Viimase JDW artikli kohaselt sai 21.11.2005 toimunud lahingus Hezbollahi sisside vastu Iisraeli Merkava 2 pihta 7 juhitava tankitõrjeraketiga (AT-3 Saggeri ja AT-4 Fagotiga). Väidetavalt ei saanud meeskond vigastatada.
Some excerpts from the JDW article:
*An Israel Defence Force (IDF) Merkava Mk 2 main battle tank (MBT) sustained seven hits by anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) on 21 November - with its crew remaining unharmed.
*4 Hizbullah killed, in attempt to capture IDF personnel.
*"One Merkava took seven hits of 'Sagger' [AT-3], TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked wire-guided] and 'Fagot' [AT-4 Spigot] ATGMs, but its crew was not injured," Brigadier General Gal Hirsh"
*As far as is known, all the ATGMs launched against the Merkava Mk 2 MBTs in the 21 November engagement were fitted with a single high-explosive anti-tank warhead.
Video of attack shown here:
http://www.filefactory.com/get/v2.1...9179e1ca59981f3
Merkava 2 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... erkava.htm
AT-3
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... a/at-3.htm
AT-4
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... a/at-4.htm
Hezbollah vs Iisraeli tankid
Iseenesest pole tegu mingi üllatusega,sest väidetavalt olid kõik mürsud ühelaengulised,mitte tandem lõhkepeaga.Ning Merkava 2 on väga tugev masin,kuskilt(ausalt enam ei mäleta kust) olen kuulnud,et RPG rakette on need masinad rohkemigi pihtasaanud kui 7.Pealegi Merkava puhul ei pea paika see lause,mida mõned armastavad tsiteerida(a'la juudid on vanad ihnuskoid jne)Merkava puhul on pannustatud just meeskonna ellujäämisele,erinevalt paljudest vene tankidest.
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Hjalmar Nelk
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Merkavast
Ma natuke täpsustaksin - on vale öelda, et juudid on panustanud kaitsesse ja venelased mitte. Õigem oleks merkava puhul öelda - selle tanki arendamisel on esimene prioriteet olnud kogu aeg kaitse. Soomuskaitse on muidugi üks parimaid (kui mitte parim) maailmas, kuid peale selle on veel ka konfiguratsiooniga otsitud kaitset. Mootor on ees, osadel versioonidel olid kütusepaagid tanki külgedel jne. Venelased (õigemini nõukogude liit) on otsinud kaitset teistmoodi - tankide madal siluett, kiirus ning kõige tähtsamana tankide arv. Ehk teisisõnu kui on vaja eesmärgile jõuda saja tankiga alustame liikumist tuhandega.
Vat see on kui igasugused sponsorid sulle träni kingivad ehk Hezbollah sai oma raketid ju kingituse korras. Palestiinlastel nii helded toetajad puuduvad ning sellid peavad ise katse-eksitusega relvi arendama. Järgnev jutt räägib sellest kuidas nad Gazas IED-ga Merkava tükkideks lasid.
Prior to 14 February 2002, the IDF's Merkava Main Battle Tanks were considered fairly invulnerable assets, since the Palestinians had no real antitank weapons. So Tel Aviv deployed their tanks to deal with the Intifada, safe in the assumption that their tankers were safe, that the tanks would dampen any crisis and that they'd suffer no embarrassing losses.
Wrong assumption. Shortly before 07:00 14 March, Palestinian terrorists triggered a Command Detonated Mine under a $3 million, 60-ton Merkava III MBT that had been escorting a civilian convoy on the Karni - Netzarim road in the central Gaza Strip. The force of the explosion from the 50 kilo (110 pound) radio-controlled mine blew the turret off the tank. The terrorists were hiding in or behind a nearby mosque near the settlement of Netzarim.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htarm/ ... 20316.aspx
Siin on BBC lugu järgmise õhkulaskmise kohta.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle ... 765545.stm
Samadest rakettidest veel. Järgneva artikli 4 lk. ühest lõigust tuleb välja, et Merkavat on siiski nende rakettidega õnnestunud hävitada.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/3aps98.pdf
Üks pidev õppimisprotsess.
