Noppeid artiklist:
Today, Lebanon and Jordan are the two Arab countries hosting the largest number of these refugees, with around 1.1 million Syrians and 8,000 Iraqis registered with the United Nations (UN) in Lebanon and 629,000 Syrians and 30,800 Iraqis registered in Jordan as of July 2015.
Juuli seisuga oli Liibanonis 1,1 M Süüria ning 8000 Iraagi põgenikku ja Jordaanias 629 000 Süüria ja 38 000 Iraagi põgenikku.
Meenutagem jälle, et Saksamaale on praeguseks jõudnud suurusjärgus
800 000 põgenikku, neist umbes pool Lähis-Idast.
UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) require $4.53 billion to carry out a regional response plan to the crisis in Syria for 2015–2016. Yet only $1.83 billion—41 percent—had been secured as of the end of September 2015. In Iraq, only 37 percent of the $2.23 billion requested for 2014–2015 had been funded by February 2015.5 In June, the UN issued a new humanitarian appeal for $497 million to address the urgent needs of 5.6 million vulnerable Iraqis.
ÜRO sõjapõgenike abistamise plaani täitmiseks oleks vaja 4,53 miljardit dollarit, septembriks 2015 oli aga kätte saadud ainult 1,83 miljardit.
In 2013, the World Bank estimated that the refugee crisis would cost Lebanon $2.6 billion—$1.5 billion in lost revenue and $1.1 billion in providing public services. It also suggested that an additional $2.5 billion would be required for stabilization, that is, to reinstate the access to and quality of public services to their pre-Syrian-conflict level. Meanwhile, Jordan’s Economic and Social Council estimates that the Syrian crisis has cost the country $1.2 billion, with the total estimated to rise to $4.2 billion by 2016.
Maailmapank hindas 2013, et põgenikekriis maksab Liibanonile 3,1 miljardit dollarit, Jordaania hindab oma kulu 4,2 miljardile 2016. aastaks.
Meenutagem jälle, et Saksamaa kavatseb kulutada enda territooriumile jõudnud põgenike integreerimiseks
aastas 11 miljardit eurot.
Süürias ja Iraagis on üle kümne miljoni inimese muutunud sisepõgenikeks ning getostuvad uutes elukohtades:
In Syria, the shifting nature and borders of the ongoing conflict and a surrender-or-starve policy of the regime and other parties to the conflict70—that includes using barrel bombs and chemical weapons and besieging entire areas to prevent the entry of food, medicine, and other essentials—have driven 7.6 million individuals from their homes. As of June 2015, the conflict in Iraq had driven 3.1 million Iraqis to seek shelter elsewhere. [...] Reports indicate that due to the increasing transportation costs through conflict zones, the more destitute Syrians tend to move into informal settlements rather than official camps constructed in the north of the country or along the Turkish border. By August 2014, estimates indicated that 172,000 Syrians had moved to informal settlements in northern Syria, as well as in Lebanon and Jordan.73 In Iraq, most of those displaced by the Islamic State have moved to camps in the north of the country.
Liibanonil on valus kogemus põlistunud Palestiina põhenikelaagritega ja seetõttu keeldub valitsus kategooriliselt asutamast põgenikelaagreid Süüria põgenike jaoks:
This concern with sectarian balance intersects in complex ways with Lebanon’s experience with the protracted Palestinian refugee crisis. Eight decades after their arrival in Lebanon as a short-term measure awaiting a political solution, Palestinians continue to reside in twelve refugee camps across the country. With the exception of middle-class Christian families, the Lebanese state has denied most Palestinian refugees (mainly Sunni Muslims) citizenship rights for fear of altering the country’s sectarian balance. Moreover, despite radical differences in context and circumstances, many Lebanese recalled with alarm the previous military involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the country. It used southern Lebanon as an operational launching pad for military attacks on Israel in the 1970s and subsequently acted as a trigger, and then as an active participant, in the Lebanese civil war from 1975 to 1982.
Perhaps the most palpable expression of this overlap between national anxieties and refugee policy lies in the debates that took place around the construction of refugee camps for fleeing Syrians. The Lebanese government has categorically refused to build such camps, despite repeated advice from international organizations. Concerns focused mainly on the idea that the construction of camps would be tantamount to acknowledging the potential permanence of the Syrian populations, as happened with the Palestinians.
