Ju siis läksid / anti armeele.... vabatahtlikud on olnud algusest peale vaeslapse osas. Ju siis oli neid liiga vähe.tasa kirjutas:Ukraina äsja ostis omale Barrett M82A3 püsse? Kuhu need siis nüüd järsku kadusid või palju neid üldse osteti? Ukraina toodab ise ka snaiprirelvi nt. TS.338. Kas neist ei piisa?
See twitteri konto omanik on Anna Knishenko, kes on RT (Russia Today) ajakirjanik. Sellega on kõik öeldud. Ukraina presidendi valmiste ajal 2014a. kevadel saadeti see Knishenko ja temaga kaasas olnud teised RT tegelased Kiievi lennujaamas piirilt tagasi (nn. mustas nimekirjas). Erapooletuid ajakirjanikke on Venemaal kahjuks väga vähe hetkel.võhik kirjutas: ...
Väidetavalt bojevikud Debaltsevo teel nii edenenud, et saavad lubada U. hukkunuid omadel üles korjata. Mingid pildid twitteris sellest - igatahes üks U. soomuk on kuskil teel tõesti.
https://twitter.com/A_Knishenko_RT
Hetkel - selles twiidis näeme esmalt Uglegorski hävingupilte, siis see teelõik?
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Teatan tagasihoidlikult, et olen ettevõtja ühe mehe firmas ja just sain tähtajalise tellimuse.HeiniR kirjutas:Fucs, Svejk ja teised seltsimehed, ega Te ometi peale pikka "reisi" ära pole väsinud?
Kamraadid ootavad uudiseid, täna elaks nagu infosulus...
Kommenteerin teemat veel niipalju, et automaatne halgude tulle loopimine pole mõtekas, kui enne seda saab veel tingida ehk ähvardada - see on ju tasuta.Siga kirjutas:Võtaks neid poliitikute väljaütlemisi pisut tõsisemalt. Ameerika teatas võimalikust relvaabist tasandil, mis ei jäta kahtlustki selles, et põhimõtteline otsus kui selline on olemas. Selline figuur poliitmaastikul, nagu seda on Kerry, kinnitas relvastuse tarnimise võimalikkust vahetult enne Putiniga kohtumist ja mitte lihtsalt enne, vaid Ukrainas. Ka järjekord: Esmalt visiit Ukrainasse ja alles sealt Moskvasse, on kõnekas. Eelistusi on näidatud.
Seega anti Puutjale selgelt mõista, et kui ei tule kasvõi kompromisse, tulevad relvad.
Seda olukorras, kus Ukraina armee on Putjale selgeks teinud, et ilma kolossaalsete kaotusteta edasi vandid ei liigu. Mättaalused on vatte täis ja kola põleb sellistes kogustes, mis peaks Puutja pisut mõtlikuks tegema küll. USA relvad on võimekamad ja taustsüsteemid kindlalt parimad võimalikest. See tähendaks Putja jaoks armeekontingendi olulist suurendamist ainuüksi paigalseismiseks.
Putjal, ütleme ausalt, ei ole selleks varsti enam pappi.
Euroopa relvi ei lubanud, samas pole keeldutud muust abist laial skaalal, lisaks kamaluga uusi sanktsioone poliitiliste tippude liigse innukuse kustutamiseks. See kaart käidi lauale samuti enne homset kokkusaamist ja samuti väga tõsiseltvõetaval tasandil.
NATO ja EL, muide, pole teatanud, et ei abista USA-d trantspordi või muude vahenditega või ei luba kasutada oma territooriumi või logistikat. Kui läheb kola tassimiseks, siis ei tooda mitte kõike üle suure lombi ja küllap siis on näha ka muid lennukeid lendamas kui triibutähelisi.
Eks näis, homme arutatakse tähtsaid asju ja mulle tundub, et piisava survega.
Enamuses VF i kodanikest koosnev, aga ka Krimmist pärit ajateenijaid sisaldav spetsväljaõppega diversantide rühm paisati Debaltsevo alla.Под Дебальцево перебросили спецотряд боевиков, большинство которого составляют граждане России, а также военные РФ из оккупированного Крыма.