Prior to 14 February 2002, the IDF's Merkava Main Battle Tanks were considered fairly invulnerable assets, since the Palestinians had no real antitank weapons. So Tel Aviv deployed their tanks to deal with the Intifada, safe in the assumption that their tankers were safe, that the tanks would dampen any crisis and that they'd suffer no embarrassing losses.
Wrong assumption. Shortly before 07:00 14 March, Palestinian terrorists triggered a Command Detonated Mine under a $3 million, 60-ton Merkava III MBT that had been escorting a civilian convoy on the Karni - Netzarim road in the central Gaza Strip. The force of the explosion from the 50 kilo (110 pound) radio-controlled mine blew the turret off the tank. The terrorists were hiding in or behind a nearby mosque near the settlement of Netzarim.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htarm/ ... 20316.aspx
Siin on BBC lugu järgmise õhkulaskmise kohta.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle ... 765545.stm
Samadest rakettidest veel. Järgneva artikli 4 lk. ühest lõigust tuleb välja, et Merkavat on siiski nende rakettidega õnnestunud hävitada.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/3aps98.pdf
Üks pidev õppimisprotsess.
No selle jutu peale tahaks meenutada vana asja Lahesojast, kui kord juhtus nii, et uks AT chopper kogemata pani AT raketiga Abramsile paugu ara, otse eest ja pihta ca 45 kraadise pihtamisnurga all. Tank jai seisma, meeskond viidi sinisest sinisema basseini juurde puhkama, aga choppriga toodud mehed soitsid sama tankiga kohe edasi ...
Oman vastavaid kohustusi ja piiramatuid õigusi antud ülesannete täitmisel.
Hezbollah vs Iisraeli tankid
Israeli Tanks and Hezbollah Countermeasures
Jul 24, 2006
Summary
Any Israeli advance into Lebanon will involve the Merkava tank. Whether Hezbollah can slow this advance will depend upon the effectiveness of its land mines and anti-tank missiles.
Analysis
Any Israeli advance into Lebanon will involve the Merkava tank. Whether Hezbollah can slow this advance will depend upon the effectiveness of its land mines and anti-tank missiles.
An Israeli Merkava Mark II tank struck a land mine about 77 yards north of the Israeli-Lebanese border July 12, almost completely destroying the tank. The mine is thought to have contained about 440 to 660 pounds of explosives, and would almost certainly have been shaped to achieve that effect given the amount of explosives used. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sources said even with improved protection, the blast still would have killed the tank's crew.
Nevertheless, the IDF reportedly began attaching steel plates to the underbellies of its Merkava tanks July 23 at an improvised maintenance station north of Avivim. (The underbelly, rear and top are the most vulnerable points in tank armor.) Named for the Hebrew word for chariot, the Merkava was designed from the ground up after the 1967 war, with crew survival as the highest priority, since a well-trained tank crew is far more valuable than a tank.
Initial operational capability came in 1979, and the original Merkava first saw action in southern Lebanon in 1982. The Merkava Mark II is an update of the original design. The Merkava Mark III and Merkava Mark IV represent substantial improvements over the Merkava Mark II, with the latest model among the most modern and capable tanks in the world. It is also the heaviest, outweighing even the heaviest M1A2 Abrams by several tons and employing a special modular, layered armor that can be changed in the field.
Scattered reports maintain Hezbollah has successfully engaged IDF tanks. A Merkava hit an explosive device in Bent Jbail on June 24, killing a battalion commander and one crew member. Within a few hours, an anti-tank missile struck another tank; no damage or casualties have been reported in this incident. Merkava Mark IVs are part of the current operations in Maroun al-Ras and Bent Jbail. That neither tank was entirely destroyed may indicate the Mark IV can withstand Hezbollah's capabilities.
Hezbollah almost certainly deploys the AT-3 Sagger -- a 60s-era anti-tank missile --which would not give a modern Merkava Mark IV any trouble. Reports also suggest Hezbollah possesses second-generation European MILAN and U.S. TOW and the third-generation Russian Kornet anti-tank guided missiles. The Kornet may have played a role in disabling U.S. M1A1 Abrams tanks in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and would give Hezbollah an anti-tank capability on par with most modern militaries.
