OTSEST, seda et kaudne väärtus on seda mõistan ma isegi ja täitsa nõus olen. Võibolla me defineerime lihtsalt siin otsest ja kaudselt erinevat. Võibolla oleks pidanud ütlema ma hoopis et otsest lahingulist väärtust? Nii oleks vist sobivam olnud ja oleksin paremini väljendunud.hillart kirjutas:Neil pole ju enam suurt kedagi välja õpetada.Kui palju Lätlased oma kolme t-55'te väljaõppel kasutavad? On kellegil selle kohta andmeid?
Toh-oh? Või ei ole? Kuidas siis ei ole, kui neid väljaõppel kasutataks. Samahästi võiks ju hiiglasliku kokkuhoiu saada, kui enam Kaitseväele õppimiseks laskemoona ei väljastaks, või mis veel efektiivsem - ei annaks üleüldse relvi kah välja. Õpivad edaspidi teoreetiliselt ja pildi pealt (nagu praegu suuresti kõrgestikvalifitseeritud tankitõrjujaid tehakse), E-õppe vormis. Ja paberil on ju kõik nii kaunis ning raha eest saab pensione tõsta, odavat vorsti kodututele osta, bussipiletetid doteerida, või mida iganes. Tuhanded sõdurid on meie võitmatu Kaitseväe reservi nimekirjades ja laiad rahvahulgad on vaimustusest sillas.Ei iseenesest olen nõus et muuseumisse oleks võind küll võtta, ja vahetevahel kevadtormil või mujal natuke ringi müristada, aga otsest sõjalist väärtust neil ju ei oleks, eriti 55'tel.
P.S.
Muideks. See kõik on juba isegi selles foorumis juba teab mitmendat ringi läbi hekseldatud teemaarendus.
"Tankid EKV-le"
-
Kapten Trumm
- Liige
- Postitusi: 43807
- Liitunud: 28 Juul, 2005 15:35
- Kontakt:
Nendest õppetankidest - ma ei oleks nii kindel, et VÕKide arvamust keegi selle kohta üldse küsis, vahest rääkis kamin peastaabiga (kus otsustaja oli võibolla rühmaülem kuskil 90ndate alguses ning edaspidi paberitööl) ning koos jõuti "konsensusele", et pole otstarbekas, sest pole kontseptsiooni, õppinud kaadrit ja nii edasi. Ja kui keegi kisa tõstab, siis saab alati viidata "kaitseväe arvamusele". Lisapowerit andis muidugi "aegunud vene vanaraud" ja "suured ülalpidamiskulud". Olen minagi lasknud suuremaid torusid laudadest ja koormakattest tehtud "tanki" pihta ja tunnen end täisväärtusliku tankitõrjujana 
/Veelgi hullem on see, et koos kohustusliku patriootliku riigioptimismi kehtestamisega nõrgeneks paratamatult ka meie ohutaju, mis on enesealalhoiuks vältimatult vajalik instinkt/ S. Mikser 2014.
2 asja: 1. - raha... Seda on alati vähe, aga samas raiskamiseks jätkub samuti alati. 2. - kaasaegsus... Seni treenitakse veoautode pääl, siis hoobilt minnakse pataljoni Leo-de pääle... Laskma õpitakse ju ka esmalt lihtsama ja kergema relvaga, siis võetakse kuulipilduja... Asja nimi on õpitud abitus koos simmlusega... 20 aastat seltsimehed, 20 aastat saab Eesti vabariiki... Aga see eest saame kõrberebaste tõttu kiita iga kuu...
Kui teedeehitajad suudavad linttraktoritega opereerida ja seejuures isegi raha teenida, ei peaks miski kompanii jagu tanke olema yletamatu väljaminek. Ilusti kysides saaks kindlasti ka "söbrahinnaga".
Kui inimene ei ole osalenud öppusel, kus talle teatakse et oled parasjagu oma yksusega tanki sihikul, kaugus 500 meetrit ja minut hiljem tetatkse et sinu yksuse pihta tulistati 5 lasku kildmyrsku pea kohale puude latvadesse, siis on raske seda ette kujutada, mis see on.