Oтряд спецназначения численностью до 70 человек был переброшен со стороны Алчевска в район Чернухино-Новогригорьевки. "Около 80% личного состава данного подразделения - граждане РФ (все - бывшие военнослужащие подразделений спецназа ГРУ и участники боевых действий), идентифицированы также военнослужащие РФ из оккупированного Крыма" Задание "отряда", подчеркивает эксперт, - проведение силами отдельных диверсионно-разведывательных групп диверсий в тылу украинских войск.
Esiteks. Pigem on vaja sõda Putini jaoks vaja teha just intensiivselt kalliks, et tal raha otsa saaks. Raha Läänel on ja seda on Ukrainale kerge anda ja juba antakse. Sõda tuleb teha kalliks, kuni nafta veel odav on. Sõdur ei maksa Venemaale midagi, kerge peita, kerge juurde leida. Vaja on hävitada tehnika ja pidurdada juurdevedu.Svejk kirjutas:Vene on näidanud, et igale U edusammule vastab ta omapoolse juurdekeeramisega - nii ka läänest tulev relvaabi tõenäoliselt puhub lihtsalt lõkke suuremaks. Poliitiline lahendus tuleb, kui Putinil on vesi kremli korstnas, ehk papp päriselt otsas jne. Sinnamaani on vaja võimalikult odavalt välja venitada.
Mulle endiselt meeldib kohutavalt naši liikumise alusel tekkinud nimetus našistid. Esiteks selle sõna kõlalise sarnasuse pärast üht teist sarnast ideoloogiat kandva sarnase liikumisega, mis maailmas sõja valla päästis. Teiseks selle pärast, et see iseloomustab väga hästi seda "meie - nemad" veelahet, mis nende tegelaste peades on.Andre170 kirjutas:...Sama moodi oleks Ida-Ukrainas sõdimas "russistid" ehk Venemaa "rahvuslike huvide" eest võitlejad...
What Germany Owes Ukraine
On Ukraine, Angela Merkel enjoys a reputation as Europe’s Iron Lady. Here’s why it’s unearned.
By James Kirchick
February 5, 2015
What Germany Owes Ukraine
In a state visit to Hungary on Tuesday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated what has become her mantra ever since Russian tanks, men, and materiel began pouring over the border into Ukraine last spring. “I am convinced that this conflict cannot be solved militarily,” the Queen of Europe, now entering her 10th year as the most powerful leader on the continent, said.
If only Vladimir Putin agreed.
Almost immediately following its stealth invasion of Crimea and subsequent illegal annexation of the peninsula last march, Russia began supplying arms and tactical support to rebels in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Soon thereafter, Russian soldiers themselves joined the fight. Official Russian claims to the contrary, the steady trickle of body bags back to Mother Russia over the past year has attested to the presence of Russian forces fighting (and dying) in Ukraine. In the past two weeks, pro-Russian rebels, emboldened by the support they have received from regular Russian military forces, have killed dozens of Ukrainian civilians, including children, by firing shells indiscriminately into non-combatant areas like transit stops.
Putin’s strategy is clear. He intends to punish Ukraine for ousting its pro-Russian leader, Viktor Yanukovych, and for having the gall to seek a western political orientation. And he intends to do so by rendering it a failed state. A semi-permanent condition of low-intensity armed conflict in the East serves that function. To secure his grip on Crimea, Putin also seeks to establish a land bridge connecting it to the Russian mainland, which explains the increased military activity around Donetsk and Mariupol in recent weeks.
Putin seems to have no misgivings about using military means to achieve his goals.
Putin seems to have no misgivings about using military means to achieve his goals. Which is why, according to the Ukrainian government, there are currently some 15,000 Russian soldiers on Ukrainian territory and an untold higher number amassed at the border, ready to be deployed at a moment’s notice. A cease-fire agreement signed in Minsk last fall — in which Merkel and other European diplomats naively invested much hope — is no longer worth the paper it was written on, if it ever was.