In the IDF's first push into Maroun al-Ras on July 20, one of the lead tanks was reportedly penetrated by an unspecified anti-tank rocket fired at the rear quarter of the tank, but was able to retreat. The attack did not destroy the tank -- speaking to the survivability of the Merkava -- but successfully held up the engagement, as the Israelis pulled back to evacuate their wounded. A second tank was reportedly disabled.
This question of capability is a crucial one since it goes to the core of Hezbollah's ability to challenge Israel. With sufficient mines and anti-tank weapons, Hezbollah can slow, and effectively oppose, Israel's advance.
Mines can be fashioned and shaped with fairly rudimentary resources, such as the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) employed successfully against IDF tanks in the Palestinian territories. Israel undoubtedly could blast its way through all of southern Lebanon, clearing mine after mine. But mine clearing could severely hinder Israel's advance, and speed is one of the cornerstones of Israeli doctrine.
Hezbollah has carefully watched and learned from insurgent activity in Iraq. Such asymmetrical fourth-generation warfare is exactly what Israel hopes to avoid, and exactly what Hezbollah seeks to incite. Iraq has demonstrated that mines and IEDs can be employed to maximum effectiveness in this kind of warfare. And if Israel is drawn back into another long occupation of southern Lebanon -- an occupation Israelis remember as their Vietnam -- then Hezbollah will have won.
Anti-tank guided missiles, on the other hand, offer Hezbollah the ability to actively engage Israel. They allow Hezbollah to assault sizable units and force the Israelis to dismount in order to protect their armor with infantry. While the IDF has the reputation for technology, more information is still needed on Hezbollah's ability to employ state-of-the art anti-tank guided missiles against the Merkava Mark IV, one of the most modern and capable battle tanks in the world.
Jul 24, 2006
Summary
Any Israeli advance into Lebanon will involve the Merkava tank. Whether Hezbollah can slow this advance will depend upon the effectiveness of its land mines and anti-tank missiles.
Analysis
Any Israeli advance into Lebanon will involve the Merkava tank. Whether Hezbollah can slow this advance will depend upon the effectiveness of its land mines and anti-tank missiles.
An Israeli Merkava Mark II tank struck a land mine about 77 yards north of the Israeli-Lebanese border July 12, almost completely destroying the tank. The mine is thought to have contained about 440 to 660 pounds of explosives, and would almost certainly have been shaped to achieve that effect given the amount of explosives used. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sources said even with improved protection, the blast still would have killed the tank's crew.
Nevertheless, the IDF reportedly began attaching steel plates to the underbellies of its Merkava tanks July 23 at an improvised maintenance station north of Avivim. (The underbelly, rear and top are the most vulnerable points in tank armor.) Named for the Hebrew word for chariot, the Merkava was designed from the ground up after the 1967 war, with crew survival as the highest priority, since a well-trained tank crew is far more valuable than a tank.
Initial operational capability came in 1979, and the original Merkava first saw action in southern Lebanon in 1982. The Merkava Mark II is an update of the original design. The Merkava Mark III and Merkava Mark IV represent substantial improvements over the Merkava Mark II, with the latest model among the most modern and capable tanks in the world. It is also the heaviest, outweighing even the heaviest M1A2 Abrams by several tons and employing a special modular, layered armor that can be changed in the field.
Scattered reports maintain Hezbollah has successfully engaged IDF tanks. A Merkava hit an explosive device in Bent Jbail on June 24, killing a battalion commander and one crew member. Within a few hours, an anti-tank missile struck another tank; no damage or casualties have been reported in this incident. Merkava Mark IVs are part of the current operations in Maroun al-Ras and Bent Jbail. That neither tank was entirely destroyed may indicate the Mark IV can withstand Hezbollah's capabilities.
Hezbollah almost certainly deploys the AT-3 Sagger -- a 60s-era anti-tank missile --which would not give a modern Merkava Mark IV any trouble. Reports also suggest Hezbollah possesses second-generation European MILAN and U.S. TOW and the third-generation Russian Kornet anti-tank guided missiles. The Kornet may have played a role in disabling U.S. M1A1 Abrams tanks in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and would give Hezbollah an anti-tank capability on par with most modern militaries.