Edasi lugu ainult paraneb, kolme miunti pärast teatakse et tankid möödusid 500 meetri kauguselt vasakult positsioonidest. Köik vahivad ja näevad aint kerget suitsuvinet pouude vahel ja kuulevad paari mootori möiratust.
Vahest tekib mul tunne, et parem on et neod tanke pole mitte kui yhtegit. Kui oleks, saaks liiga paljud inimesed öite kiirelt pihta, kui soos me omadega oleme. Et jahh, seni kuni oma kogemust ei ole, ei hinnata eriti körgelt ei tankitörje miine ei pioneeritökkeid ja vöidakse arvata, et 90 mm toruga ongi vöimalik tankiga vöidu joosta. Asjade reaalne seis vöib seega osutuda ysna hirmsaks ärkamiseks.
Aga Mehed! Laulame!
Kui inimene ei ole osalenud öppusel, kus talle teatakse et oled parasjagu oma yksusega tanki sihikul, kaugus 500 meetrit ja minut hiljem tetatkse et sinu yksuse pihta tulistati 5 lasku kildmyrsku pea kohale puude latvadesse, siis on raske seda ette kujutada, mis see on.
Edasi lugu ainult paraneb, kolme miunti pärast teatakse et tankid möödusid 500 meetri kauguselt vasakult positsioonidest. Köik vahivad ja näevad aint kerget suitsuvinet pouude vahel ja kuulevad paari mootori möiratust.
Vahest tekib mul tunne, et parem on et neod tanke pole mitte kui yhtegit. Kui oleks, saaks liiga paljud inimesed öite kiirelt pihta, kui soos me omadega oleme. Et jahh, seni kuni oma kogemust ei ole, ei hinnata eriti körgelt ei tankitörje miine ei pioneeritökkeid ja vöidakse arvata, et 90 mm toruga ongi vöimalik tankiga vöidu joosta. Asjade reaalne seis vöib seega osutuda ysna hirmsaks ärkamiseks.
Aga Mehed! Laulame!
Inglaste tank seestvaates tulistamise ajal. Pilt on natsi vilets, aga midagi ikka aimab.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IxQ4JQz-to8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IxQ4JQz-to8
Ela täiel rinnal ja kui kord kooled, siis ära kahetse elatud elu!
Hea video ja pildimaterjal leo-st ja selle meeskonnast ning nende tegutsemisest.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYoJ-jqheo8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYoJ-jqheo8
Ela täiel rinnal ja kui kord kooled, siis ära kahetse elatud elu!
Muide, grusiinid pidasid vene rünnakule 2008 augustis 4 päeva vastu AINULT tänu tankidele. Neil on umbes 100 tanki, Moderniseeritud T-72.
Lahingbrigaadil on 30 tanki, neist lahingus pidevalt 15, 15 reservis.
T-72 peab lahingus vastu umbes 12-24 tundi, siis tuleb igal juhul kas remontida või maha kanda. Kõige ebakindlam on T72 laadimismehaanika. Neil käib laadmine auomatisseritult ja laadimislabad kipuvad kinni kiiluma. Aga laias laastus saab isegi 72-dega veel tänapäeval sõdida küll. Eriti arvetsades, et ega venedel midagi palju paremat suures hulgas ka ei ole.
Leod oleks muidugi super.
Vene taktika oli Gruusias ikka sama, mis 1944. Kolonn kolonni järgi tanke ja soomukeid pressib peale, natuke jalaväge kõrval, pluss muidugi lennuväe toetus. Samas, sel ajal kui tankid peale suruvad on õhuvägi eemal.
Nii et territooriumi võetakse tankidega ja neile on ainult tankitõrjerelvadega raske vastu saada. Pealegi. Kui territooriumi tagasi võtta, siis millega sa peale lähed kui omal tanke ei ole.