Osa Liibanoni territooriumist kontrolliv Hizbolla välistab samuti Süüria põgenike laagrid enda alal, sest esiteks on Hizbolla sunni põgenike suhtes teisel pool tindejoont ja teiseks pelgab samuti demograafilise tasakaalu muutumist:
With the escalation of conflict and the expanding military participation of Hezbollah, the Shia political party aligned with Iran, in the Syrian war in support of the regime, resistance to the construction of these camps took on an additional military and sectarian tint. In short, Hezbollah focused its public position on the undesirability of having such camps within its geographic areas of influence. When the UN announced plans to build a dozen refugee camps across the country, Hezbollah’s deputy leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, objected: “We cannot accept refugee camps for Syrians in Lebanon because any camp will become a military pocket that will be used as a launch pad against Syria and then against Lebanon.”39 However, it is likely that Hezbollah was equally concerned that this mainly Sunni population would further tip the demographic balance in the country away from its hegemony.
Jordaania andis suurele osale 1967. aasta Palestiina põgenikest kodakondsuse ning on enda identiteedi ehitanud Jordani jõe idakalda ümber. Süüria põgenike vool aga tekitab reaalse mure, et selles tähenduses jordaanlased võivad saada vähemuseks omal maal:
The issue of national origin has shaped Jordan’s perspective on the refugee crisis. Established in the post–World War I era under the British Mandate, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, unlike Lebanon, granted full citizenship to the majority of Palestinians who fled to the country following the establishment of Israel in 1948 and again after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In light of these circumstances, the monarchy has built its legitimacy around East Jordanian national identity. However, the arrival of large numbers of Syrian refugees, after a major influx of Iraqi refugees, threatens to tilt the demographic balance away from East Jordanians even further. This has prompted increased concerns among East Bankers that they “will become minorities and guests in [their] own nation,” according to a former member of Jordan’s parliament.
Ei Jordaania ega Liibanon ole ühinenud kahe rahvusvahelise põgenikeõiguse alusdokumendiga: 1951. aasta konventsiooni ega selle 1967. aasta lisaprotokolliga. Viimane kaotas konventsiooni rakendamisel geograafilised ja ajalised piirid, mis algselt lähtusid II ms järgsest Euroopast. Kõige olulisem põhimõte neis on, et põgenikke ei saadeta jõuga välja, kui see nende elu ohtu seab. Selle asemel käsitletakse rändureid mitte põgenike, vaid külalistena, kes ei jää püsivalt sihtriiki ja keda ei pea ühiskonda integreerima. See tähendab, et piiratakse kõike, mis viib jätkusuutlikkusele: ligipääsu tööturule, haridusele, tervishoiule ja üldse igasugusele lõimumisele:
Neither Lebanon nor Jordan has ratified the two international conventions for dealing with refugees: the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol. The convention defined refugee status and identified the legal obligations of the host state toward refugees, including guaranteeing their rights to freedom of movement, protection, justice, and work. The protocol removed the geographic and temporal boundaries included in the convention, a post-WWII instrument that had limited its applicability to persons who had become refugees due to events in Europe and prior to January 1951. A basic pillar of both instruments is non-refoulement, or protection from being forcibly expelled and returned to a context where freedoms are threatened and lives endangered.
In place of this convention, the governments of Lebanon and Jordan consider fleeing populations as guests and not as refugees. This approach allows both governments to deny refugees a number of basic rights guaranteed by the convention, including the right to identification papers, the right to work, and the right to protection, and to reduce refugees’ well-being to the largesse of host countries and international agencies. The thinking behind this policy, as expressed repeatedly by different Jordanian and Lebanese political figures, is to ensure that displaced individuals are not integrated and do not settle in their area of refuge, and that new refugees are not encouraged to flee to either country. To do so, a Jordanian minister remarked, “You try to restrict their access to the labor market.” He continued, “You try to restrict their access to areas that could enhance sustainability. You provide the minimum education, health and food, but not anything further. You don’t want to enhance their engagement with the rest of the society.”
2013. aastal keerati kruvisid veelgi kinnipoole:
By 2013, and as the conflict grew more protracted and the capacities of both Lebanon and Jordan were stretched to the limit, their respective governments undertook a series of changes to their refugee policies. The principal policy changes created additional restrictions on the inflow of refugees, their residency conditions, and their access to the labor market. For example, the Lebanese government enacted laws that restrict entry to the country as well as potential employment opportunities for Syrian refugees. These included a new residency permit law, which requires refugees to pay an estimated $200 per person every six months for permits, placing already-impoverished refugees under undue duress.