Much has been said about how fortunate Europe is to have Merkel dealing with Putin at such a sensitive moment, given her East German upbringing, fluent Russian, and appreciation for cold, hard data instilled via a scientific education. A recent laudatory profile in the New Yorker by George Packer praised her “characteristically unsentimental view of Russia.” On the face of it, her tough posture has stood in stark contrast to the emotional attitudes held by so many of her countrymen, especially past Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Helmut Schmidt, who have bent over backwards to make excuses for Putin. And yet, despite Merkel’s Teutonic stoicism, her position on Russia is anything but firm.
Mindful of her role as leader of the country that twice plunged Europe into war in the last century, Merkel has, from the very start of the Ukraine crisis, repeatedly advised NATO against providing military support to Kiev. “Military action isn’t an option for us,” she declared last March, days before Putin formally annexed Crimea, a line that she has recited at nearly every opportunity. So much for the principle of strategic ambiguity.
Not only has Merkel opposed NATO supplying weapons to Ukraine, she has also gone so far as to oppose the stationing of NATO forces further east on the territory of the alliance’s newer members so as to reassure them in the face of the new Russian aggression. To justify this stance, she has formulated a dubious interpretation of a clause in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, which stated that NATO would not station “permanent” forces in the new member countries in the “current and foreseeable security environment.” Calls today by Poland and the Baltic states for NATO troops to be deployed on their territory need not violate this provision, however, as they would not necessarily be “permanent.” Moreover, the Founding Act itself has been effectively nullified by the actions of Russia and Russia alone, which has perpetrated an Anschluss. Yet Merkel leads a bevy of other hesitant European statesmen in clinging to its outdated provisions, echoing positions favorable to the Kremlin.
Merkel’s leadership style hinges upon a deft reading of public opinion, followed by a gentle guiding from the front. This rule-by-consensus approach is what has kept her in power for the past decade. As the broad majority of Germans has always opposed sending any military support to Ukraine, there is little reason to believe that Merkel would ever risk standing athwart this popular accord. In the first place, Russia’s propaganda machine has done its work. The German public has been especially susceptible to Russian claims that the new government in Kiev is replete with “Nazis,” as Germans are ever sensitive to claims of nascent fascism on the European continent. Secondly, calls to get tough on Russia are often viewed as explicitly American machinations, something many Germans are allergic to in an era when they regard the U.S.-Germany alliance with growing skepticism. (Danke, Edward Snowden.)
But most immediately, Germans’ hesitation to confront Russia is rooted in their confused understanding of their country’s wartime history.
Germans’ hesitation to confront Russia is rooted in their confused understanding of their country’s wartime history. Seventy years after World War II, German political discussion of Russia continues to be plagued by a misplaced sense of guilt toward Moscow. This sympathy for Russia is so wide and so deep that the epithet Russland-Versteher, or “Russia understander,” entered the political lexicon last year. Many German political leaders have difficulty separating the historic atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht and SS against Soviet troops and citizens with the atrocities being visited upon Ukrainians by Russians this very day. So, when, for instance, last year German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble very reasonably compared Putin to Adolf Hitler — on the basis that both men forcibly seized whole chunks of other countries’ territories based solely upon the utterly illegitimate predicate of ethnic comradeship — he was set upon by all sectors of German media and politics as an uncouth barbarian trampling upon Germany’s sacred debt to honor its wartime history. Their number included no less a figure than the Chancellor herself, who described Crimea as “a standalone case.”
Simply put, most Germans, already averse to violence in the first place, cannot countenance the idea of German weapons being used to kill Russians. It doesn’t matter if those weapons are being used purely in self-defense to protect Ukrainians, who would otherwise perish in the Russian onslaught. More important to the collective German conscience is its own moral immaculacy. It’s an understandable historical hang-up, but a deeply erroneous one. For in ascribing permanent victimhood status to Putin’s Russian Federation, the Germans not only absolve the Russian leader of responsibility for his actions — they commit a grave historical error by conflating the former Soviet Union with contemporary Russia.