Planeerida Eesti kaitset eeldades, et sõdurid, kes pole kunagi ei tankidega õppust pidanud, ega neid lähedalt töötamaski näinud, saaksid neile lahingus vastu, on ABSOLUUTSELT VASTUTUSTUNDETU.
Lahingbrigaadil on 30 tanki, neist lahingus pidevalt 15, 15 reservis.
T-72 peab lahingus vastu umbes 12-24 tundi, siis tuleb igal juhul kas remontida või maha kanda. Kõige ebakindlam on T72 laadimismehaanika. Neil käib laadmine auomatisseritult ja laadimislabad kipuvad kinni kiiluma. Aga laias laastus saab isegi 72-dega veel tänapäeval sõdida küll. Eriti arvetsades, et ega venedel midagi palju paremat suures hulgas ka ei ole.
Leod oleks muidugi super.
Vene taktika oli Gruusias ikka sama, mis 1944. Kolonn kolonni järgi tanke ja soomukeid pressib peale, natuke jalaväge kõrval, pluss muidugi lennuväe toetus. Samas, sel ajal kui tankid peale suruvad on õhuvägi eemal.
Nii et territooriumi võetakse tankidega ja neile on ainult tankitõrjerelvadega raske vastu saada. Pealegi. Kui territooriumi tagasi võtta, siis millega sa peale lähed kui omal tanke ei ole.
Planeerida Eesti kaitset eeldades, et sõdurid, kes pole kunagi ei tankidega õppust pidanud, ega neid lähedalt töötamaski näinud, saaksid neile lahingus vastu, on ABSOLUUTSELT VASTUTUSTUNDETU.
2003 vast "harjutasid kätt" ikkagi esmalt Iraani-Iraagi ja Lahesõja kogemusega sõdijad... ja liiatigi on minu meelest siiski tunduvalt inimsõbralikum anda tankitõrjujatele igakülgne väljaõpe, kaasa arvatud ka elus tankiga toimetamine, selmet võtta eeskujuks Hamasi või fedajeene. Hambaid pidada saama tagumiku kaudu ka välja tõmmata, iseasi, kas see kõige ratsionaalsem ja inimsõbralikum tegevus on. Kahtlemata esinesid 2003 ka eelneva kogemuseta noorukid kes 20 eluaasta jooksul kordagi tanki polnud näinud nagu meil siin valdav seis on(samas ikka kahtlane, kas see sealkandis reaalne on, ka Süüria relvastuses olid tankid olemas üle nelja ja poole tuhande arvuliselt, ja noorsool vähemasti paraadidelt sõitva tanki kogemus olemas), aga kas valdavalt just sellised tankitõrjega tegelesid?
Errare humanum est-aga veel inimlikum on selle teise kraesse väänamine...
"The Tanks of August", leidsid aga allika. See on ju Vene propaganda "vastus" rootslaste, amide, grusiinide, (ja venelaste) artiklikogumikule "The Guns of August". Kus küll otsese sõjategevuse kohta on vaid Felgenhaueri üsna pealiskaudne lugu.
Klassikaline on muidugi pealkiri ,vana trikk, et kirjuta valmis mingi jama ja pealkirjasta sarnaselt sellele, milllele vastu kirjutad. Meenutab 70ndatel punaste üllitatid lisaköiteid pagulaste poolt välja antud koguteosele "Eesti rahvas Teises maailmaõjas"
Aga see selleks.
Ma panen siia inglise keeles jutu, mis on üles kirjutatud umbes kaks nädalat pärast sõda vestluses Gruusia 4 brigaadi komandöriga (kes on nüüdseks Maaväe ülem kui ma ei eksi). Võtab lühidalt kokku ühe brigaadi kogemuse. Ja muuhulgas kinnitab, et venelased jah kasutavad seda tuima konvois pealepressimise taktikat jätkuvalt. Kinnitab ka, et tankid on olulised. Ja parem leks kui oleks miskit etemat kui T72 (rääkimata vanematest mudelitest) Vähemalt sama oluline on muidug korralik suurtükivägi, tankitõrje ja muidugi õhutõrje. Aga kuna siin räägime tankidest, siis üteln seda ainult selleks, et oleks selge: ma ei arva, et tankid on vastus kõigele. Aga tankid on üks paratamtult vajalik element kui tõepoolest ennnast sõjaliselt kaitsta tahame.
