 30-40
kilometers. These will enable the Ukrainian military to
identify ceasefire violations and potentially to target
the Russian/separatist weapons that have thus far
caused the greatest number of Ukrainian casualties.
(Approximately 70 percent of Ukrainian casualties are
from rocket and artillery fire.)
• Medium altitude/medium range UAVs. These will
assist the Ukrainian military to increase its tactical
situational awareness, identify opposing troop
deployments, and locate opposing MLRS and artillery.
• Electronic counter-measures for use against opposing
UAVs. This will give the Ukrainian military capabilities
to disrupt opposition UAVs conducting missions
against Ukrainian forces.
• Secure communications capabilities. Much Ukrainian
tactical communication currently is conducted over
non-secure radios or cell phones and thus is extremely
vulnerable to interception by Russian intelligencegathering
systems.
Armored Humvees. With Russian UAVs patrolling the
skies and the persistent threat of Russian precision
rocket and artillery fire, Ukrainian forces require
all-weather mobility, speed, reliability and a measure
of protection as they move between positions on
the battlefield.
• Medical support equipment. Ukrainian casualties are
greater because of their relatively underdeveloped
and severely under resourced military medical system.
The provision of field hospitals would greatly improve
their soldiers’ survival rate.
• In addition to the above non-lethal items, the U.S.
government should immediately change its policy
from prohibiting lethal assistance to allowing
provision of defensive military assistance, which may
include lethal assistance, most importantly, light antiarmor
missiles. Ukrainian light anti-armor capabilities
are severely lacking at a time when the Russians have
moved large numbers of tanks and armored personnel
carriers into the Donbas (70 percent of their existing
stocks of light anti-armor weapons reportedly do not
work). Any major Russian/separatist advance beyond
the line of contact would presumably make heavy use
of tanks and armored personnel carriers. Anti-armor
missiles would give the Ukrainian army the capability
to impose heavier costs and support the disruption of
such attacks. Raising the risks and costs will help deter
further Russian offensive operations.
Given the urgency of the situation—some fear that a new
offensive could be launched once the spring arrives in
April/May—consideration should be given to drawing
equipment from U.S. stocks and using assistance funds to
replenish U.S. inventories.
Mardikad kiitlevad "Tochka-U" allatulistmisega. Kanged poisid, huvitav kas kasutati Mossinit või Kalašši 