“The vast majority of Ukrainians who fought in [World War II] did so in the uniform of the Red Army,” writes historian Timothy Snyder. “More Ukrainians were killed fighting the Wehrmacht than American, British, and French soldiers — combined.” By swallowing Russian propaganda about Ukrainian nationalists who fought on the side of the Nazis against the Soviets, Germans forget that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians who fought in World War II did so on the side of the Soviets and died at the hands of Germans. If war guilt is to be a major determinative factor in the formation of 21st-century German foreign policy (and it appears that it will), then Germans owe Ukrainians at least as much, if not more, than whatever they may owe Russians: after all, their grandfathers killed plenty of both. Ultimately, what Germany owes both countries in equal measure is an honest accounting of history. It is the very least that Germany, which has produced some of the best historians of World War II, can do.
An honest accounting of history, then, would show that Ukraine was a victim both of German and Soviet predations, and is today being set upon by a rapacious, authoritarian Russia. In words, at least, Merkel seems to understand this. “What Russia is visiting upon Ukraine is a violation of our European system of peace and security,” she said Tuesday in Budapest, stating that Moscow’s actions signify “the old pattern of thought that neighboring states are spheres of influence, and not partners.” It is just that she seems unwilling to match her words with deeds.
Today, Germans proudly see themselves as staunch advocates for liberal democratic values — the sharpest repudiation possible of their own dark past. In Budapest earlier this week, Merkel criticized Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, whose right-wing populist government has repeatedly come under fire from the European Union and human rights watchdogs for weakening checks and balances and for whitewashing the country’s World War II collaboration with the Nazis. But during the same visit, she repeated her position against arming Ukraine. Hungary, however, is not where the continent’s most desperate battles in defense of a struggling new democracy are being waged. It’s all well and good for Merkel to speak out for democracy with words and bureaucratic instruments. But in neighboring Ukraine, where the state’s very existence hangs in the balance, the battle for democracy must be waged with bullets.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/05/wha ... s-ukraine/
Vuglegirskis on vaid kolm positsiooni, kus venelased on mõnuga langenud ukrainlasi näidanud: a) blokkpost enne linna (seal oli 3 langenut ja 2 vangi); b) linnas olev eramaja hoov (3 suurtükitules langenut); ja c) üks langenu linna keskväljakul istumas seina ääres.kupiseeru kirjutas:võhik kirjutas: ...
Samast kohast on vändatuid kaadreid nii lumega kui ka ilma lumeta, millest võib järeldada, et need laibad vedelesid seal pikka aega enne kui nad ära viidi. Et kõik mardikad ja huilo ajakirjanikud saaksid endale nii öelda "head materjali" koguda. Muud polnud vist ette näidata.
Ukraina olukorra üks lahendusi oleks Venemaale tähtsama probleemi tekitamine.Jaanus2 kirjutas:... Ajaloo parimad võimalused on selleks, aga neid ei kasutata. ...
Ma ei väida, et see ei ole õige (ma ei tea), aga minu arvates on see liiga kitsas viis asja vaadata. Moskaalide jaoks oleks Ukraina ülioluline ka ilma tuumatehnoloogiata (vt. signatuuri).Siga kirjutas:Ma vaatan asja selles kontekstis, kus üks tuumariik aitab relvastusega suure tuumavõimekusega riiki sõdimaks teise tuumariigi vastu.
Ukraina tuumavõimekus ei ole kuhugi kadunud. On know-how, vastava kvalifitsiooniga insenerid ja tootmisbaas.
Ei maksa unustada, et Venemaa olulisimaks Ukraina külge klammerdumise põhjuseks on asjaolu, et vene tuumavõimekus sõltub Ukraina insener-tehnilisest baasist ja spetsialiseerunud tootmisvõimekusest, lisaks veel teadmine, et rohkem, kui kolmandik vene kasutuses olevatest võimsustest olid kuni viimase ajani Ukraina hooldada. Tehnikud ja pulgad selleks tulid Ukrainast.
Kasutajad foorumit lugemas: Registreeritud kasutajaid pole ja 1 külaline