Personnel and equipment
The brigade consists of 3300 men. 1500 men and brigade’s Artillery battalion participated in direct combat. Aritllery battalion had 18 120mm howitzers D30A. The rest were supporting units.
Brigade had 30 T72 tanks and BMP2-s. Toyota Hilux-s were also used for transportation.
Strela and Grom were used for anti-aircraft. These are out-dated Ukrainian weapons. Kalandadze said 70% of Strela-s were not operational. Grom-s worked better.
RPG 7 was used for antitank. He said these were very poor. Almost useless against tanks, there were also difficulties with BMP-s.
About armaments he commented that T72 was quite dysfunctional. After 24 h of warfare 15 tanks out of 30 had technical problems. For example self-charging system stopped working very often. Hand-charging is much slower for T72.
The whole brigade was equipped with light bulletproof vests and Kevlar helmets. He said this equipment considerably reduced losses.
Combat staff of the whole brigade was equipped with night-viewers, which was of advantage against Russians who seemed to have very few night-viewers.
Communication
They used Harries radios, which were functional until battle contact with the Russians. Then enormous communication interference started. It is not clear what was used to jam the communication but it worked well. Communication was not entirely lost during the whole warfare. In case of emergency they used mobile phones. Mobile communication worked.
Logistics and supplies
Kalandadze was content with the logistics. There was enough food and medical supplies during the entire combat operation . Ammunition arrived in the right place at the right time and was plenty. Technicians managed to repair damaged technique, tanks and BMP-s were used in shifts.
Command
4th brigade took orders from the Chief of Ground Forces, who stayed in a command HQ between Gori and Tskhinvali. The whole operation was commanded by Joint Staff , which also included commanders of MIA forces. During peacetime MIA units take orders from deputy minister of internal affairs. During war their commander is included to the Joint Staff.
Kalandadze said JS was located in direct vicinity of operational area. But commanded the warfare on the whole territory of the state – the first days the 2nd brigade near Abkhazian border, defense of Tbilisi, anti-aircraft and command of mobilization. Battle orders and tasks given to the navy is unclear. The whole command structure needs to be specified. The mentioned above it seemed to be on the level of the head of brigade.
Combat acitivities of the brigade and Russian tactics
During first hours of 8th and 9th of August the whole responsibility are was seized without any significant resistance and the first operative task was accomplished. Thereafter they moved to suburb of Tskihnvali by the morning of 9th. Center of Tskhinvali was under jurisdiction of MIA Special Forces.
Battle contact with the Russians started during mid-morning of 9th. Russians moved to Tskhinvali with BMP2 convoy. Brigade was on defense line on the southern side of Tskhinvali. Defense line was kept against continuous attacks until the evening of 9th.
“Russians didn’t use any tactics”, Kalandadze answered to relevant question. Russian convoy just tried to move on at any cost. They mainly moved on BMP2 accompanied by some support from T72 in the city, on opened landscape there were more of T72. BMP2 moved in front, T72 supported with fire.
Russian so-called tactics was to move on in specific direction without being stopped. After destruction of first BMP-s in convoy the direction was not changed and new battle machines moved in the same direction. Fire of Russian ground forces was not exact and was uncoordinated.
The most losses for Georgian defense were caused by Russian air-force and long distance fire. During the day attack bombers SU 25 and during the night battle helicopters MI 24 were used.
Russian ground forces were in warfare only during the day. They started attacking at 5 in the morning and continued until darkness. UAV-s were used for tactical reconnaissance, which flew higher than gunshot of Georgian anti-aircraft. Local Ossetians also used their mobile phones to inform Russians about Georgian units.
For the night Georgians retreated from defense lines fixed during the day. Therefore Russian helicopter attacks were ineffective during the night, they bombed empty trenches.