Ligi 85% jordaanlastest arvab, et süürlasi ei tohiks maale lasta ning 65% sooviks, et nad suletaks põgenikelaagritesse. Sarnane on suhtumine Liibanonis. Mõlemas on põgenikud suundunud niigi kõige vaesematesse piirkondadesse:
For example, close to 85 percent of Jordanians believe that Syrians should not be allowed into the country, and 65 percent would like to see them confined to refugee camps. Equally vocal and negative voices are heard in Lebanon. Such negativity emerged from several interrelated factors.
The majority of Syrian refugees have wound up in the most impoverished areas of Lebanon and Jordan, which, in time, has generated competition between refugees and the poorest of Lebanese and Jordanians for scarce resources.
In Lebanon, the largest concentrations of refugees are mainly in Akkar, Hermel, the Beqaa Valley, and around the cities of Tripoli in the north and Tyre in the south; in urban poverty pockets such as Hay el-Sullum; or in existing informal settlements such as Shatila. Close to 85 percent of the refugees reside in areas where more than two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line of $2.40 per day.56 In Jordan, a similar pattern is apparent as three-quarters of refugees have settled in impoverished areas in the capital, Amman, as well as two other northern municipalities, Irbid and Mafraq, and where 40–50 percent of Jordan’s poor live.
80% kohalikke näevad abiorganisatsioonide tegevust ebaõiglasena enda suhtes, sest nemad ei saa mingit abi:
Finally, the initial focus of aid agencies on providing support to refugees while ignoring destitute host communities has also generated local resentment and aggravated the situation further. Indeed, almost 80 percent of Jordanians believe that international financial support for Syrians is unfair since they are also poor and are not receiving such support. Similar perceptions are evident in Lebanon as well.
Kuna Jordaania ja Liibanon on rahvusvaheliste standardite järgi keskmikud, ei saa nad taotleda ka vaeste riikide abipakette:
Meanwhile, since Lebanon and Jordan are both considered middle-income countries based on their gross national incomes, they are excluded from additional aid packages and concessional loans from international financial institutions. Such packages could have been used to finance development projects and support both countries in dealing with the economic and financial fallout from the crisis. “We are being penalized for achieving middle-income development,” the Jordanian minister of planning and international cooperation complained.
Nii võistlevad vaesemad kohalikud ja süürlased allakäigus:
The contiguity of destitute refugees and the poorest of Lebanese and Jordanians along with their competition for scarce resources is also expanding the underclass in both countries. In the words of Makram Malaeb, the former head of the Syrian crisis response for Lebanon’s Ministry of Social Affairs, “It is a race to the bottom between the poorest Syrians and the poorest Lebanese.”
Perhaps the clearest indicator of this expanding underclass is its impact on poverty and employment levels in both countries. A 2013 World Bank report indicated that the crisis might push 170,000 Lebanese into poverty. Meanwhile, one-third of Lebanese youth are now unemployed, a 50 percent increase since 2011. In Jordan, indications are that the incidence of poverty has also expanded among ordinary citizens as Syrian workers displace Jordanians in the informal sector.
For the refugees the situation is also dire. Those residing in Lebanon have limited access to livelihoods and are dependent on aid for survival. More than half are living in insecure conditions, while 75 percent are struggling to make ends meet.84 Approximately one-third lack the necessary legal documents to move freely. Many have managed to find work as laborers building high-end luxury apartments. With little legal or physical protection, they earn a minimum living and sleep in the basements of construction sites. Estimates suggest that Syrian laborers in Lebanon are earning significantly less than the minimum wage and that 92 percent are working informally without legal or social protection. Child labor is also publicly apparent on the streets of
the country.
Meanwhile, two-thirds of Syrian refugees in Jordan are living below the monthly poverty line of 68 Jordanian dinars ($97) per person, and one in six refugee households lives on less than $40 per person. Many must spend considerably more than what they earn just to meet basic needs and are having to deplete their savings or rely on social networks of families and friends. In addition, one in ten resides in informal housing considered precarious, and close to half (47 percent) of the refugees live in housing assessed as bad.89 A particularly adverse coping strategy is to pull children from school in order to find work that will generate income for the family.
Liibanonis käib päriskoolis 10% põgenike lastest, Jordaanias 65%:
In Lebanon, of the 300,000 Syrian refugee children of school age, only 30,000 are attending school and 88,000 are enrolled in informal education that is not recognized by the government or other entities. In Jordan, half the refugees are under the age of eighteen yet only 62 percent are attending school.
