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The Russian-Georgian War: Implications for the Middle East

Ariel Cohen

Lessons from the War

Lessons for the Middle East and Israel from the Russian-Georgian War abound, and apply both to military operations, cyber-warfare, and strategic information operations. The most important of these are:

Watch Out for the Bear - and Other Beasts! Russian continental power is on the rise. Israel should understand it and not provoke Moscow unnecessarily, while defending its own national security interests staunchly. Small states need to treat nuclear armed great powers with respect. Provoking a militarily strong adversary, such as Iran, is worthwhile only if you are confident of victory, and even then there may be bitter surprises. Just ask Saakashvili.
Strategic Self-Reliance. U.S. expressions of support of the kind provided to Georgia - short of an explicit mutual defense pact - may or may not result in military assistance if/when Israel is under attack, especially when the attacker has an effective deterrent, such as nuclear arms deliverable against U.S. targets. In the future, such an attacker could be Iran or an Arab country armed with atomic weapons. Israel can and should rely on its own deterrent - a massive survivable second-strike capability.
Intelligence Failure. U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis on the Russian threat to Georgia failed. So did U.S. military assistance to Georgia, worth around $2 billion over the last 15 years. This is something to remember when looking at recent American intelligence assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat or the unsuccessful training of Palestinian Authority security forces against Hamas. Both are deeply flawed. There is no substitute for high-quality human intelligence.
Air Power Is Not Sufficient. Russia used air, armor, the Black Sea Fleet, special forces, and allied militias. Clausewitzian lessons still apply: the use of overwhelming force in the war's center of gravity by implementing a combined air-land-sea operation may be twentieth century, but it does work.6 Israel should have been taught this lesson after the last war with Hizbullah.
Surprise and Speed of Operations Still Matter - as they have for the four thousand years of the recorded history of warfare. To be successful, wars have to have limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved most of its goals between Friday and Monday, while the world, including President George W. Bush, was busy watching the Olympics and parliaments were on vacation.
Do Not Cringe - within reason - from taking military casualties and inflicting overwhelming military and civilian casualties at a level unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost some 100-200 soldiers and effectively capitulated. A tougher enemy, like the Japanese or the Germans, or even Hizbullah, could well suffer a proportionally higher rate of casualties and keep on fighting.
Information and Psychological Warfare Is Paramount. So is cyber-security. It looks like the Russians conducted repeated denial of service attacks against Georgia (and in 2007 against Estonia), shutting down key websites. Russia was ready with accusations and footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in South Ossetia, shifting the information operation playing field from "aggressor-victim" to "saving Ossetian civilians from barbaric Georgians." These operations also matter domestically, to shore up support and boost morale at home.

2008-08-14 Игорь Джадан

Пятидневная война: техника и мораль
Разбор полётов

Still, to fully equip, embark, transport and coordinate the arrival and integration of these troops into combat operations alongside the 58th Army units moving overland is a notable demonstration of not only long-range airlift capability involving over 100 airlift sorties, but also improved command and staff arrangements, which proved so difficult for Russia’s army in the 1990s.

Russia also fired at least 15 SS-21 Tochka/Scarab short-range ballistic missiles at Georgian military targets

Conflict Exposes Obsolete Hardware
15 August 2008

kaur3 kirjutas:

2008-08-14 Игорь Джадан

Пятидневная война: техника и мораль
Разбор полётов

http://www.apn.ru/publications/article20642.htm

Jaanus2 kirjutas:Sollmann, kui täpne olla, tähendab see "täielikult hävitatud", mis ka tõsi ei ole. Aga jätaks propagandateemad, peab see foorum kauem vastu. Muidu läheb äkki mölaks ja lahmimiseks ja pannakse kinni ka, millest oleks kahju. Kui asi puudutab ainult sõjandust, on denis täitsa hea. Jätame õiguse eriarvamusteks ja ärme püüa üksteist ümber veenda asjades, milles see võimalik ei ole!

denis23 kirjutas:samas, ei hakka väita, et piltidel on terved hooned?

kert122 kirjutas:ma ei näe arvamusi vene kindrali lubadusest panna tuumalõhkepead balti laevastiku rakettidele-või on see teine teema`?