On 10th of August the 4th brigade was on defense line a bit south of Tskhinvali, defense line was held throughout the day. By the morning of 11th they retreated a few km-s southwards. The new defense line was held on 11th of August until came the order to retreat on defense of Tbilisi.
They decided not to defend Gori for the sake of civilians. By that time Russians had already bombed the center of Gori. Also arrived messages of excessive bombing in western Georgia and possible new attack direction from Armenia, where Russian units are located.
Brigade retreated structured and there was no panic.
It had effect on men’s moral though, especially on the first day when massive Russian air attacks caused battle shock. The head of the brigade found also negative the fact that soldiers had mobile phones and received panicking phone calls from home.
Casualties
4th brigade lost 20 men, 40 men are still missing, probably also dead. There are around 300 wounded.
Out of combat technique 15 T72 dropped off, mainly for technical reasons. Most of the armament and technique was taken along when retreating.
Russian losses in responsibility area of 4th brigade were evaluated: 100 infantries, 150 among BMP2 staff and around 700 separatists. Separatists didn’t have helmets and vests. Helmets and vests were used by Russian infantry, especially in Tskhinvali.
4th brigade destroyed 22-25 BMP2 and 10 T72 (some of these with indirect fire of artillery battalion, therefore it’s not possible to determine the exact number).
Brigade’s anti-aircraft shot down 3 SU25.
Losses 1:3 for Georgians, together with Ossetians even 1:10.
Klassikaline on muidugi pealkiri ,vana trikk, et kirjuta valmis mingi jama ja pealkirjasta sarnaselt sellele, milllele vastu kirjutad. Meenutab 70ndatel punaste üllitatid lisaköiteid pagulaste poolt välja antud koguteosele "Eesti rahvas Teises maailmaõjas"
Aga see selleks.
Ma panen siia inglise keeles jutu, mis on üles kirjutatud umbes kaks nädalat pärast sõda vestluses Gruusia 4 brigaadi komandöriga (kes on nüüdseks Maaväe ülem kui ma ei eksi). Võtab lühidalt kokku ühe brigaadi kogemuse. Ja muuhulgas kinnitab, et venelased jah kasutavad seda tuima konvois pealepressimise taktikat jätkuvalt. Kinnitab ka, et tankid on olulised. Ja parem leks kui oleks miskit etemat kui T72 (rääkimata vanematest mudelitest) Vähemalt sama oluline on muidug korralik suurtükivägi, tankitõrje ja muidugi õhutõrje. Aga kuna siin räägime tankidest, siis üteln seda ainult selleks, et oleks selge: ma ei arva, et tankid on vastus kõigele. Aga tankid on üks paratamtult vajalik element kui tõepoolest ennnast sõjaliselt kaitsta tahame.
Personnel and equipment
The brigade consists of 3300 men. 1500 men and brigade’s Artillery battalion participated in direct combat. Aritllery battalion had 18 120mm howitzers D30A. The rest were supporting units.
Brigade had 30 T72 tanks and BMP2-s. Toyota Hilux-s were also used for transportation.
Strela and Grom were used for anti-aircraft. These are out-dated Ukrainian weapons. Kalandadze said 70% of Strela-s were not operational. Grom-s worked better.
RPG 7 was used for antitank. He said these were very poor. Almost useless against tanks, there were also difficulties with BMP-s.
About armaments he commented that T72 was quite dysfunctional. After 24 h of warfare 15 tanks out of 30 had technical problems. For example self-charging system stopped working very often. Hand-charging is much slower for T72.
The whole brigade was equipped with light bulletproof vests and Kevlar helmets. He said this equipment considerably reduced losses.
Combat staff of the whole brigade was equipped with night-viewers, which was of advantage against Russians who seemed to have very few night-viewers.
Communication
They used Harries radios, which were functional until battle contact with the Russians. Then enormous communication interference started. It is not clear what was used to jam the communication but it worked well. Communication was not entirely lost during the whole warfare. In case of emergency they used mobile phones. Mobile communication worked.