In the IDF's first push into Maroun al-Ras on July 20, one of the lead tanks was reportedly penetrated by an unspecified anti-tank rocket fired at the rear quarter of the tank, but was able to retreat. The attack did not destroy the tank -- speaking to the survivability of the Merkava -- but successfully held up the engagement, as the Israelis pulled back to evacuate their wounded. A second tank was reportedly disabled.
This question of capability is a crucial one since it goes to the core of Hezbollah's ability to challenge Israel. With sufficient mines and anti-tank weapons, Hezbollah can slow, and effectively oppose, Israel's advance.
Mines can be fashioned and shaped with fairly rudimentary resources, such as the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) employed successfully against IDF tanks in the Palestinian territories. Israel undoubtedly could blast its way through all of southern Lebanon, clearing mine after mine. But mine clearing could severely hinder Israel's advance, and speed is one of the cornerstones of Israeli doctrine.
Hezbollah has carefully watched and learned from insurgent activity in Iraq. Such asymmetrical fourth-generation warfare is exactly what Israel hopes to avoid, and exactly what Hezbollah seeks to incite. Iraq has demonstrated that mines and IEDs can be employed to maximum effectiveness in this kind of warfare. And if Israel is drawn back into another long occupation of southern Lebanon -- an occupation Israelis remember as their Vietnam -- then Hezbollah will have won.
Anti-tank guided missiles, on the other hand, offer Hezbollah the ability to actively engage Israel. They allow Hezbollah to assault sizable units and force the Israelis to dismount in order to protect their armor with infantry. While the IDF has the reputation for technology, more information is still needed on Hezbollah's ability to employ state-of-the art anti-tank guided missiles against the Merkava Mark IV, one of the most modern and capable battle tanks in the world.
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Würger 190G
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Würger 190G
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Müstika, mul vist nii loll ja vana arvuti.
Viimati muutis Würger 190G, 25 Juul, 2006 12:07, muudetud 3 korda kokku.
http://www.botinok.co.il/spaw/images/Me ... (web).jpeg
kopeeri ise lõpuni!
kopeeri ise lõpuni!
[i]Last thing I remember, I was Running for the door
I had to find the passage back To the place I was before
"Relax", said the night man, "We are programmed to receive.
You can check-out any time you like, But you can never leave!"[/i]
I had to find the passage back To the place I was before
"Relax", said the night man, "We are programmed to receive.
You can check-out any time you like, But you can never leave!"[/i]
Würger190G. Esimese artikli allikas - http://www.stratfor.com
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Würger 190G
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Kapten Trumm
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Tundub, et järjekordne "Hezbollah Uurimise Sõltumatu Teaduslik Instituut" on paari õhkulastud tanki pärast asunud vaat et tankivägede rolli muutvaid järeldusi tegema 
Tegelikult tuleks siia juurde lisada, et ilmselt on juutide kaotused tankide katkiminekust tehniliste rikete või kobade juhtide pärast tükkmaad suuremad kui mõned üksikud õnnestunud "õhkimised".
Järeldusi tuleks ikka teha siis, kui "tibud loetud". Siis kirjutage kõrvuti, palju Saggereid välja lasti, palju tanke puruks lasti, palju lõhkeainet kulus ja palju kummalgi poolel surma sai. Ei imestaks, kui statistika on 5 tanki, 120 raketti, 15 tonni lõhkeainet, 15 tankisti ja 400 sissi.
Ja siis teha järeldusi.
Tegelikult tuleks siia juurde lisada, et ilmselt on juutide kaotused tankide katkiminekust tehniliste rikete või kobade juhtide pärast tükkmaad suuremad kui mõned üksikud õnnestunud "õhkimised".
Järeldusi tuleks ikka teha siis, kui "tibud loetud". Siis kirjutage kõrvuti, palju Saggereid välja lasti, palju tanke puruks lasti, palju lõhkeainet kulus ja palju kummalgi poolel surma sai. Ei imestaks, kui statistika on 5 tanki, 120 raketti, 15 tonni lõhkeainet, 15 tankisti ja 400 sissi.
Ja siis teha järeldusi.
Et kohe mitte statistikasse sukelduda, siis lisaks pommi- ja tankijutule natuke suurmast pildist ka http://www.defensetech.org/ saidilt lugu "Inside Israel, Hez Ground War Strategies"
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