Logistics and supplies
Kalandadze was content with the logistics. There was enough food and medical supplies during the entire combat operation . Ammunition arrived in the right place at the right time and was plenty. Technicians managed to repair damaged technique, tanks and BMP-s were used in shifts.
Command
4th brigade took orders from the Chief of Ground Forces, who stayed in a command HQ between Gori and Tskhinvali. The whole operation was commanded by Joint Staff , which also included commanders of MIA forces. During peacetime MIA units take orders from deputy minister of internal affairs. During war their commander is included to the Joint Staff.
Kalandadze said JS was located in direct vicinity of operational area. But commanded the warfare on the whole territory of the state – the first days the 2nd brigade near Abkhazian border, defense of Tbilisi, anti-aircraft and command of mobilization. Battle orders and tasks given to the navy is unclear. The whole command structure needs to be specified. The mentioned above it seemed to be on the level of the head of brigade.
Combat acitivities of the brigade and Russian tactics
During first hours of 8th and 9th of August the whole responsibility are was seized without any significant resistance and the first operative task was accomplished. Thereafter they moved to suburb of Tskihnvali by the morning of 9th. Center of Tskhinvali was under jurisdiction of MIA Special Forces.
Battle contact with the Russians started during mid-morning of 9th. Russians moved to Tskhinvali with BMP2 convoy. Brigade was on defense line on the southern side of Tskhinvali. Defense line was kept against continuous attacks until the evening of 9th.
“Russians didn’t use any tactics”, Kalandadze answered to relevant question. Russian convoy just tried to move on at any cost. They mainly moved on BMP2 accompanied by some support from T72 in the city, on opened landscape there were more of T72. BMP2 moved in front, T72 supported with fire.
Russian so-called tactics was to move on in specific direction without being stopped. After destruction of first BMP-s in convoy the direction was not changed and new battle machines moved in the same direction. Fire of Russian ground forces was not exact and was uncoordinated.
The most losses for Georgian defense were caused by Russian air-force and long distance fire. During the day attack bombers SU 25 and during the night battle helicopters MI 24 were used.
Russian ground forces were in warfare only during the day. They started attacking at 5 in the morning and continued until darkness. UAV-s were used for tactical reconnaissance, which flew higher than gunshot of Georgian anti-aircraft. Local Ossetians also used their mobile phones to inform Russians about Georgian units.
For the night Georgians retreated from defense lines fixed during the day. Therefore Russian helicopter attacks were ineffective during the night, they bombed empty trenches.
On 10th of August the 4th brigade was on defense line a bit south of Tskhinvali, defense line was held throughout the day. By the morning of 11th they retreated a few km-s southwards. The new defense line was held on 11th of August until came the order to retreat on defense of Tbilisi.
They decided not to defend Gori for the sake of civilians. By that time Russians had already bombed the center of Gori. Also arrived messages of excessive bombing in western Georgia and possible new attack direction from Armenia, where Russian units are located.
Brigade retreated structured and there was no panic.
It had effect on men’s moral though, especially on the first day when massive Russian air attacks caused battle shock. The head of the brigade found also negative the fact that soldiers had mobile phones and received panicking phone calls from home.
Casualties
4th brigade lost 20 men, 40 men are still missing, probably also dead. There are around 300 wounded.
Out of combat technique 15 T72 dropped off, mainly for technical reasons. Most of the armament and technique was taken along when retreating.
Russian losses in responsibility area of 4th brigade were evaluated: 100 infantries, 150 among BMP2 staff and around 700 separatists. Separatists didn’t have helmets and vests. Helmets and vests were used by Russian infantry, especially in Tskhinvali.
4th brigade destroyed 22-25 BMP2 and 10 T72 (some of these with indirect fire of artillery battalion, therefore it’s not possible to determine the exact number).
Brigade’s anti-aircraft shot down 3 SU25.
Losses 1:3 for Georgians, together with Ossetians even 1:10.
Kes on foorumil
Kasutajad foorumit lugemas: Registreeritud kasutajaid pole ja 3 külalist